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Aristotle's RHETORIC;

Or the True
GROUNDS and PRINCIPLES
OF
ORATORY;

SHEWING,
The *Right Art* of PLEADING
and SPEAKING in full Assemblies
and Courts of Judicature.

Made *English*
By the *Translators* of the *ART of THINKING.*

In Four Books.

LONDON,
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To the Honourable

Coll. *HENRY SYDNEY,*

AMBASSADOR Extraordinary

From His late

Sacred MAJESTY

TO THE

STATES of HOLLAND.

Honourable *Sir*,

THERE is not any of *Aristotle's* Writings wherein that Ancient Author ſeems to have been more Elaborate, then in his four Books of *Rhetoric*. And this the Famous Philoſopher does in ſome Meaſure acknowledeg in his laſt *Piece*, which is dedicated to *Alexander* the Great, and written

written in Obedience to his Commands. Which made him doubtleſs employ the choiceſt of his thoughts to gratifie ſo Excellent a Prince. Nor is it to be thought that *Ariſtotle* deem'd it a ſmall Honour to be ſo Illuſtriouſly Patroniz'd.

The Emulation of the *Engliſh Verſion* to approach as near as might be to the *Greek Original*, and to follow the Authors Example, emboldenʼd this Addreſs to your Honour. For they were not the Pedantic Rudiments of *Rhetoric*, which *Ariſtotle* offerʼd to one that had been his *Royal Pupil*, but the moſt ſubſtantial Part, which he therefore fits and appropriates to the Practical Management of Humane Life. As knowing the Potent Effects of Learned Eloquence in the Conduct of all Great Affairs, whether at the *Council Board*, or in the *Field*. What

What then was once thought worthy the acceptance of a Prince, ſeeks now for Harbour in your Honours Favour. For where ſhould Learning, when Important, ſeek for Patronage, but to a Perſon ſo well acquainted with Her, as your ſelf? The Greateſt Glory and the Greateſt Juſtice ſhe can do her ſelf, is to lay her humble offering at the Feet of Honour and Vertue. Accompliſhments, which you your ſelf ſo conſpicuouſly inherit by a long deſcent of Famous Anceſtry. Story, that near will dye, admires *Ireland* once govern'd with applauſe by Great and Prudent *Sidney*; no leſs Famous for the Overthrow of *Shane*, *Oneal* and all his Rebel Crew. Nor can Time deface the Memory of Sr. *Philip*, of whom *Thuanus*, *Juvenis virtute, ingenii ſolertia & eruditione præſtans*; nor of his Siſter the Counteſs of *Pembrook*, once the Ornament

ment of her Age. And if your Noble Father excell'd in Learning and Philoſophy, well may we ſay, your ſelf the Son of ſuch a Parent have rais'd your ſelf no leſs Conſpicuous Monuments of your Wiſdom and Prudence, both at home and abroad; while the Deep Affairs of late Negotiation and Treaty ſtill Crown'd your Tranſactions with eminent ſucceſs,

No wonder then that *Alexander* and *Ariſtotle* dubious what entertainment they may find in *Engliſh* Dreſs, make their Applications to your Honour, for a new Paſs-Port through the Common-wealth of Learning; ſince their Fate depends upon your Pleaſure.

For my own part, I was glad of the Opportunity, not knowing (though under ſome Relation to the Noble Blood of the *SYDNEYS*) how I might approach your

your Preſence in better Company, or that could better excuſe the Preſumption of

(*Honourable Sir*)

Your Honours moſt

obliged and Devoted

Servant,

H. C.

THE PREFACE TO THE READER

THE *Universality of Things is discern'd in Three places; In this same living* Fabrick *of* Heaven *and* Earth: *then again it shews it self in the Mind as in a Looking Glass; and lastly in* Oration *or* Speech, *which is a kind of* Image *representing the* Minds *of Men. For neither is there any thing in the World, nor in the Mind, which is the other World, or which can be conceiv'd by the Mind, about which* Oration *or* Sence *does not in some Measure or other exercise it self. Wonderful therefore is the Force and Prevalency of* Oratory, *to Transfer and delineate in the Lively Co-*

lours

lours of Words, as in a Picture, the whole Spectacle of Nature into the Mind and Senſes of him that hears thee, by which means the knowledge of things is as it were embody'd and transform'd into the Mind it ſelf, and all things are made one and incorporated with it. A Faculty which is both one and the ſame, and lyes in a narrow compaſs, which way ſoever it may be made uſe of. And therefore they do ill that load it with an Infinite Croud of Precepts. Since the whole force of it conſiſts in conceiving in the Mind, in expreſſing by Words, and in Conforming to the Auditory. The Knowledge of Human Cuſtoms, Civil Inſtitutions, of all Hiſtories, of the whole Series of Antiquity and of all things in Nature, flows from hence, as from a Copious Fountain. However there is no great difficulty in conceiving, provided we be watchful and attentively diligent to ſtore up in our Minds the Force and Moments of Human Tranſactions, and to obſerve carefully the Nature of things: Which is the True

Fountain

Fountain of Elocution. For all things imprint their forms and ſhapes in the Mind, and leave certain footſteps of themſelves behind, which are imprinted by Nature. Which he that takes notice of while they are before him, ſhall recall 'em the more eaſily to mind being paſt, and from thence ſhall be able to form to himſelf the Forms and Images of things as often as neceſſity requires. In expreſſion there is a great Proclivity or Proneneſs, if the Things be well conceiv'd, and imprinted, if the Mind of the Orator, which is the Spectator, Obſerver, Arbitrator and Judge of Things be furniſhed with good judgment. For the Tongue, the Lips and Countenance all move according to the Habit of the Mind. Therefore they miſtake, who believe Elocution to be the Force of Words, which is the Strength and Efficacy of the Mind. For which Reaſon, this is a ſhort Maxim, That He who will ſpeak according to the Habit of the Mind, muſt take care in the firſt place rightly to adorn and perfect his mind.

In

In conforming to the Auditory *there is more difficulty; and this is that which has produc'd ſuch an infinite number of* Precepts. *For we ſee the vaſt Variety of Times, of Places, Perſons, Cauſes and Moments of Things. Therefore ſeeing the Former require a kind of Civil and Boundleſs Exercitation; This is to be obtain'd from converſing with Men, and from the Cuſtoms of Nations, and to be learnt from our Infancy. Now whether* Cicero *has rightly comprehended theſe things, in thoſe few words* VVhat? VVherein? At what time? and how to be ſpoken? *the* Orator *is to take care.* Ariſtotle *does the ſame here, diſcourſing of the* Firſt, *in the firſt place, of* Conformity *in the next, and of* Expreſſion *in his* Third Book.

And now ſhould we go about to ſpeak in praiſe of the Author, as it is the Cuſtom *of moſt* Interpreters, *we might juſtly fear the ſame* Reproof *as was given to him that went abou to applaud* Hercules, *among*

the

the Lacedæmonians. *For who, cry'd they, is there among us that has the leaſt Evil Thought of* Hercules, *or that does not already reverence and adore him, as being aſcrib'd into the Number of the Immortal Gods? For ſuch is the High Eſteem of* Ariſtotle *in the World, and his Authority among Men, that it would be a vain thing to make any farther* Encomiums *upon his* Wit *and* Learning, *the Profoundneſs of his Knowledge, or his Diligence in explaining what he wrote; and whom therefore* Tully *alſo allows to be the* Prince *of all* Philoſophers.

Ariſtotle's

Aristotle's RHETORIC TO Theodectes.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

That Rhetoric and Logic treat of the same Subject. That they who treated of Rhetoric before, did not rightly understand it, and of the Benefit of Rhetoric.

RHetoric and Logic are near of kin the one to the other: For both treat of the same things, which are in a manner known by all Men, and belong to no certain Science. And therefore one way or other all Men participate of both; seeing that all People by some means or other endeavour to find out and maintain an Argument, or to impeach and defend; which

many do raſhly and without Experience, many through Exerciſe, and ſeveral naturally and habitually. Which being either way to be done, it is apparent that there is a way and method to be found out, to which the matter may be reduc'd when both attain their Ends, as well they who proceed according to the dictate of Nature, as they who ſearch into the cauſes and reaſons of what they do; which all will grant to be the Office of Art. Whoever therefore till this time have compos'd the Art of Eloquence, have found out but a ſmall part of it; for when only Art prevails to gain Credit and Belief by Perſwaſion, other things are only additional; they make no mention of Enthymemes, which are the Sinews of Perſwaſion, but make a great pudder about thoſe things which are little to the purpoſe. For Crimination, Compaſſion, Anger and thoſe other affections of the Mind are nothing to the buſineſs, but only ſerve to move the Judges. And therefore as it is the cuſtom in many Cities; eſpecially ſuch as are governed by good Laws, if the ſame were obſerv'd in Judgments, they would have nothing left for them to ſay. For ſo all People partly believe it ſhould be ordain'd by the Law; partly they retain the ſame Conſtitution, to ſpeak nothing from the purpoſe; as in the *Areopagus*, wherein they did well. For it is no way laudable to pervert a Judg by moving him to Anger, Envy or Pity. Which is no more then if a Man ſhould pretend to make uſe of a Rule, and bend it crooked. Beſides that whoever ſets up a Controverſy, has no more to do then to demonſtrate whether the thing is, or is not? whether it were or were not done? Now whether

whether the Act were great or of little Conſequence, whether juſt or unjuſt, whatever the Legiſlator has not diſtinguiſh'd, that the Judg ought to know, and not to learn from him that propounds the Controverſy. Therefore it is convenient that good and wholeſome Laws ſhould make a diſtinction of all thoſe things themſelves, and leave as few as poſſible to the opinion of the Judges. Firſt, becauſe it is more eaſy to find one, or but a few Prudent Perſons that are able to make good Laws, and give true Judgment then many: In the next place, Laws are made by ſuch as take long time to conſider. Judgments are ſuddenly pronounc'd, and therefore it is a difficult thing rightly to diſpence what is juſt and profitable. But this is the chiefeſt thing of all to be conſider'd, that the judgment of the Legiſlator does not confine it ſelf to Particulars and things Preſent, but dilates and extends to Univerſals, and things to come. But the Senator and the Judg determine of things definite and preſent. Whence it happens that their own affection, or hatred, or private advantage intervening, they make but a negligent enquiry into the Truth; while their Judgments are ſway'd by their own gain or loſs. So that as to other things, as already has been ſaid, the leaſt power of determining that may be is to be left to the Judg; but whether done or not done, whether it be or not be, will come to paſs or not, all this of neceſſity muſt be ſubmitted to his Determination; ſince it is impoſſible for a Law-giver to make ſufficient Proviſion in ſuch Caſes. Which being ſo, it is apparent that they teach thoſe things that are quite from the purpoſe, who treat of other things, as what the

Proeme, what the Narrative ought to contain, or any one of the other parts. For therein they teach us no more then how to diſpoſe the Mind of the Judg this way or that way. But as to artificial Perſwaſion they inform us nothing, that is, how a Perſon may become a good Argumentator. Seeing therefore there is the ſame Method to be us'd in popular Orations, as in Pleadings at the Bar, and that it is much more noble and of greater uſe to be a popular Orator, then a litigious brangler about Contracts and private Bargains, they do ill in being ſo ſilent as to the former, ſo voluminous as to the latter, believing it is of leſs concernment to be extravagant in popular Arguments, and leſs wile and ſubtilty in that then in Bar-Pleading, as being more common. For in the former the Judg determins of what in part concerns himſelf; ſo that there is no more requir'd then to demouſtrate the thing to be, as the Adviſer ſays. But in cauſes of *Meum* and *Tuum* that will not ſuffice where it is neceſſary to take the Ears of the Hearer; for the Judgment is to be of other Mens concerns: So that while they conſider their own profit, and hear with favour, they give themſelves up to the Pleader, but make no determination. Therefore in many places the Law forbids digreſſions from the Matter, and there the Judges exactly obſerve that Law. But in regard it is manifeſt that the artificial way relates and conſiſts in Perſwaſion, and that Perſwaſion is a kind of Demonſtration, (for then we chiefly believe a thing when we ſuppoſe it to be demonſtrated,) and for that Rhetorical Demonſtration is Argument; which if I may ſo ſay, is the moſt powerful way

of

of Perſwaſion; and for that Argument is a a certain Syllogiſm, and ſeeing all Syllogiſms are under the Conſideration of Logic, either in whole, or in part; it is manifeſt that he who can moſt readily find out of what, and how a Syllogiſm is Compos'd, will prove the ſharpeſt Argumentator, eſpecially Underſtanding in what things Enthymemes are of chiefeſt uſe, and how they differ from Logical Syllogiſms. For the ſame Conſideration will find out what is true, and what is like to Truth. For Men are ſufficiently inclin'd to Truth, and for the moſt part attain to the Truth. Wherefore he who attains eaſily to Probability by conjecture, takes the ſame courſe to find out the Truth. Why therefore others have been ſo nice about things which are nothing to the purpoſe, and why they have made judicial Pleading, the Subject of their Labour is apparent.

Now Rhetoric is therefore uſeful, becauſe that by Nature thoſe things that are juſt and true, are much better then their Contraries; and therefore if Judgments be not properly and conveniently made, there is a neceſſity of their failing, and being eaſily refuted; the conſequence of which is nothing but diſgrace and reproof. Beſides it is not an eaſy thing to perſwade ſome Men with all our talking, tho' we have never ſo exquiſite a Knowledg of the thing; (for the Speech of Inſtruction is that which proceeds from Knowledg) which being ſo difficult, if not Impoſſible, there is a neceſſity of procuring the Impreſſions of Belief and Reaſon from common things, as we have already ſaid in our Topicks concerning Haranguing to the unskillful Multitude. Nor is it amiſs to

be able to perſwade contraries, as in Syllogiſms, not that we ought to perſwade thoſe things that are evil, but that we may not be Ignorant how they ſtand in Competition with Truth, and when ſuch Arguments are unjuſtly made uſe of by others, that we may be able to refute 'em. Now of all the other Sciences none conclude contraries Syllogiſtically, except Rhetoric and Logic; for they both diſcourſe of Contraries; tho' 'tis not ſo with their Subjects; but always thoſe things which are naturally beſt and trueſt, are much more fit for Argument, and moſt proper to perſwade. Moreover it would be very abſurd that it ſhould be a diſgrace for the Body not to be able to help it ſelf, yet no ſhame for a Mans reaſon to be defective, which is of more uſe to Man then the defect of his Body. If it ſhould be objected that it might prove of very ill Conſequence for a Man to make a bad uſe of an effectual power of Reaſon, that certainly is no more then what is common to all things that are accounted good, unleſs Vertue it ſelf; but more eſpecially the Fate that attends thoſe things that are moſt beneficial to Mankind, as Strength, Health, Riches, and Command. For he that makes a juſt uſe of theſe things is commonly a great Benefactor; but he that abuſes thoſe advantages, oft-times becomes a public Peſt. Now then that Rhetoric is not under any certain and Determinate kind, but as Logic is, and equally uſeful, is apparent by what we have ſaid. For perſwaſion it ſelf is not its Duty, but to ſee what may be appoſitely made uſe of for convincement upon every Subject, as in all other Arts and Sciences; For it is not the Office of Phyſic to create Health; but

but as far as it is poſſible to reform an ill habit; for it is poſſible to Cure thoſe, that it is impoſſible to reſtore to a ſane Conſtitution. In like manner it is alſo the part of Rhetoric to conſider what is Perſwaſive and what is probably convincing, as of Logic to diſcern what is a Syllogiſm, and what a ſeeming Syllogiſm. For a cavilling Diſputant, is ſuch not in force of Argument, but in pre election. On the other ſide, one Man ſhall be a Rhetorician by vertue of his Knowledg, another by Election. But no Man ſhall be a good Logician by Pre-election, but by the force of his Arguments. Now therefore as to this ſame Method it ſelf, we ſhall endeavour to make out how and by what Principles we may attain to what we have propounded, beginning again with the definition of Rhetoric.

CHAP. II.

What Rhetoric is? what its Subject? how it relates to Logic? and of what Things Oration chiefly conſiſts?

LET Rhetoric therefore be a Power or Faculty, to conſider in every Subject what is therein contain'd proper to perſwade. For this is the Duty of no other Science. For particular Arts are both Doctrinal and Perſwaſive, as to what is their Subject; as Phyſic in reference to Health or Sickneſs; Geometry in reference to

Bodies and their Accidents, and Arithmetic in reference to Numbers, and ſo of the reſt of the Arts and Sciences. But Rhetoric makes it her Buſineſs to conſider the probability, or truth of the thing propounded whatever it be. And therefore we ſay it has not any proper and peculiar operation upon any peculiar *Genus*. Now of Proofs or Convincements, ſome are without Art, others Artificial. Thoſe I call done without Art, which we never ſtudy for; Artificial, thoſe that are invented by reaſon and Method; ſo that it behoves us of theſe two ſorts, to make uſe of the one and invent the other. Now of thoſe Proofs which Reaſon affords us there are three ſorts. Some in the Manners of the Speaker; ſome in the diſpoſition of the Hearer, ſome in the Oration it ſelf, by vertue of its Demonſtration or Probability of Demonſtration. Convincement by manners is when the Oration is ſo pronounc'd that the Orator may be thought a perſon worthy to be credited. For we believe the Vertuous more eaſily and ſooner, and barely in all things; but abſolutely in theſe things where there is not that Certainty, but a ſuſpence of Judgment, and difficulty of Determination, in regard of the various opinions of Men. However this ought to come to paſs, out of ſome reſpect gain'd by the delivery of the Oration, not out of Partiality, advancing the undeſerv'd Credit of any Perſon. For then like ſome Rhetoricians, they do not place the probity of the Speaker in his Skill, which they look upon as no way conducing to Convincement, but as if the chief Argument of perſwaſion lay in the vertue of an Orator.

Again the Auditors believe in reſpect of themſelves,

ſelves, when they find the Impulſe of ſome affection rais'd in their Minds. For we do not give the ſame Judgments, when we grieve as when we are glad; when we love as when we hate Concerning which things the Writers now adays pretend to give Inſtructions; of which Particulars we ſhall ſay more, when we come to diſcourſe of the affections.

Convincement by the Orations themſelves is when we demonſtrate what is true, or what appears to be ſo, by what is moſt proper to perſwade in every Particular. Seeing then that all Convincements ariſe from theſe things, it is apparent that all theſe three ought to be made uſe of, to the end we may obtain the faculty of Ratiocination, that we may be able to conſider the conditions and vertues which ought to give perfection to Men, and as to the affections, that we may underſtand what they are, their ſeveral ſorts, and whence and how they ariſe, and from all theſe to make Syllogiſtical concluſions. So that Rhetoric ſeems to be a kind of ſhute growing out of Logic, and the doctrine of Manners, and may therefore juſtly be ſaid to be Political. Wherefore alſo Rhetoric ſeems to Perſonate Politics; and they who challenge the knowledg of it, claim that knowledge partly through Ignorance, partly through arrogance, and partly upon other human Reaſons; for it is a kind of Particle and Similitude of Logic, as we have ſaid in the beginning. For neither of both is the Science of any thing determinate, but a certain faculty and ability to invent Arguments. Now as to their effective Power, and how they relate one to another, enough has been ſaid. But as to thoſe things

things which are ſaid, or appear to be demonſtrated, there is one way to do this by Induction, another by Syllogiſm, or by that which ſeems to be a Syllogiſm. For Example is Induction, and an Enthymeme a Syllogiſm: Now I call an *Enthymeme* a Rhetorical Syllogiſm, and Example a Rhetorical Induction; ſince all Men prove by Demonſtration, producing either Examples or *Enthymemes*, and little elſe beſide. So that if it be abſolutely neceſſary that he who makes uſe of a Syllogiſm or Induction, muſt demonſtrate ſome thing, or ſome Perſon; which is manifeſt from our diſcourſe of *Analitics*, by the ſame neceſſity muſt both thoſe be like to both theſe. Now what is the difference between Example and an *Enthymeme* is manifeſt from the *Topics*. For there we have formerly ſpoken of Syllogiſm and Induction. Since if by many and like Arguments we ſhew the thing to be ſo, in the firſt there is Induction, in the latter Example. But where ſome things being granted, there are ſome things elſe that for their ſakes happen to be not granted, in regard ſuch things are either altogether or for the moſt part, the one is call'd a Syllogiſm, the other an *Enthymeme*, and it is apparent that both are to be commended in Rhetoric. For what has been ſaid in the diſcourſe of Method, holds good in theſe things; for as ſome ſorts of Rhetoric are exemplary, others Enthymematical; ſo ſome Orators move by Examples, others by *Enthymemes*. Therefore Orations conſiſting of Examples are no leſs perſwaſive then others; but Enthymematical Orations more diſtract the judgment then the former. But we ſhall enquire afterwards into the cauſes of either, and how to make

make uſe of both; at preſent let us examine theſe very things a little more plainly and diſtinctly. Seeing then that Perſwaſion is perſwaſive to ſome Body; and this is immediately perſwaſive of it ſelf, the other becauſe it ſeems to be demonſtrated by ſuch Arguments; ſeeing alſo that no art inſpects into Singulars; as Phyſick does not conſider what is wholeſome for *Socrates*, or *Callias*, but what is for every one, which is the true deſign of Art; ſeeing moreover that Singulars are infinite, and not to be comprehended by knowledg; ſo neither is Rhetoric to conſider what will convince every particular perſon, as *Socrates*, or *Hippias*, but what will convince the Generality, as Logic alſo does. For Logic alſo makes uſe of Syllogiſm, not from whatever they ſee (for ſome things appear to Madmen;) but Logic raiſes her Syllogiſm from ſuch things as ſtand in need of reaſon; Rhetoric argues upon thoſe things that fall under Conſultation. For it is the duty of Rhetoric to diſcourſe of ſuch things about which we conſult, and have no Art to direct us, and among ſuch Auditors that cannot ſee through multitude of things, nor diſcourſe of things remote; but we diſcourſe of things that ſeem poſſible to be brought about one way or another. For as to ſuch things which it is impoſſible they ſhould be otherwiſe, either at preſent or for the Future, no Man conſults, at leaſt upon ſuch a Suppoſition, in regard there can be no conſultation concerning things that can not be otherwiſe. But we reaſon and draw our Collections either from what has been Collected by Syllogiſms before, or from things confus'd that want

want the contraction of Syllogiſm, becauſe they do not ſeem to be probable. Of which ſome are of that ſort as not eaſily to be underſtood by reaſon of their Prolixity, let the Judg be never ſo candid; and other things not convincing, as neither being taken for granted, nor look'd upon as probable. Wherefore there is a neceſſity to make uſe as well of *Enthymeme*, as Example, to prove things to be ſo, which may be otherwiſe; Example requiring Induction, and Enthymeme Syllogiſm, and that from but a few or fewer things, then the firſt Syllogiſm conſiſts of. For if there be any thing there which is perſpicuous, it is not to be mention'd; for the Auditor ſupplies that himſelf. As when a *Lacedæmonian* has been victor in ſuch a game wherein he won the garland, it ſuffices to ſay, he was a Victor at the Olympic Games; but to ſay that he was crown'd becauſe he won the Prize at the Olimpic Games is ſuperfluous, there being no Man who is ignorant of the Victors being Crown'd. But becauſe there are few neceſſary things from whence Rhetorical Syllogiſms are drawn, in regard that many things which fall under judgment and deliberation happen to be otherwiſe, ſince Men conſult and deliberate about what they have to do, not of neceſſity, but by choice; therefore common Accidents are collected from common Examples; neceſſary things are prov'd and perſwaded by neceſſary Conſequences. Whence it is apparent, that of thoſe things from whence Enthymemes are drawn, ſome are neceſſary, others ſuch as are ſo for the moſt part: For Enthymemes are deduc'd from Probables and Signs: So that of neceſſity, both of theſe muſt be the ſame to the other.

That

That being probable that for the moſt part and moſt uſually happensto be; not ſimply, as ſome would have it to be; but as being that, which in thoſe things that may be otherwiſe, has the ſame relation to Probable, as univerſal to particular. Of Signs there are ſome that have the ſame Relation one to another, as ſingular to Univerſal; others, as ſomething Univerſal to Particular. Of theſe ſome are neceſſary, which are call'd τεκμήρια; but ſuch, as not neceſſary, have no name according to this Diſtinction. I call thoſe neceſſary, out of which a Syllogiſm is Compos'd; which is therefore call'd an Argument. For when they believe there can be no contradiction of the thing Propounded, then they think they have brought a τεκμήριον, or Sign that the thing is Demonſtrated, Limited, and Determin'd. For *Tekmar*, and Term or Limit ſignify both the ſame thing in the antient Language. Now becauſe of theſe ſame *Signs*, ſome hold one to another as the ſingular to the Univerſal, as if we ſhould ſay 'tis a ſign that wiſe Men are juſt, becauſe that *Socrates* being a wiſe Man was juſt. This is a Sign; but ſuch a one as does not always hold good, tho' what was ſaid were Truth, for it cannot be Syllogiſtically concluded without a Contradiction. But this neceſſarily follows, ſuch a one is Sick becauſe he has a Fever. Such a one has had a Child, becauſe ſhe has Milk. Which is the only Argument by Signs, when the Sign alone is ſo true that it cannot be contradicted. The other ſort of Signs have the ſame relation one to another as the whole to the part. As if a Man ſhould ſay, 'tis a ſign he has a Fever; for he breathes ſhort, and yet this may be

contradicted.

contradicted, tho' it were true when ſo ſaid. For it happens that many who are not troubled with Feavers, breath ſhort. And thus far what is probable, what a ſign, what an argumentative or concluſive ſign, and how they differ one from another. We have alſo ſhewn that Example is Induction, and wherein Induction conſiſts. But Induction is neither as the whole to the part, nor the part to the whole, nor as the whole to the whole; but as the Part to the Part, and as the like to its like, as being both ſubject to the ſame Genus, tho' the one is more perſpicuous then the other. As for example, *Dionyſius* affected a Tyrannical Government, becauſe he requir'd a Guard. For *Piſiſtratus*, who affected the ſame before him, demanded a Guard, and when it was granted him he became a Tyrant. In like manner *Timagenes* of *Megara*; and whoever were known to have acted in that manner are examples to prove the Intention of *Dionyſius*; while the thing was in Conſultation whether to allow him a guard or no, and before they knew the reaſon why he demanded it. All which Examples fall under the ſame general *Whole*, that he who affects Tyrannical Government, firſt demands a Guard. And thus much to ſhew from whence ſeeming Demonſtrative Proofs may be drawn.

But there is a great difference between Enthymemes, and beſides there are very few that underſtand the method of Syllogiſms in Logic. For ſome are appropriated to the method of Rhetoric, as others to that of Logic; ſome appear in other Arts which are extant, others reſerv'd for other Arts not invented. Wherefore they lye hid from the Auditors, and they that meddle

meddle with 'em more then is fitting, wander from themſelves. All which a further Explanation will make more manifeſt. I ſay therefore that Logical and Rhetorical Syllogiſms are ſuch, to which we aſcribe their common places. Theſe are ſuch as are commonly reduc'd under the Heads of Juſtice, Philoſophy, Politics, and many other things ſpecifically different, as the Topics greater and leſſer; nor is there any reſtriction from arguing more upon one then another Subject or Topic, be it what it will, or never ſo ſpecifically different, and theſe are general Topics.

Particular Topics are ſuch as belong to every Genus and Species of Propoſition: as for Example, thoſe are Topics or Propoſitions belonging to natural Philoſophy, from whence no Enthymeme or Syllogiſm can be drawn that has any relation to Ethics, and others are Propoſitions proper to Ethics, that have no relation to natural Philoſophy; and ſo in all other arts and Sciences whatever. But theſe things will not give a Man to underſtand any one Genus, as not being fixt to any Subject. But he that can with moſt Judgment ſelect theſe Propoſitions, e're he is aware ſhall frame a Science diſtinct from Logic and Rhetoric. For if he happen upon Principles, it is neither Logic nor Rhetoric; but that Science whoſe Principles it contains. But moſt Enthymemes are drawn from thoſe Forms, which are particular and proper; fewer from thoſe which are common. And therefore the Genus's of Enthymemes are to be diſtinguiſh'd, as are alſo the places from whence they are taken. I call Forms the Propoſitions proper to every Genus. *Places*, ſuch as are alike common

mon to all. Now then concerning Forms. But first let us take along with us the Genus's of Rhetoric, that when we have distinguish'd how many they are, we may discourse apart of their Principles and Propositions.

CHAP. III.

Of the three kinds of Causes, and their Ends.

THE forms of Rhetoric are in number three; for so many sorts of Auditors there are that hear Orations. The Oration it self also consists of three things, the person that speaks, the matter discoursed of, and the Person to whom the address is made, in whom, that is to say the *Auditor*, the end is included; for the Auditor is either a Spectator or a Judg, the Judg is either a Judg of things past or to come. The Judg of future things is the Senator; the Judg of things past, is the determiner of Causes, the Judg of the force of the Oration is the Spectator. So that of necessity there must be three kinds of Rhetorical Ratiocinations or Discourses, Deliberative, or appertaining to the Council-Board, to the Bar, or Judicial, and Demonstrative. As to that which concerns the Council-Board, the one part of it is perswasive, the other diswasive. For always they who privately debate, or publickly harangue, intend one of these two things. Of the Judicial one part is the accusation, the other is the Defence. For they that are in Controversy

troverſy muſt do one of theſe two things, either complain or defend. Of the Demonſtrative, the one part is Praiſe, the other Diſgrace. Seaſons alſo are accommodated to every one of theſe. To the Privy-Counſellor the future, for he conſults about what is to come, either to procure or prevent. To the Judg of Controverſies the time paſt; for all ſuits relate to what has been done. To the Demonſtrative, the preſent time is moſt properly allow'd; for they approve or diſlike, as the Inſtant of Delivery. But they make uſe of things paſt and future to the ſame purpoſe, calling to mind things paſt, well or ill alledg'd, and conjecturing of future things whether well or ill judg'd by the Orator.

But in every one of theſe there is a different End. The end of the Counſellor is either good or bad; for he that perſwades, perſwades for the beſt; he that diſwades, diſwades from the worſt: to which he adds juſt and unjuſt, bravery, and ignominy.

The Judges of Controverſies propoſe alſo Juſtice or Injuſtice; but they that praiſe or diſlike, chiefly look upon honour or diſgrace; including alſo thoſe other Ends of *Good and Bad*, *Juſt and unjuſt*.

And the ſign that theſe are the Ends that every one of the three propoſe, is this; for that they never call the reſt in queſtion. As for Example, he that is ſued at Law, will alledge that he never did the thing, or that he did no harm in doing it; but will never confeſs that he did unjuſtly; otherwiſe there would be no need of Determination. In like manner they who conſult for the public, grant all the reſt; but that they adviſe what is

hurtful, and dehort from what is for the common good, they will never admit. But whether it is juſt to enſlave their Neighbours, and ſuch as do them no Injury, they never conſider. In the ſame manner they who praiſe or diſproove, never mind whether the Perſon has acted for the public good or not; but more often applaud him, becauſe he never minded his own Intereſt, that he might act like a good Common-wealths Man. For they commend *Achilles*, becauſe he undertook to aſſiſt his Friend *Patroclus*, tho' he were certain to dye himſelf, and that his friend ſhould live. For to him ſuch a death was more honourable; Life only beneficial.

From what has been ſaid, it appears therefore neceſſary to be furniſh'd with Propoſitions in the firſt place concerning theſe things. For argumentative Marks, and Probabilities, and Signs are Rhetorical Propoſitions: Seeing that every Syllogiſm conſiſts of Propoſitions, and every Enthymeme is a Syllogiſm conſiſting of the foreſaid Propoſitions. But becauſe it is impoſſible for Impoſſibilities to be acted, or that they will be acted hereafter, but only things that are poſſible, or that thoſe things that never were, nor ever will be, ſhould now be done, or ever can be done, it is neceſſary as well for the Conſulter and the Judg, as for him that goes about to demonſtrate, to be furniſh'd with Propoſitions of Poſſibility and Impoſſibility, whether it were or were not, whether it will be or no. Moreover, ſeeing that all People who either approve or diſlike, perſwade or diſwade, ſue or defend, endeavour to ſhew not only what has been already ſaid, as what is uſeful, what is hurtful, what is honeſt, what

what diſgraceful, what juſt; what unjuſt; but whether the thing be of great or ſmall moment, either conſidering uſeful and hurtful, honeſt and diſhoneſt, juſt and unjuſt in themſelves, or by comparing one with another; it is manifeſt, that they muſt be furniſh'd with Propoſitions of great and little, more and leſs, with reſpect to Particulars as well as Univerſals; as what is more, what leſs profitable, which the greater, which the leſſer Injury or Injuſtice, and ſo of other things: And thus much as to thoſe things of which Propoſitions muſt be made. Now we muſt diſtinguiſh every one of them apart; and firſt to which Deliberation, next to which Demonſtration, laſtly to which Judgments belong.

CHAP. IV.

Of what things Men uſually Deliberate?

FIRST then we are to conſider about what things good or hurtful the Politician conſults for that he does not deliberate upon all things, but upon what may be, or may not be done, in regard it is in vain to deliberate upon things that are or will be of neceſſity, or ſuch as it is impoſſible that they ever will be. Nor yet upon all Accidents neither. For there are ſome good things which proceeding from Nature and Fortune, happen ſometimes to be, ſometimes not to be; upon which it's not worth while to Deliberate. But we are to conſult of thoſe things that may be re-

ferr'd to us, whoſe Original and Cauſe is within our ſelves. For we deliberate till we have found whether the things may or may not be done by us. Nevertheleſs it is not our preſent Buſineſs to enumerate every particular, nor to digeſt the ſeveral ſubjects of Deliberation into their ſeveral Species's and Forms, nor to enquire what may be determin'd concerning 'em according to Truth. For that belongs not to Rhetoric, but to a more prudent and certain Art; tho' much more then what falls properly under her Conſideration, is now adays allow'd her. For what we have already affirm'd is true; that *Rhetoric* is compos'd of the Analytic Science, and that part of *Politic*'s which relates to manners, and partly reſembles Logic, partly ſophiſtical Oration.

However if any one go about to teach either *This* or *Logic*, not as Faculties, but as Sciences, he ſecretly ſubverts their Nature, while he dilates them into Sciences of certain Subject Matters, and does not confine them to Oration alone.

But now let us therefore ſhew what things more properly fall under Political Conſideration, and are more proper to be explain'd.

The chiefeſt things then of which all Men conſult, and argue upon in Deliberation are five in number; of Wealth, of War, of Peace, of the Preſervation of the Country, and of what things are exported and imported, and of the making and obſervance of Laws.

He that conſults about the raiſing of Treaſure, ought to underſtand the Revenues of the Country, and whence they ariſe, that if there be any deficiency, it may be ſupplied; and if it be too

ſmall

ſmall, that it may be augmented; alſo that all unneceſſary Expences of the City may be cut off; and all profuſeneſs moderated. For not only addition of Treaſure, but frugality in Expences, increaſe Wealth. And this not only appears from our experience of private affairs; but there is a neceſſity for him that would ſpeak to the purpoſe concerning theſe things, to know the Obſervations of others.

He that conſults concerning War and Peace, muſt underſtand the Forces of the City, what they are at preſent, and how powerful they may be; what ſort of Strength there is at preſent, and what ſort of additional Force is to be provided: alſo what Wars, and in what manner the People have carried on their Wars before. Nor is he only to underſtand the Concerns of his own Country, as to theſe Particulars, but to be well inform'd of the State and Condition of his Neighbours, eſpecially of thoſe with whom his Country may have an occaſion to enter into a War: and what is the equality, or inequality of Force on both ſides, that he may make a Peace with the ſtronger; and be at his own Liberty, whether or no to make a War with the weaker: and then again which is the moſt wealthy Common-weal of the two; for in that alſo we may be either Superiour or Inferiour.

Moreover he ought not to be ignorant how the Country may be beſt preſerv'd and defended, nor of the number or quality of the Soldiers, fit to be kept on Foot; nor of places proper for Garriſons; which it is impoſſible to do, without an exact knowledge of the Country; that if the Garriſons are too weak, they may re-inforc'd; if ſuperfluous, they may be diſmantled, and

Garriſons plac'd in more proper places. Alſo what Expence is neceſſary to ſupply the City with Proviſion, what the Country will afford, and what muſt be ſupplied from abroad. What commodities are fit to be imported, what exported, that Leagues may be conſider'd accordingly. There being a neceſſity for a Common-weal to keep fair with two ſorts of People, with thoſe that are ſuperiour in Strength, and benefical to it in Commerce.

But as the knowledg of theſe things very much conduces to the Preſervation of a Common-weal, there is one thing no leſs beneficial, which is the skill of making Laws. Wherefore it is neceſſary to underſtand how many ſorts of Governments there are, what Conſtitutions are moſt profitable, and by what Adverſities or Proſperities they may be upheld or deſtroyed; for the ſafety of a City conſiſts in the obſervance of the Laws. I ſay, deſtroy'd by Proſperity; for that unleſs it be an abſolute conſtitution of Government indeed, all others are diſſolv'd or deprav'd by rigorous Severity or Remiſſneſs.

As *Democracy* is not only weakned by Remiſſneſs; but alſo when it is too rigorouſly ſevere; ſo that at laſt it falls under the Power of a few. Like Noſes that being moderately flat, or Hawk-Beak'd, look well enough; but when too much bent or Arch'd, or flatted to the Face, can hardly be diſcern'd to be Noſes. Therefore it mainly conduces to the making of good Laws, as well to gather from the benefit of former Conſtitutions, how the Common-weal thriv'd at that time, as to underſtand the condition of other Common-weals, and what is moſt agreeable

to

to the conditions of the People: whence it is apparent that a good Law-maker ought to be a great Traveller, there being nothing so necessary for him as to understand the Constitutions of other Nations; and to enable him for public Council, to be exact in the knowledg of History. But these things belong to Politics, and not to Rhetoric. Thus much therefore concerning those things which a good Counsellor ought chiefly to deliberate upon. Now let us see upon what he ought to employ his gifts of Perswasion or Dissuasion.

CHAP. V.

Of the Felicity and End of Deliberations.

FOR the most part there is a certain end which every Man in particular, and all Men in General aiming at, either choose or reject. And that end in a word is Happiness, and those things that belong to it. Wherefore for examples sake, let us explain what this Felicity is, and what are the parts of it. For all perswasions and diversions have an Eye upon this, and those things that attend it, and their contraries. For those things that procure this, or any of its parts, or being less; render it greater, are to be observ'd and done; but whatever deprave or hinder it, or procure its Contraries, is utterly to be rejected.

Therefore let *Felicity* be a prosperous acting with Vertue; or contentedness of Life; or a most pleasant Living in security, or a sound constitution of Estate and Body, with a powerful faculty to preserve and cause these things. For of these Enjoyments, either one or more, all Men confess to be felicity. If this then be Felicity; the parts of it must be Nobility of Extraction, Multiplicity of Friends, and those good Men; Wealth, numerous and hopeful Off-spring, and long Life. And then for Bodily perfections; Health, Beauty, Strength, Lustre, Proportion, Glory, Honour, Success, Agility in Combat, Success and Victory, Vertue, and its parts; as Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, Justice; for surely he must be contented with his Lot, who is the person possess'd of all these Enjoyments, both External and Internal; for besides these, there are no other of Moment. Internal are the Blessings belonging to the Mind; and those within the Body. External, Nobility, Friends, Wealth, and Honour; we also think it convenient to add Strength and Success: for thereby our Life is secured. Let us then consider what every one of these is. Nobility therefore is to be a Native of the same City or Country, of most ancient descent, numbring a long Progeny of famous Captains, and Persons Illustrious, for such worthy actions as all Men emulate. In private persons. Private Nobility is either by the Man or Womans side, and a Legitimacy from both; as in Cities and Kingdoms there is a Superiority in Vertue, Wealth, or any other Ornaments honour'd among Men, together with a race of Men, and Women, old and young, conspicuous for their

their Vertue, ſo in private Nobility. As for a vertuous and numerous Off-ſpring it is plain what it is. Commonly it is taken for a numerous company of young Children, and vertuouſly inclin'd. The vertues of the Body are Proportion, Beauty, Strength and activity. The Beauties of the Mind in Youth are Temperance and Fortitude. In private Families that is ſaid to be a numerous and vertuous Iſſue, where the Children are many, and lawfully begotten both Male and Female. The vertue of Wives as to the Body, is Beauty and goodly ſhape; as to to the Mind, Sobriety, and Sedulity, without avarice. And as well in private as public Famlies both in Men and Women, every one of theſe Vertues are requir'd to be; for whereever theſe Vertues are wanting, as among the *Lacedæmonians*, the men hardly enjoy the half of Happineſs.

The parts of Wealth are many, Lands, Mannors, rich Furniture, ſtore of Cattel, and a numerous retinue of ſtrong, healthy, and handſome Slaves. All which things ought to be ſecure, free, and uſeful. Uſeful implies Profitable, Free implies Pleaſure and Enjoyment. Profitable I call thoſe things that yield a Revenue. The Definition of *Secure* is to poſſeſs in ſuch a place, and ſuch a manner, that the uſe of what he enjoys, or the Power to alienate or keep, the Properties are ſtill in himſelf. I call Alienation giving or ſelling; ſo that to be rich, conſiſts rather in Enjoyment and uſe then Poſſeſſion. For the uſe and performance of ſuch things are properly to be call'd Wealth.

Reputation is when a perſon is by all Men eſteem'd a perſon of Vertue; or is accompted to be

be endow'd with that which all or moſt Men of Integrity and Wiſdom value.

Honour is the Sign of a high Opinion of a man's Liberality, and therefore they are juſtly and moſt deſervedly honour'd, who are moſt liberal and bountiful. He is alſo honour'd who is able to do kindneſſes. Now Beneficence is that, whatever it be, which is the cauſe of either our ſafety, and that we are, or of our attaining Riches, or ſome other Benefit, which we cannot either altogether, or in ſuch a place, or at ſuch a time readily and eaſily attain to. For ſeveral attain to honour, which they never merited, but the manner and the opportunities are the Cauſe. Now the parts of Honour are Sacrifices, Eulogies in Proſe and Verſe, Crowns, Temples, Poſſeſſions, Monuments, Statues, and public Salaries. Among the *Barbarians*, Cringing Adoration, giving place, and Preſents which are univerſally valu'd. For a gift is the giving of Poſſeſſion, and a mark of honour. And therefore while they who are covetous of Mony, and ambitious of Honour, eagerly deſire the one and the other, they both by that means attain their deſires. For the Covetous gain the Poſſeſſion of what they deſire, and the ambitious attain to Honour.

The vertue of the Body is health, whereby we have the uſe of our Limbs free from all Diſeaſes and Diſtempers. For no man will believe them to be happy that only enjoy the Health of *Herodicus*. For he, for the Preſervation of his Health, was forc'd to abſtain from all or moſt of thoſe things, which other Men make uſe of.

Beauty

Beauty varies according to Age. For he is a beautiful young Man, who has a Body able to endure racing and violent Labour, having a pleasant aspect with all. Therefore they that exercis'd the five Games were most beautiful, as being born to Strength and Swiftness. A handsome Man is he, who being able to endure the toils of War, appears with an Aspect pleasing, but yet stern and awful. A comely old Man is such a one as having a Body strong enough to undergo necessary Labour, lives altogether free from the Pains and Diseases of old Age.

Strength is that whereby a Man is able to move what he desires to move as he lists himself. Now we move a Body either by drawing to us, or thrusting from us, by lifting up, or casting down, or by crushing and squeezing together; So that a strong Man has Strength to do all these things, or many of 'em.

The vertue of Magnitude is to excel in length, depth and breadth, so that the motion of the Body be no way hindred by its Bulk.

The wrestling or contending vertue of the Body consists in Bulk, Strength, and Agility, or Swiftness; for a swift Man is a strong Man; for he that can move his Legs swiftest and fartherest is a Runner. Who can grapple and hold fastest, a Wrestler. Who can keep off from his Person by striking, a Boxer. Who can do both, a *Pancratiast* or general Wrestler; who excels in all, a *Pentathlian*, or a Man for all the five Exercises of Cuffing, Leaping, Running, Hurling the Bowl, and Wrestling.

A happy old Age is that which comes late, and brings no Pains or diſtempers with it. For he who ſooner or later grows old, if he be tormented with Aches and Diſtempers, leads an uneaſy Life.

Now there are ſome which are vertues both of the Body, and of Fortune; for he that is of a ſickly Conſtitution, and not Strong, ſhall not be free from Pain; or tho' he be, he ſhall not be long liv'd; nor can he laſt without Fortune; for there is another way to live long without Strength and Health, ſeeing that many live long without the Vertues of the Body.

But a farther Examination of theſe things is needleſs at preſent. Now what is multiplicity of honeſt and vertuous Friends, ſhall be ſhewn in the definition of a Friend. A Friend is therefore he, who does for his friends ſake whatever he thinks will be for the advantage and profit of his Friend. He then who has many ſuch friends is the Friend of many, and if they be perſons of Integrity, he has many good and vertuous Friends.

Proſperity is that, when all, or moſt or the chiefeſt part of theſe Bleſſings, of which Fortune it ſelf is the cauſe, flow into a Man, and make him happy. Now Fortune is the cauſe of many things artificial, and of many things without Art, which tho' they proceed from Nature are Preternatural; as the air is the cauſe of Health; nature the cauſe of Beauty and Stature. And thoſe Benefits that altogether proceed from Fortune, which are ſtill the Subject of other Mens Envy.

Fortune

Fortune is alſo the cauſe of thoſe Benefits, for which no reaſon can be given; as when all the reſt of the Brothers are deform'd, and one alone proves to be Beautiful; or when all the reſt of the Brothers overſaw the Treaſure, and one had the luck to find it out. Or when the next Perſon happens to be ſtruck through with an Arrow, and the other eſcapes. Or when only one Perſon came not to a place, who was never wont to fail, and all the reſt that came who never uſ'd to come, came only that time, and happen'd to be all kill'd. For all theſe things ſeem to be the act of Fortune. As for the Vertue of the Mind, becauſe it is a Topic moſt proper for the diſcourſe of Applauſe and Commendation, we ſhall refer it to Demonſtration.

CHAP. VI.

Of Profitable and Good.

WHAT we ought to aim at in perſwading, whether in reference to things preſent or to come, or in diſſwading, we have already made manifeſt. For they that diſſwade, diſſawade the contrary. Now in regard that Profitable is the ſcope of him that adviſes, and they that adviſe, conſult not about the End, but thoſe things which relate to the End; and for that theſe things are profitable in the Effects, if rightly acted, and profitable is good, we are to conſider the Element of good and profitable ſimply. Good is therefore

therefore that which is to be desir'd for its own sake, and that for whose sake we desire something else; and which all things or Creatures desire, if they have Sence and Understanding, or would desire if they had; and whatever the Understanding dilates to every one, and what the understanding Dictates concerning each Particular, good to every Man, that is good to all in general. Which being present, the Mind is at rest, and contented in it self. Which is sufficient for it self; and which is the cause and Preserver of these things, and upon which those things attend that prevent and destroy the Contraries to it. Now those things attend upon it two ways, either at the same time or afterwards; as Knowledg attends Instruction, but afterwards; but Life and Health go both together. The Efficient causes attend three manner of ways, sometimes as soundness of Body attends upon Health; sometimes as Diet, attends Health; sometimes as Exercise attends it, for it generally procures Health. These things thus laid down, there is a necessity that the Election of things good, and the rejecting of what is hurtful, should be good. On the one side it follows that we are not pester'd with what is hurtful at the same time; on the other, that we obtain the good afterwards, and instead of the lesser good we choose the greater, and in lieu of the greater Evil, we chuse the less. For the same reason that the greater exceeds the less, therefore we chuse the one, and avoid the other.

And of necessity all Vertues must be good, it being always well with those that are endu'd with 'em. Besides that they are the efficient and active

active cauſes of Good; but to ſay what and of what nature they are, requires a diſtinct diſcourſe of each.

Pleaſure alſo is moſt certainly a Good; ſince all Creatures naturally covet it: wherefore it is neceſſary alſo that delectable and honeſt ſhould be good. For Honeſt is the effective cauſe of Pleaſure. And honeſt things are partly delightful, and partly choſen for their own Sakes.

But that we may diſcourſe of each particularly; of neceſſity theſe muſt be good things.

Firſt Felicity, becauſe it is deſired for its own ſake, ſufficient, and that for whoſe ſake we deſire many other things; as Juſtice, Fortitude, Modeſty, Magnanimity, Magnificence, and all the reſt of the Vertues of the Mind, together with Health, Beauty, and the like. For theſe are the Vertues of the Body, and the effective cauſes of many things; as Health is the cauſe of Life and Pleaſure. And therefore ſome account it the beſt of good things, as being the cauſe of thoſe two things which are the chiefeſt of good things, Life and Pleaſure.

Then Riches, wherein conſiſts the vertue of Poſſeſſing; which is the effective cauſe of many other Benefits. Next, Friends and Friendſhip; for Friendſhip is deſireable for its own ſake, and is the effective cauſe of many good things. Honour alſo and Fame. For they are delightful and produce many good things, and generally ſhew that they contain thoſe things within themſelves, for which they are admir'd. Next the faculty of ſpeaking and acting. For they are alſo the effective cauſes of good things. Likewiſe Wit, Memory, aptneſs to learn, excellency of Mind and

and Thought with all other things of the ſame Nature. For all theſe are faculties productive of good things. In the ſame Liſt we may number the Arts and Sciences, and Life it ſelf. From whence though no other good ſhould flow, yet it is deſirable for its own ſake. *Juſt* is alſo in the ſame Roll, becauſe it conduces to the public advantage, Theſe are the chiefeſt part of thoſe things which all Men account good things.

As to thoſe things that are call'd in queſtion, Arguments are thus fram'd to prove them good. That to which evil is contrary, is good, and the contrary of that which is ſerviceable to our Enemies; as if to be Cowards is a kindneſs to our Enemies, it is manifeſt that Fortitude is a great good to our ſelves and our Country. And in a word, what our Enemies deſire and rejoice at, the contrary to that muſt be advantageous to us: Therefore it was well ſaid of the Poet.

Sure Priam will rejoice.

However theſe are not always, but for the moſt part good things, ſince it may happen that ſometimes the ſame things may be of advantage as well to our Adverſaries as to us. Whence it is ſaid that Miſery reconciles Men, when the ſame thing is pernicious to both. Alſo the *Mean* between both is good. For that which is greater then it ought to be is bad, and that for whoſe ſake Men have endur'd many hard labours, and waſted much Treaſure; for now it is a ſeeming Good, and as ſuch, is look'd upon as the end, and the end of many things; but the end is good. Whence that of *Homer.*

——*Not*

——————*But Fame.*
Indeed was only Priam's *aim.*
And that other of the ſame Poet.
——————*But Delay*
Will ſhame us, if we longer ſtay.

With which the Proverb agrees, There lies a Snake at the door. Moreover what many Men covet and contend for is good; for many are look'd upon as the generality, and what they commend is fit to be commended. For there is no Man will applaud that which is not good. As alſo what our Enemies and wicked Men approve; for indeed we may ſay that all men confeſs, if the bad confeſs the ſame. For becauſe it is undeniable, therefore it is confeſs'd on all hands; as that they are bad whom our Friends diſcommend, and that they are good of whom our Enemies ſpeak no ill. And therefore the *Corinthians* thought themſelves affronted by *Simonides* for ſaying,

However Ilium *does not* Corinth *blame.*

Alſo the good opinion of wiſe and good Men or Women. Thus *Minerva* preferr'd *Ulyſſes*; *Theſeus*, *Helena*; *Alexander* was preferr'd by the Goddeſſes, and *Achilles* by *Homer*. And in general, whatever things are deſirable before others. Now Men chuſe to act not only thoſe things which have been already ſpoken of, but to ſerve their Friends, and miſchief their Enemies, and by ſuch means as are poſſible. Now Poſſibilities are two-fold, ſuch as may be done, and ſuch as may be eaſily done. Facil things are ſuch as may

be done either without Pain, or in a ſhort time. For facility is terminated either by Pain, or length of time, or if they be done according to their Wiſh; but Men wiſh either for no Evil at all, or for much leſs then the Good, which may come to paſs, if either they can hide themſelves from the Puniſhment, or procure it to be ſmall. Alſo what a Man wiſhes of his own Election, not made choice of by any Man elſe, but beyond the common road. Hence the more honour. And what are agreeable to their Genius; ſuch are thoſe things which are moſt ſuitable to their Fortunes, or their Strength, and what Men believe they are defective in, tho little things; for they chuſe to act in thoſe things to gain or recover Credit. And what may be perform'd by any one. All theſe things may be done, as being eaſy. And another may do thoſe things, which all or many, like, or leſſer have well done before. And what will make us acceptable to our Friends, and odious to our Enemies. And what every one admires, they chuſe to act. And thoſe things wherein Men are ingenious and expert; for ſuch things they believe they ſhall more eaſily accompliſh: and ſuch things as they deſire; for then the Pains is a Pleaſure. And which the wicked refuſe to undertake; for ſuch acts are ſo much the more Praiſe-worthy. And ſuch things upon which Men have moſt ſingularly plac'd their affections: As the Warrior upon Victory, the Ambitious upon Honour, the covetous Perſon upon Money, and ſo of the reſt. And thus much concerning good and profitable.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of the greater and leſſer.

NOW becauſe they who grant both to be profitable, cannot agree upon which is moſt profitable, therefore we muſt ſay ſomething of the greater good, and of that which is moſt Profitable. That which exceeds is therefore that which is ſo much and more. The exceſs, that which is within it, and always greater, and more in reſpect of the leſs; but great or leſs, many or fewer, in the reſpect of the Magnitude of many. And the exceſs is called great, the defect little, and ſo of many and few Since therefore we call Good that which is deſirable for its own, and not for the ſake of another; of which all the parts are coveted; and which every Creature that has Sence and Underſtanding would covet, and that which is the efficient and Preſervative cauſe of all; and upon which all things of that nature depend, of which the why and the wherefore is the end, and the end is for whoſe ſake all the reſt; and this is good for this or that, which is moſt appropriated to it; of neceſſity the more muſt be the greater good then one, or the leſſer, according to the number of the one and the leſſer: becauſe it exceeds, and what is contain'd within is exceeded. For if the greateſt be exceeded by the greateſt, thoſe alſo muſt be exceeded by themſelves; and if the Kinds are thus exceeded by the Kinds, the biggeſt by the biggeſt; as if the biggeſt Men are bigger then

the biggeſt Women, Men are abſolutely bigger then Women; and if Men are abſolutely bigger then Women, the biggeſt Man is bigger then the biggeſt Woman. For the exceſs of the Kinds, and of thoſe things that are contain'd in the Kinds, hold the ſame proportion one with another. The ſame may be ſaid when this follows from that, but that does not follow from this. Now that which follows, follows either together or afterwards, or potentially. For the uſe of that which follows is in the other. Now it follows together if a Man be in health, that he lives; but it does not follow that he is in health becauſe he lives. But Knowledg follows the being taught afterwards. Potentially it follows, that if a Man be a Sacrilegious Perſon, that he may rob a Temple, ſeeing a Sacrilegious Perſon will rob. And they are greater that exceed the ſame thing in greatneſs; for of neceſſity the greater muſt be exceeded. The Effective cauſes alſo of the greater good are greater; for by that means the Efficient cauſe became greater, and in the ſame manner the effects of the greater cauſe muſt be greater. For if wholeſome be more to be deſired, and a greater Good then Pleaſant, Health is greater then Pleaſure, and that which is more deſirable in its ſelf then that which is not more to be deſired in its ſelf; as Strength, then Health. For that is deſirable for its own, this not for its own ſake; which is the true condition of good. Alſo if this be the End, that not the End; this is more to be deſir'd than that; for this is deſir'd for that, and that for its own ſake; as that the Body may be kept in Exerciſe, and by Exerciſe in Health: And the leſs defective then the other,

or

or the others is moſt deſirable, as being more ſufficient. Now the leſſer is defective in wanting fewer or more eaſy; or when this cannot be accompliſh'd, or be without that; but that may be accompliſh'd without this. For that which is not defective is moſt ſufficient in it ſelf, and therefore it is apparently the greater good. Alſo if one be a Principle, the other not; if one thing be the cauſe, the other not. For without the Cauſe or the Principle nothing can be, or be done. Now where there are two Principles, that which proceeds from the greater Principle is the greater. Where there are two cauſes, the Product of the greater cauſe is the greater. So that either way the thing muſt be greater whether one be a Principle, the other not; or whether proceeding from the greater of two Principles. For the end is greater and not the Principle. As *Leodamus* ſaid, when he accus'd *Calliſtratus*. He who advis'd was more in fault then he who acted. For had not the thing been advis'd, it had ne'r been put in Execution. But *Chabrias* argu'd that he who acted was more to blame then he who advis'd; becauſe the thing had not been put in Execution, had it not been adviſed; for Action is the end of Conſultation. Moreover that which is more ſcarce is more deſireable then that which more Plentiful, as Gold then Iron. For Iron is leſs profitable. Therefore the poſſeſſion of Gold is greater, becauſe it is more ſcarce to be found. But in another Sence, that which moſt abounds is the greater, becauſe we make more uſe of it. At other times that which is ſcarce, is exceeded by that which is Plentiful, and therefore we ſay the beſt Water. Briefly, difficult things are ex-

ceeded by thoſe things that are more eaſy, becauſe they are more ſcarce; but in another Sence eaſy things exceed difficult, becauſe we can obtain 'em when we pleaſe.

Alſowhere the contrary exceeds; as likewiſe where the Privation exceeds. Alſo where the Vertues and Vices of Men are greater; there their Actions are more eminent and greater. For ſuch as the Cauſes and Principles, ſuch are the Effects; and ſuch as are the Effects. ſuch the Principles and Cauſes. Alſo where the exceſs is more deſireable, or more beautiful; as a quick Sight is better then a quick Smell: Sight being more deſireable than Smelling; alſo it is much nobler to covet Friends then Money; wherefore love of Friends is better then love of Money. The exceſſes of the beſt things are beſt, and more vertuous the Exceſſes in Vertue: and of which our deſires are more honeſt and generous. Such things alſo of which the Knowledg is more honeſt and ingenious: As alſo the things themſelves, which are more honeſt and Lawful. For as it is with Knowledg, ſo it is with Truth; for every Science teaches thoſe things that belong to it; and therefore the Sciences and the things taught, hold the ſame Proportion. Alſo what all, or many, or moſt Men of Prudence and Learning have deem'd and decreed to be the greateſt good, that either ought ſimply ſo to be, or ſo far as they have in their Prudence adjudg'd it. But that is common to other things. For the what, and how much, and the what ſort are to be look'd upon as Knowledg and Underſtanding have decreed. But we have number'd Prudence however among good things,

things, as having defin'd Prudence to be that which all Men would deſire if they had Prudence. And therefore that muſt be greater which Prudence ſo adjudges.

Alſo what is contain'd in the better things, either as they are ſimply ſo, or as they are better; as Fortitude is better then Strength of Body. Alſo what a perſon of more worth would chuſe, as rather to ſuffer then do an Injury; which a more juſt Man would chuſe to do. And what is more pleaſing and delightful then what is leſs. For all follow Pleaſure, and covet it for delights ſake. But the good and end of Pleaſure is bounded within Limits. For that which is more delightful is as well that which is leſs irkſome, as that which is more durably delightful, and more honeſt, or leſs honeſt. For honeſt is either delightful or to be deſired for its ſelf. And what Men moſt deſire to be the Authors of either to themſelves or Friends, thoſe are the greater benefits; what they leaſt deſire, the leſſer Kindneſſes: and the more laſting then the leſs durable, and the more ſolid, then the leſs firm. For the uſe exceeds of the one in time, of the other in the Will; For where the will is, there the uſe of a thing conſtant prevails. And as when from conſequences and like caſes, other conſequences ariſe; as when that which is ſtoutly and honeſtly done, is to be prefer'd before what is acted temperately; alſo Fortitude is to be preferr'd before Temperance, and to be ſtrong before being temperate. And what all preferr, before what all do not preferr, and what more then a few. For good was that which all coveted; therefore that is greater which is more deſir'd. Alſo in Law-Suits, where are

Plantiffs, Judges, and Defendants. Here that prevails which all affirm; there what the Judges Pronounce, as excelling in Power and Knowledg. Sometimes that is greateſt of which all participate; for it is a diſgrace not to participate. Sometimes thoſe things which are moſt Praiſe-worthy, as being moſt Honeſt. Sometimes degrees of Honour make the Honours greater; for Honour is a kind of price or value ſet upon a thing. The greater Puniſhments alſo are the greater, and ſuch things as are greater than the things which are apparent and granted; eſpecially when divided into parts; for then exuberancy of many is apparent, which was the reaſon that the Poet to excite *Meleager* uſes theſe words.

What Miſchiefs muſt thy Subjects then bewail,
If into hoſtile Hands the City fall?
Slaughter and Fire their Maſions will invade,
And helpleſs Children will be Captive led.

And then addition and aggravation, as in *Epicharmus*; which is apparent, partly by the ſame reaſon, that dividing the parts makes the thing greater; for Aggravation plainly ſhews the Exceſs. Partly becauſe the Original and cauſe of things ſeems greater: and then becauſe that is greater which is leſs frequent, and more difficult. Opportunity, Age, Time, Place, and Force, make things greater; for beyond the Strength, the Age of ſuch an one, beyond others here, there and then, denote exceſs of Beauty, Goodneſs, Juſtice, or their Oppoſites. Whence the Epigram upon the *Olympian* Victor.

Though

Though formerly 'tis true, so mean my Trade,
With heavy Doſſers on my Shoulders laid,
From Argos *to* Tegea *ſtill I trudg'd,*
To ſell my Fiſh, till Victor here adjudg'd.

And *Iphicrates* gave himſelf this *Encomium, from whence all theſe.* Moreover, Genuine than acquir'd: wherfore ſaid the Poet,

School'd only by my ſelf, theſe Songs I ſing.

Alſo the greater part of a great thing. As *Pericles* ſpeaks in an Epitaph, that Youth being taken from a City, render'd it equally deformed with a year that had no Spring. Alſo ſuch things as are deſired as moſt uſeful in greater neceſſity, as in old Age or Sickneſs; and of two things, that which approaches neareſt to the end: alſo that which is in it ſelf, and ſimply of value. Alſo poſſible is better then impoſſible; for the one is in it ſelf, the other not; alſo what is at the end of Life; for that is more the end then what is farther off. Alſo what come nearer to Truth then Opinion, or Vain-glory. Now the Definition of what belongs to Opinion or Vain-glory, is this, what a Man would not chuſe if he thought it would be conceal'd. Therefore 'tis better that a Man ſhould receive a kindneſs then give it; for a Man would receive a kindneſs not caring whether any Body knew of it or no; but the giver would not chuſe to give, if he thought it ſhould not be known: and what would be greater than they ſeem to be; for they approach nearer to Truth. Therefore they ſay Juſtice is but a ſmall

thing, becauſe it is better it ſhould ſeem to be then be; but it is not ſo with Health. Alſo what is Serviceable for many things, as for Living, for well Living, to enable a Man to act honeſt things, and for delight. And therefore Riches and Health ſeem to be the greateſt things; for they are ſerviceable to all theſe things. Alſo that which is leſs painful, and that which brings Pleaſure; for they are more then one; ſo that Pleaſure is a good, and abſence of Pain. And of two things that which being added to the one, makes the whole greater, and thoſe things which being preſent, appear, then thoſe things which lye hid; for they approach nearer to Truth. And therefore to be Rich, is a greater good then to ſeem Rich. And what is to be belov'd by ſome ſingly, by others with intermixture or addition of other things. And therefore the Puniſhment is not equal to condemn him that has but one, and him that has two to the loſs of one Eye; for the only thing belov'd is thereby taken away. As thus much for Inſtruction from whence to fetch our Arguments in diſſuading or perſuading.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Number and Forms of Common-weals.

BUT there is nothing that furniſhes a man with a more ſublime and powerful ability, to perſuade and adviſe with prudence and diſcre-

into,

tion, then to know all ſorts of Common-weals, the manners and conſtitutions of each, and to diſtinguiſh which is moſt profitable. For they convince all men by uttering what is for advantage; and it is therefore advantageous, becauſe it preſerves the Common-weal. Moreover the ſentence of the Sovereign firm and undeniable, is Dominion. But Dominion is diſtinguiſhed according to the forms of Common-weals; for as many Common-weals as there are, ſo many ſorts of Dominion there are. Now there are four forts of public-weals; Democracy, Oligarchy, Ariſtocracy and Monarchy. So that the ſupreme and determining authority, is either a part of, or elſe the whole of theſe. Democracy is a Common-weal wherein the Magiſtrates are choſen by Lots. Oligarchy, when they are choſen by their Eſtates; Ariſtocracy when they are elected that excel in Diſcipline: And I call that Diſcipline or Education, which is regulated by the Law. For they who are moſt obedient to the Law, are the beſt, and govern in Ariſtocracy. From whence the name. Monarchy, according to the ſignification of the word, is where all are ſubject to one Supreme and Sovereign. And this being limited to certain conſtitutions, is called a Kingdom, being unlimited, it is called Tyranny. Now we are to underſtand the end of every Public-weal; for Men make choice of thoſe forms that relate to the end. Now the end of Democracy is Popular Liberty, of Oligarchy, Riches; of Ariſtocracy and Monarchy, wholeſom Laws and good Government; of Tyranny, ſingle Preſervation. Therefore the manners, conſtitutions and advantages of every one are to be diſtinguiſhed;

for

for men make their choice with reference to these things. And because convincement is not only that which demonstrates by oration, but by Ethical discourse, for we believe the speaker because we take him to be an honest Man; or a man of understanding, or both, therefore it behoves us to understand the customs of every sort of Public-weal. For of necessity nothing can be more prevalent with every one, then the approved constitutions of every public-weal, which are only to be found in the Governments themselves. For manners appear by pre-election, and pre-election is referred to the end. And thus much as to what they ought to understand, who desire to convince by Elocution, what arguments they ought to fetch from profit and advantage; as also from manners and customs, and with what, and by what means we ought to abound, enough has been said for the present, for the more exquisite discourse of these things, we refer to our Politicks.

CHAP IX.

Of Honest and Laudable, which belong to the Demonstrative kind.

NOW let us say something concerning Vertue and Vice, Honest and Dishonest. For these are the Aims of those that praise or dispraise. But it will happen while we discourse of these things, that we shall also explain those other Things, which will give us the repute of being

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in ſome meaſure a Perſon of good Manners; which is the ſecond ſtep to Convincement: Seeing that from thence we may gain credit, as well to our ſelves and others, for being vertuous. But becauſe we happen to praiſe ſometimes in jeſt, ſometimes in earneſt, not only Man or God, but things inanimate, we are alſo in like manner to conſider theſe things.

Honeſt therefore is that which is deſirable for its own ſake.

Praiſe worthy, is that, which being good, is therefore delightful, becauſe good. Now if this be honeſt, of neceſſity Vertue is honeſt. For being good, it is alſo Praiſe worthy.

Vertue is a faculty which produces and preſerves good things; alſo a Benefic Faculty affording many and great things, and all in all things.

The parts of it are Juſtice, Fortitude, Modeſty, Magnificence, Magnanimity, Liberality, Mildneſs, Prudence, Wiſdom. Now in regard that Vertue is a faculty to do good, of neceſſity they are the greateſt Vertues that are moſt profitable to others; therefore we chiefly admire the juſt and couragious. For the one is moſt uſeful in War, the other in Peace: Next the Liberal, for they never contend about Money which others are ſo covetous of, but freely beſtow it abroad for the public good.

Juſtice is a Vertue which diſtributes to every one their own as the Law commands. Injuſtice is that by which men ſeize upon that which is not their own, contrary to what the Law ordains.

Fortitude is that by which men perform great actions in the midſt of danger, and as the Law commands, being alſo Aſſiſtants and Supporters of

of the Law. Cowardice the contrary.

Temperance is a Vertue, by which we make ſuch a uſe of corporeal pleaſure as the Law ordains; Intemperance the contrary.

Liberality is the bountiful uſe of Money, to the benefit of others, Illiberality the contrary.

Magnanimity is a Vertue that excites us to do great actions, Puſillanimity the contrary.

Magnificence is a Vertue that conſiſts in the ſumptuouſneſs of expence, of which pinching and narrow-ſould Parcimony are the contrary.

Prudence is a Vertue of Reaſon, enabling us rightly to deliberate of evil, and thoſe bleſſings that pertain to happineſs.

And let this ſuffice in general at preſent concerning Vertue and Vice, and the parts of both; and for the reſt, they fall under an eaſie conſideration. For of neceſſity, thoſe things that are the cauſes of Vertue muſt be honeſt, as relating to Vertue, and being produced by Vertue. Of which ſort are the marks and works of Vertue. Now becauſe the marks, and ſuch like, whatever they be, which are the Acts and Sufferings of a good man; of neceſſity, whatever are the Acts or Signs of Fortitude, or whatever are acted couragiouſly, are noble and honeſt. And ſo it is with the ſigns and acts of Juſtice; but not in the ſufferings. For in this one vertue alone, not always that which is juſt is honeſt and laudable. For it is rather an ignominy to be condemn'd, if juſtly, then unjuſtly. And ſo of the reſt of the Vertues. And where honour is the reward, thoſe things are vertuous and laudable; as alſo where honour rather then money. And whatſoever among thoſe things that are deſirable, which a man acts

not

not for his own ſake. And whatſoever are ſimply good, and whatſoever a man acts for his Countries ſake, contemning his own Intereſt: And which are naturally good, and which are good, but not to himſelf. For what is good to himſelf he acts for his own ſake. And which attend the memories of the dead rather than the living. For where fame and honour attends the living, they ſeem to act rather for their own ſakes. Alſo whatever acts are done for the ſake of praiſe. For theſe are done leſs for a man's own ſake. Alſo thoſe things that are ſerviceable and profitable, not to himſelf, but to others, and chiefly to Benefactors.

Thus Juſtice and Munificence are profitable to others. Alſo the contraries to thoſe things, of which we are aſhamed, either ſpeaking or acting, or about to ſpeak, or do. For Men that ſay, or do, or are about to commit ignominious actions, are aſhamed, as when *Alcæus* ſaid,

There's ſomething I would tell thee, but for ſhame,
That will not let me the occaſion name.

To which *Sappho* made anſwer,

Speak freely on, for if a true deſire
Of good and vertuous does thy thoughts inſpire.
And that thy Tongue be not deſign'd to frame
Report and calumny, beſeeming ſhame
Will hover o're thy Brows, and aw thy Pen,
To ſpeak the truth; and I deſie thee then.

Alſo thoſe things about which Men fearleſly contend. For men are moſt affected with thoſe thing

things which moſt conduce to glory. Alſo the vertues and deeds of thoſe who excel by nature, are moſt praiſe worthy, and the vertues of Men rather then Women; and ſuch as with which others are more endowed then themſelves. Wherefore juſt and juſtice are applauded; alſo revenge rather then reconciliation. For it is but juſt to return evil for evil, and juſtice is honeſt. For a ſtout man alſo to be invincible for victory and honour, are deſirable: For though they bring no advantage, yet they are to be deſired, and ſhew a conſpicuous Vertue. Alſo Commemorations and Monuments: And the more famous they are, the more noble. However thoſe are more noble that attend upon the dead, and to whom the greateſt honours are attributed: Alſo ſuch as are extraordinary and belong to the Perſon alone; for as they are more memorable yet unfruitful poſſeſſions, they ſeem more liberal: Alſo what things are proper to particular perſons; and the marks of ſuch things that are praiſe worthy, among thoſe with whom we inhabit, as among the *Lacedæmonians* to wear long hair. For it is a mark of Liberty, for it is not for him that wears long hair, to do any ſervile drudgery, it being the mark of a Freeman not to live under another.

We are alſo here to take in thoſe things that approach to Vertue, as being the ſame both in reſpect of praiſe and diſpraiſe. As wary timid and deceitful: A fool and one good natur'd; a perſon not ſenſible of pain, and one mild and gentle: And thus from the conſequences according to that which is beſt; as to call an haſty furious man, ſilly; an arrogant man mag-

magnificent and great; and ſuch as take the exceſſes of Virtue for the Virtues themſelves; as if we ſhould call a raſh man ſtout, or a prodigal perſon liberal; ſeeing that many ſo fallaciouſly conclude from the cauſes outwardly appearing. For he that is ſo ready to run into danger, when there is no occaſion, will be much more, when he finds it neceſſary: And if he be liberal to every body, much more to his friends: For it is the excellency of that Virtue, for a man to be bountiful to all men. We are alſo to conſider from whom praiſe is proper. For, as *Socrates* ſaid, 'tis no difficult thing to praiſe the *Athenians* among the *Athenians*. But we muſt call that honourable which is honourable every where; as among the *Scythians*, the *Lacedæmonians*, among the Philoſophers; and in a word, whatever is honourable we may affirm to be honeſt. For they ſeem to approach near to vertue. And whatever looks like praiſe-worthy, as for a man to do thoſe things that are worthy his Anceſtors. For it is an addition to his felicity and to his honeſty, to advance his Reputation. Or if beſides that which is becoming, he act that which is beſt and moſt honeſt: As if a Man make a moderate uſe of his Proſperity; and ſhew himſelf magnanimous in adverſity: Or the higher he aſcends, the more generous and affable. And ſuch was that of *Iphicrates*, from which to what: or that of the *Olympic* Victor,

Tho formerly, 'tis true, ſo mean my trade, &c.

And that of *Simonides*,

Whose Father, Husband, Brothers, rare to see
All Sovereign Kings, yet were the prouder she.

Now becauſe praiſe ariſes from Actions, and for that it is the property of a good man to act by Election; we muſt endeavour to ſhew how he acts by Election; which he may be ſaid to have done, if he have ſo frequently done. Wherefore thoſe things which are done by chance, or fortune, are to be attributed to counſel and judgment. For when many things and ſimilar are joyn'd together, they will ſeem to be a mark of virtue and judgment. Now ſeeing that praiſe is a ſpeech that ſets forth the greatneſs of virtue, of neceſſity we muſt demonſtrate thoſe actions to be of the ſame nature. For *Encomiums* are upon actions: But the circulating arguments that make for convincement, are Nobility of Birth and Education. For it is moſt likely that good men beget good men, and that a perſon ſo educated will act according to his education. There we celebrate in *Encomiums* thoſe that act; which actions are the marks of the habit. Since we ſhould praiſe him that never acted, if we thought him to be like the other. And the means whereby men become happy and fortunate, are the ſame in themſelves; but not the ſame in reference to theſe. But as Felicity contains Virtue, ſo the making of a man happy contains Felicity. For praiſe and deliberation have ſomething common one with another, ſeeing, that what we propound in adviſing the ſame things, by the alteration of the ſpeech, beget praiſe. Therefore when we know

know what we have to act, and what the perſon ought to be: Theſe things being ſaid, as it were by way of advice, are to be chang'd and tranſpos'd in words; as when we ſay, a man is not to boaſt in the ſucceſſes of Fortune, but in what he wins through his own Virtue, which being ſo ſaid, has the force of a precept; but thus becomes an *Encomium*, glorying not in the ſucceſſes of Fortune, but in the acts of his own Virtue. Therefore conſider what to praiſe when you adviſe, and what to adviſe when you praiſe. For the ſpeech will of neceſſity be oppoſite, when that which prohibits and that which allows are tranſpos'd. We may alſo make uſe of many of thoſe things, which avail to amplifie: As whether he acted alone, or the firſt, or with many, or whether he were chiefeſt in the action; or whether he obſerv'd time and ſeaſon, or whether he did the ſame thing often? For that is great and ſhews him not beholden to Fortune, but his own Virtue. And whether thoſe things which encourage us to virtue and raiſe us to honour, were thought on and prepar'd by him; and upon whom the firſt *Encomium* was made: As it happen'd to *Hippolychus*, *Harmodius* and *Ariſtogeiton*, to have their Statues ſet up in the Market place. And the ſame thing is to be obſerv'd in the contraries. Of which, if there be not a ſufficient quantity to be found ſingly, compare them with others, as *Iſocrates* was wont to do, as being accuſtomed to pleading at the Bar. Which compariſons ought to be made between the moſt remarkable things, as having a power to amplifie, and is moſt commendable, when a man appears to excel in ſincerity. Which enlargement fals deſervedly upon

praiſe. For it conſiſts in excellency, and excellency conſiſts in goodneſs. Therefore altho the compariſon be not made between things moſt remarkable, at leaſt it ought to be made between other things perhaps of leſſer note, in regard the excellency denotes the virtue. And indeed of all thoſe forms which are common to all Orations, Amplification is moſt apt to demonſtrate. For they take the actions for granted, that they may have no more to do, then to add to them, Grandeur and Beauty. But Examples are more fit for Deliberation; for conjecturing of future things, from things formerly tranſacted, we make our judgment. *Enthymemes* are more fit for judicial pleadings: For the fact admits of the cauſe and the demonſtration, becauſe it is obſcure. And thus from whence all praiſes and diſpraiſes are produc'd; what we ought to look upon, when we commend or diſcommend, and of what things *Encomiums* and diſpraiſes conſiſt, is apparent by what has been ſaid. For theſe things being known, their contraries as may readily be diſcover'd.

CHAP. X.

Of Accuſation, and Defence.

IN the next place we are to ſpeak of Accuſation and Defence; of what, and of what nature they ought to prepare their Arguments; to which purpoſe we are to conſider three things. Wherein, and to what end, Men do Injuries. Next how they are affected, and thirdly what ſort of People

ple they are, and in what Condition. When we have therefore defin'd what it is to do an Injury, we ſhall proceed with the reſt. To do an Injury then, is to offer harm and violence to another, contrary to the Law. Now the Law is either peculiar or common. I call that peculiar, according to which being ſet down in Writing, Men act politically: Common, that which tho' not ſet down in Writing, prevails among all Men. We act ſpontaneouſly, whatever we act knowingly, and not by conſtraint. Yet where we act willingly, we do not all things of choice: but where we act by choice, we do all things willingly and knowingly; for no Man can be Ignorant of what he makes a choice before-hand. Now the chooſing to do harm, and commit evil acts, contrary to the Law, is a Vice and Intemperance. For whoever are addicted to one or more Vices that render 'em wicked, are alſo Injurious. As the Miſer in Money, the Intemperate in Pleaſures of the Body, the effeminate in Sloth; the Timerous in danger. For through Cowardice, they deſert thoſe that are in the ſame Jeopardy. The Ambitious in Honour; the Haſty in Anger; the deſirous of Conqueſt for Victories ſake; the Violent for Revenge ſake; the Imprudent, becauſe he is deceiv'd in what is juſt and good; the Impudent, through contempt of Reputation: and ſo of the reſt, every one according to the ſubject of his Paſſion. But theſe things are and will be manifeſt partly from thoſe things that have been ſpoken concerning the Vertues; Partly from thoſe things that ſhall be explain'd concerning the Affections. It remains to declare for what reaſon, and in what condition Men do Injuries, and whom they injure.

First therefore let us explain what we desire, and what we avoid, while we endeavour to do an Injury. For the Accuser must consider how many, and which of those things, which all Men coveting, injure their Neighbors, make up the Composition of his Adversary: and he that defends must consider which and how many of those things the Adversary misses; for all Men act all things partly of themselves; partly not of themselves. What they do not act of themselves, they act partly by Fortune, partly by Necessity. And of those that act by Necessity, some act by Force, some by Nature. So that all things whatsoever they do not act of themselves, some proceed from Fortune, some from Nature, and some from Force. But of those things which they act of themselves, and of which they themselves are the causes; some are through Custom, others out of a desire: and of those, some out of a rational Appetite, others out of an Irrational; but the Will is a rational desire of Good; for no Man covets but what he believes to be good.

The Irrational Appetites are Anger and Lust. Wherefore of necessity all things that they act, they act for seven Causes. Fortune, Force, Nature, Custom, Reason, Anger, Lust. Nor must we distinguish those things that are acted, according to Ages or Habits, or any thing of that nature; for if it happen that young Men prove Choleric and Lustful, it is not because of their Age, but because of the Passions that raign within 'em that they act so. Nor are Riches or Poverty the cause that rich or poor Men covet or desire. But it happens that the Poor for want, covet Money; and that the Rich through Licentiousness

tiouſneſs covet unneceſſary Pleaſures. However they are not actuated by their Riches, or their Poverty, but by their deſires. In like manner the juſt and unjuſt, and all thoſe that act habitually, are actuated by all theſe things; either by Reaſon or Paſſion; ſome by honeſt Inclinations and Affections, ſome by their contraries. However it happens, that ſuch Conſequences attend ſuch Habits, ſuch and ſuch others. For a temperate perſon, by reaſon of his Temperance, has always good and lawful opinions and deſires of Pleaſure. But an intemperate Perſon quite the contrary. Therefore theſe diviſions are to be omitted, and while we are to conſider, which moſt uſually follows which. For whether a Man be black or white, or great or little, nothing to our purpoſe follows from thence. But if a young or an old Man be juſt or unjuſt, there is then a difference, and in a word whatever things cauſe a difference in the conditions of Men: as it will make a diſtinction whether a Man be Rich or Poor; whether in Proſperity or Adverſity. But of theſe things more hereafter, now of the reſt.

Thoſe things proceed from Fortune, of which there is no determinate cauſe; which are not done for ſuch an end, nor always, nor for the moſt part, nor uſually. Which is manifeſt from the definition of Fortune. Naturally thoſe things are done, whoſe cauſe is in themſelves, and orderly; for they happen either always, or for the moſt part. For as for thoſe things which are preternatural, whether they proceed from ſome ſort of Nature, or from any other cauſe, it will be needleſs here to enquire, though Fortune ſhould ſeem to be the cauſe of ſuch things. By force

thoſe things are acted which are done by the Agents themſelves, through cogitation, or deſire.

Men act by cuſtom when they do thoſe things which they have often done before. Thoſe things are acted by Reaſon, which are done for advantage, as being of the number of thoſe good things already mentioned, or as the end, or conducing to the end. For the Intemperate ſometimes act many things that are uſeful, not for the ſake of being profitable; but to gratify their Pleaſure. Anger and Choler is the cauſe that many act to ſatisfy revenge; but there is a difference between Puniſhment and Revenge; for Puniſhment is inflicted for the ſake of him that ſuffers. But he that acts a piece of Revenge, does it to gratify himſelf. But as to thoſe things that are done through Anger, we ſhall ſay more when we come to ſpeak of the Affections.

For the ſake of Luſt all thoſe things are acted which appear to be pleaſant, in regard that thoſe things which are familiar to us by uſe and cuſtom, are delightful; and many things alſo that are not naturally delightful, being made familiar by Cuſtom, are acted with delight. So that in ſhort, all thoſe things which Men act of themſelves, are either good or ſeemingly good, either pleaſing or ſeemingly pleaſing. For I place the eſchewing of Evils, or of ſeeming Evils, or the choice of the greater for the leſs, in the number of good things, as being in ſome meaſure deſirable; and the eſchewing of things painful, or ſeemingly painful, or the choice of the leſs for the greater, among thoſe things which are delightful. Wherefore we are to underſtand how many and what things are profitable or pleaſant. But

of

of thoſe things that are profitable in deliberation, already has been ſpoken: We are now to diſcourſe of what is delightful; of which the definitions will be ſufficient, though they be not altogether ſo exact, if they be not obſcure.

CHAP. XI.

Of things delightful.

LET us therefore ſuppoſe pleaſure to be a certain motion, and entirely ſenſible diſpoſition of the mind, according to the preſent condition of nature: Grief the contrary. Which if it be pleaſing and delightful, muſt be the cauſe of the ſaid affection; but whatſoever depraves or cauſes a contrary diſpoſition of the mind is painful. Therefore of neceſſity thoſe things muſt be delightful that proceed according to nature, eſpecially when being acted according to nature, they have aſſum'd their own nature: In regard that cuſtom is a ſecond nature. For *moſt frequently* approaches near to *always*: Nature being *always*, Cuſtom *moſt frequently*; provided it be not violent; for violence is preternatural. Wherefore neceſſity is painful; for which reaſon it was rightly ſaid,

Whate're muſt of neceſſity be done,
As harſh and irkſome all men look upon.

Therefore

Therefore cares, diſtraction of thoughts, and intentneſs of mind, are painful. For they are of neceſſity, and by conſtraint, unleſs men be accuſtom'd to 'em. For cuſtom begets pleaſure; but the contraries of theſe are delightful: And therefore Sloth, Eaſe, Reſt, Mirth, Recreation and Sleep, are in the number of pleaſant Things, in regard they are not done by compulſion. Whatever alſo allures our deſires is pleaſant and delightful. For deſire is an eager reaching of the appetite after pleaſure. But of theſe deſires, ſome are rational, ſome irrational. Irrational are thoſe which are without any conſideration; ſuch as are natural and the appetites of the body, as hunger and thirſt after nouriſhment: There is alſo an appetite after all ſorts of nouriſhment, as alſo in taſtes and venereal ſports, and general in the ſmell, the touch, the hearing and ſight. Rational are ſuch, as when we deſire by perſuaſion. For we are eager to deſire and enjoy many things upon report and perſuaſion. But becauſe we then are ſaid to enjoy pleaſure, when we are affected with ſome ſort of ſence, and for that the imagination is a ſort of weak ſence, and conſequently a certain imagination of the thing remember'd and hop'd for, attends upon him that remembers and hopes, it is apparent that they who have ſtrong memories and hopes are affected with great pleaſure, becauſe they have a deep ſence of what they remember and hope for. Therefore all pleaſant things of neceſſity conſiſt in the ſence of things preſent, the remembrance of things paſt, or the hope of things to come. For we are ſenſible of the preſent, remember what is paſt, and hope for what is to come. Therefore thoſe things which

we

we preſerve in our memory are pleaſant, not only thoſe things, which at the time of enjoyment were delightful; but alſo ſome things that were painful; if afterwards they produce any thing of profit or pleaſure. According to that of the Poet,

Pleaſing it is, when once from dangers free
To tell the Tales of former miſery.

And that other:

For Dangers ſcap'd, and Labours undergone
To thoſe are pleaſing that renown have won.

For which reaſon it is, that it is a pleaſing thing to be free from pain. And then again, of thoſe things which conſiſt in hope, whatever ſeem to delight at preſent, or to be very helpful, or to be helpful without trouble. Generally tho, whatever delights at preſent, delights both thoſe that remember, and thoſe that hope for the moſt part. Wherefore it is ſometimes a pleaſing thing to be angry: According to that of *Homer*, concerning furious anger.

Sweeter than Honey from the fragrant Comb——

For no man is angry with thoſe upon whom it is impoſſible to act his revenge; and with thoſe that are far their ſuperiors in power, either they are but very little angry, or not at all.

Alſo there is a certain pleaſure that attends moſt deſires: For either in remembring what they were, or in hoping what they will be, we enjoy a certain pleaſure: As it fares with them who

who are thirſty in Fevers, while they remember how they did drink, and hope to drink preſently again. In like manner Lovers, when they diſcourſe, write, and ſing, are always tickl'd with ſome pleaſant fancy concerning the thing which they love. For in all theſe things they believe themſelves ſenſibly preſent with the perſon they love, when they remember him. And this is the beginning of love in all people, when they are not only pleas'd with the preſence of the perſon, but remember him when he is abſent. And therefore they are ſad and melancholy in the abſence of the thing belov'd: Inſomuch that there is a kind of pleaſure in weeping and mourning. The ſadneſs proceeds from the abſence of the perſon belov'd, but the pleaſure conſiſts in the remembrance of the perſon whom they behold in imagination. Whence that of the Poet.

Thus having ſaid, he rais'd in every one
A pleaſing ſtrife his ſorrows to bemoan.

It is alſo a pleaſure to be reveng'd of another. Of which, if a man happen to fail, he is troubled; if his deſign hit, he is overjoy'd. And for Choleric men, they are in a rage if they miſs their revenge; but they are pleas'd with the hopes of revenge. It is alſo delightful to get the better, not only to thoſe who are eager after victory, but to all mankind. For there is an imagination of excellency, which all men ſeek after, either more or leſs ardently. Seeing then it is a pleaſing thing to vanquiſh, therefore of neceſſity, all ſports and exerciſes relating to War, Muſic or Diſputation, of neceſſity muſt be delightful, in regard

regard it was a frequent thing to be victorious in thoſe things: as alſo all manner of Games, as Cards, Dice, Tennice, Tables, *&c.* where there is an Emulation or deſire to win: and ſo of Games and Exerciſes accompted more ſerious: of which ſome are delightful through uſe and practice; others naturally ſo; as all manner of Hunting. Wherefore pleading of cauſes and contentious diſputes, are pleaſant to thoſe that are accuſtom'd thereto, and know themſelves to be nimble at diſputation. Honour and Reputation are alſo in the number of thoſe things which are moſt delightful, in regard every one is willing to fancy himſelf ſuch an one. So much the more when affirmed by them who believe they ſpeak truth. Such are Neighbours rather then thoſe that live at a diſtance; Friends, Acquaintance and Citizens, rather then Forreigners; and ſuch as are in Being, rather then ſuch are yet to be born; prudent rather then imprudent, and many rather then a few. For it is moſt probable, that all already mentioned, ſpeak truth, rather then their oppoſites. For as to thoſe things which a man deſpiſes, as Children and Beaſts, no man regards their honour or eſteem, for the ſake of Reputation it ſelf; unleſs he have any other reaſon. Friends are alſo in the number of things delightful; alſo to love is delightful: For there is no man, a lover of Wine, who is not pleaſed with Wine: And it is alſo delightful to be belov'd. For then men imagine there is ſomething in 'em, which all men deſire that are endued with ſenſe. But to be belov'd, is to be carreſs'd by another for his own ſake. Alſo to be admir'd is pleaſant, becauſe it admits a man to be honour'd. As alſo

ſo to be flatter'd, and a Flatterer, are both things that pleaſe: For a Flatterer ſeems to be both an Admirer and a Friend. Alſo frequently to do the ſame thing is pleaſing; for what is cuſtomary is pleaſing: Exchange is alſo pleaſing, for exchange is proper to nature, in regard it is always the ſame, begets a ſatiety of the conſtituted and fix'd habit. When it is ſaid, that there is a pleaſure in the viciſſitude of all things. Wherefore the alterations of proceſs of time, whether in men or faſhions, is pleaſing: As being an alteration from what is at preſent; as alſo for that what ſpace of time produces is leſs frequent. Alſo to learn and to admire, is for the moſt part delectable. For there is deſire in admiration. Wherefore what is admirable excites deſires. For learning is the perfection of Nature. Alſo to do and receive kindneſſes are in the number of delectable things; and becauſe that whatever avails to do good is pleaſing, therefore men are delighted in correcting the miſcarriages of their Neighbors; and to amend what is defective. And becauſe it is a pleaſing thing to learn and admire ſuch things, of neceſſity thoſe things muſt be pleaſant which are expreſſed by imitation, as Painting, Sculpture and Poeſie: And whatever elſe is done by imitation, though the imitation it ſelf be not pleaſing. For they are not delighted with the imitation, but they argue from thence, that this is that, and ſo they come to learn ſomething. Alſo variety of unexpected accidents, and the narrow eſcapes from danger; for all theſe things are to be admired. Alſo becauſe all things that are natural are delightful, and for that thoſe things which mutually agree one with another,

are

are natural; there all things that are alike in agreement are natural. As Men with Men, young Men with young Men, Horſes with Horſes. Hence thoſe celebrated Proverbs; *like to like, the Whale to the Whale, the Blackbird to the Blackbird*, and ſo of the reſt. And becauſe like and homogeneous, are always delightful to themſelves, and every thing is thus or thus affected toward it ſelf, of neceſſity all men muſt be lovers of themſelves, either more or leſs. For all ſuch things chiefly have a regard to themſelves. And becauſe all Men are lovers of themſelves, thoſe things which are their own, muſt of neceſſity be equally delightful, as their Works, their Orations, their Poems, *&c.* Wherefore for the moſt part they love their Adorers and Friends, their Ambition, their Poſſeſſions and Children; for Children are their own works. Alſo to finiſh what they have begun is delightful, for it was their own work before, and becauſe it is moſt pleaſing to be the chiefeſt, therefore to be thought wiſe is moſt delightful. For it is Prince-like to be wiſe. For Wiſdom is the knowledge of many and admirable things. And becauſe they are generally ambitious, they delight in reproving their neighbors. And to abide by that, wherein every man thinks he has a particular excellency. According to that of *Euripides*,

To this doth He, with eager thought
The chiefeſt part of every day devote,
Himſelf to make the beſt, and better too,
Nay, better then himſelf, if toyl would do.

In

In like manner, becauſe all Recreation is pleaſant, together with relaxation of Mind, therefore Mirth and Laughter are delightful, and alſo moſt ridiculous things are pleaſant; as well ridiculous Men, as Speeches and Performances; but as for things ridiculous, we have diſcours'd in our Art of Poetry. And ſo let this ſuffice to ſhew what things are delightful; what things are irkſome will appear by their Contraries. And thus much for thoſe things which are the cauſes of Injuſtice and Injury.

CHAP. XII.

How Men believe themſelves capacitated to do Injuſtice, and by what means they do it.

NOW let us ſee how Men are capacitated to do an Injury, and by what means they do it. Theſe People therefore when they think the thing poſſible to be done, and to be done by themſelves, they conſider likewiſe whether they can conceal themſelves when they have done it; or if they cannot, whether they ſhall be queſtion'd, or if they come to ſuffer, whether the Puniſhment will be greater then what they have got by the Act. But as to what may be done, and what not, we ſhall afterwards declare, for theſe things are common to all the parts of Rhetoric. Now they believe themſelves moſt able to do an Injury, who think themſelves of greateſt ability both to ſpeak and act; whether out of their Experience in contention

tention and controverſy, or confiding in their Friends and their Riches: for if they find themſelves thus ſupported, they believe themſelves able. Or otherwiſe whether they have ſuch or ſuch for their Friends, Aſſiſtants, or Accomplices; for perhaps by the help of ſuch Aids, they may accompliſh their ends without fear of Puniſhment, or elſe conceal themſelves from it. Or if they be in Friendſhip with thoſe that ſuffer the Injury, or with the Judges; for Friends are careleſs of Injuries, and eaſily reconcil'd before Proſecution. The Judges alſo are willing to gratify their Friends, either by acquitting 'em, or by inflicting but a ſmall Puniſhment. Moreover it is eaſy for them to conceal themſelves, who are adjudg'd unable to commit the offence, as if a lame Perſon ſhould be accus'd for beating a Man, or a poor, or a deform'd perſon be accus'd of Adultery. Or if the Crime be ſaid to be committed publickly, and in the face of the World, for People are not apt to believe ſuch things; or if the Crimes be ſo great or ſo many that never were committed before. For Men are not aware of ſuch Injuries: in regard all Men ſhun common actors of miſchief, like ſo many Peſts or Diſeaſes. But as for him that never was ſick, no Man avoids him, and ſuch as have no Enemies or many. For theſe believe they may conceal themſelves, becauſe they are not ſuſpected. Others believe they may conceal themſelves, becauſe it cannot be thought they would ſet upon thoſe who are aware of 'em; or that it would be an Argument that they did never make the attempt, becauſe they were ſure to find reſiſtance. The ſame may be ſaid of ſuch as are provided of a means to eſcape, or of ſome place

at hand to ſecure themſelves, and of ſuch who if they cannot conceal themſelves, can put off the cauſe by delay of Juſtice, and corruption of the Judges. Or if he be amerc'd, is ſure to delay or buy off the Payment, or if he be ſuch a one who through Poverty has nothing to loſe; or ſuch whoſe gains are apparent, great, and at hand, their Fines but ſmall, hard to be found, and at a diſtance. And where the Puniſhment cannot be equal to the Profit. And ſuch as gain by the Injury, but are only ſham'd by the Puniſhment. Or where the Injury may ſeem commendable, as if a Man revenge an Injury done to his Father or Mother, as it was *Zeno*'s Caſe; where the Puniſhment is only a Fine or Baniſhment, or ſome ſuch thing; for both do an Injury, whether this way or that way done: tho' both are not the ſame Perſons, but contrary in their Manners and Diſpoſitions. Alſo they who have often had the good Fortune to conceal themſelves, and never more to be call'd in queſtion, alſo ſuch as frequently fail in their Attempts. For there are ſome in ſuch things, as well as in warfare, who are ſtill prepared to renew the Fight. Or ſuch as obtain a preſent Pleaſure, but the loſs follows afterwards, as it fares with the Intemperate; for there is Intemperance in all things which are deſired. On the contrary, ſuch as preſently ſuffer pain or loſs, but attain to Pleaſure or Profit afterwards, tho' later. And ſuch are the things which the abſtemious and prudent ſeek after. And ſuch as may ſeem to have acted by Fortune or Neceſſity, or by Nature or Cuſtom, and to have been miſtaken altogether, and not to have done any Injury. Partly ſuch as could not otherwiſe obtain their right,

right, partly ſuch as were in want. Now Men happen to be in want two ways: either they want Neceſſaries, as the Needy, or Superfluities, as the Rich. Partly, they who are Men of Repute, or Infamous: Thoſe becauſe they ſhall not be the leſs eſteem'd, theſe becauſe they ſhall not be the more eſteem'd: and under theſe Circumſtances they both attempt. And they injure thoſe who are furniſh'd with ſuch things, of which they ſtand in need, either neceſſaries, or for ſuperfluity, or pleaſure, and as well thoſe that live at a diſtance, as thoſe that live near at hand. The one are ſoon apprehended, the other more ſlowly puniſh'd; as they who rob'd the *Carthaginians*. Alſo the unwary, and ſuch as are not watchful, but credulous; for it is eaſy to deceive all theſe, alſo the negligent. For he that ſeeks revenge muſt be dilligent. The baſhful alſo, for they ſeldom contend for gain. Alſo thoſe who being injur'd by many, never care to take revenge. For to uſe the common Proverb, theſe are the *Myſians Prey*. Alſo thoſe who never, or they who were frequently injur'd, for both are neglectful: Theſe becauſe never, thoſe becauſe they think they ſhall be no more. Alſo thoſe that are or may be eaſily oppreſs'd with ſcandalous Reports. For ſuch never chuſe to defend themſelves, fearing the Judges; nor can perſwade the contrary; of which ſort are they whom many hate, or many envy. And againſt whom they have any Pretences, either of their Parents, or of their own, or of their Friends, either that they have or would do wrong, either to their Parents themſelves, or ſuch as are their deareſt Relations, who are under their Protection. For as the Proverb

ſays, Improbity only wants a pretence. We alſo injure our Friends and our Enemies; for it is eaſy to do the one, pleaſing to do the other. Alſo thoſe who have no Friends, who are not in a condition to ſay or do. Alſo ſuch as are neglectful of Revenge, or apt to be reconcil'd, or never proſecute to the end. Or ſuch as to whom it is not worth their while to ſpend time to ſtay for Judgment and recompence, as Forraigners, and Handicraft Tradeſmen, who are contented with ſmall ſatisfaction for an Injury committed. Or ſuch as have done many Injuries to others, or themſelves have ſuffered ſeveral like to what they have done. For that does not ſeem an Injury, when a Man has ſuffered no more then what he has often done himſelf, as if a Man ſhould be a perſon that uſed to give ill Language to others; or ſuch as have done an Injury, or intended it, or were about to do it. For in ſo doing there is both ſatisfaction, and applauſe; nor does it ſeem for the moſt part, to be an Injury. Or ſuch who do an Injury, that may be grateful to their Friends or their Maſters, or thoſe with whom they live. Alſo ſuch as from whom they eaſily hope for Forgiveneſs. Alſo when they have accuſed a Man and are at odds with him; as it was the caſe between *Calippus* and *Dio*. For ſuch Acts do altogether ſeem to be Injuries. Alſo thoſe not doing harm themſelves, are oppreſs'd by others, as if it were then too late to conſult a Remedy, as *Æneſidemus* is reported to have written to *Gelo*, when *Catabia* was by him diſpeopled; that he wanted but a little of preventing him, as if he intended to have done it himſelf. And ſuch to whom if we once do an Injury, we may do many things juſtly by way of Satisfaction.

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As Jaſon of *Theſſaly* ſaid, we muſt do Injury in ſome things, that we may do Juſtice in many. Alſo they more eaſily commit thoſe things which all or many do: hoping eaſily to obtain Pardon for ſuch things. Alſo Men are ready to commit Injuries which may eaſily be conceal'd. As when a Man takes unjuſtly from another ſuch things as are eaſily conſum'd, as things that are eatable; or which are not eaſily detected, becauſe of their changing Colour and Complexion, or ſuch things as are Portable, and hid in a ſmall Room, or things that are like to many things, which he that did the Injury poſſeſs'd before; or which a Man is unwilling to diſcloſe, as the Adulteries of his Wife, or his own, or his Childrens miſcarriages, and ſuch things that ſhew the Proſecutor to be a contentious perſon, and given to Strife: things of little Conſequence, and for which Pardon is frequently allowed. And thus, how Men are capacitated to do an Injury, by what means, who they are that act and ſuffer, and wherefore Men ſeek to injure others let this ſuffice.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Injury, and things done juſtly.

NOW let us diſtinguiſh between all Injuries and Lawful Actions, beginning firſt from hence. Juſt things and unjuſt are therefore deſtinguiſh'd according to the Laws, and the Perſons to which they relate, two ways. Now I

ſay the Law is either Proper or Common. Proper, that which concerns all Perſons in particular one among another; and this is either written or not written. Common is that which is according to Nature; for there are ſome things that are juſt or unjuſt by nature, and would be ſo if there were no Society or Agreement among Men. As *Antigone* in *Sophocles* ſeems to intimate; when ſhe avers it to be a thing naturally juſt to bury *Polynices*.

For neither now, nor yet of Yeſterday,
But always this has born perpetual ſway.
In all Mens Minds; nor is there one that knows
From whence this ſecret Law of Nature flows.

And as we find in *Empedocles* againſt Murther; for Murther is not juſt among ſome; unjuſt among others.

But a fix'd Law in all Mens Breaſts, where e're,
Heaven's Immenſe Light ſhines through the ſpa-
cious Air.

Which alſo *Alcidamas* confirms in his *Meſſeniac*. Now where they are determin'd, they are two ways determin'd; for what we ought to do or not to do relates either to common Society, or to one ſupream thing in that common Society. Therefore we may do right and injuſtice two ways; for either we hurt one ſingle perſon, or a common Society. For he that commits Adultery or beats a Man, harms a certain perſon; but he that deſerts his colours, injures the public. To ſuffer an Injury is to be injur'd by him that does

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it willingly, and with an Intention ſo to do. For we have already defin'd doing an Injury to be a voluntary act. And becauſe he that ſuffers an Injury receives a miſchief unwillingly, and all Injuries conſiſt of thoſe things already repeated (for we have already diſtinguiſh'd between things good and evil of themſelves, and what Men do ſpontaneouſly, that they do willingly) of neceſſity all offences relate either to the public, or to private Perſons; and that they are committed either unknowingly or unwillingly, or elſe willingly and knowingly: and of theſe, ſome are committed out of Pre-election, or out of Affection. Now what things Men make choice of, and in what Capacities, has been already ſaid. But becauſe ſome Men who confeſs they have done ſuch a thing, either will not acknowledg the declaration of matter of Fact in the complaint; as if it ſhould be ſaid, that he ſtole the thing where he took it. Or if he confeſs that he ſtruck firſt; but did not give the firſt Provocation; that he was in the Womans Company, but did not lye with her: or that he did commit the Theft, but it was not Sacriledg; as it was alſo laid in the Declaration; or that he brake up Land, but not belonging to the public; or that he diſcours'd the Enemy, but not as a Traytor; Therefore when we treat of theſe things, we define, what is Theft, what Contumely, what Adultery, that whether we would demonſtrate it to be or not to be, we may declare what is juſt; for in all theſe things, the queſtion is, whether the thing be unjuſt, or wicked, or not: For Improbity or Injury conſiſts in Election. And words indeed of this nature demonſtrate the Election; as Contumely and

Theft. Yet he that ſtrikes a perſon, does not preſently offer an indignity to the ſame perſon, but if he do it to ſome other purpoſe and intention, as either to diſgrace the ſame perſon, or elſe for to pleaſe himſelf. Nor can he that takes a thing privily be ſaid to ſteal, but if he do it to the damage of another, and to his own proper benefit. And the ſame rule is to be obſerv'd in other things of this nature.

And becauſe there are two ſorts of juſt and unjuſt things; for ſome are ſet down in writing, others not; of what are delivered in the Law we have already ſpoken; but of thoſe things which are not ſet down in writing, there are two ſorts beſides. And theſe are partly according to the exuberancy of Vertue and Vice, wherein are ignominy and praiſe, diſhonour and honour, and gifts and gratitude to a Benefactor, and returning kindneſs for kindneſs, to be aſſiſting to a mans friends and the like: Partly a ſupplement to the written and proper law. For equity ſeems to be juſt, and equity is that which is juſt, beſides what is ſet down in the written Law. And this happens, ſometimes though the Lawgivers are unwilling; ſometimes by their connivance. Unwillingly, when they were ignorant of the matter; willingly when they cannot determine, but there is a neceſſity to ſpeak in general terms, not ſo, but as is moſt uſual; or where they cannot diſtinguiſh becauſe of Infinity, as to give rules if a man wounds, with what ſort of mettle, and how much of any ſort: For it would be tedious to enumerate thoſe particulars. If therefore, when the thing is Indefinite, a Law muſt be made concerning it, nothing can be ſaid otherwiſe

wiſe then ſimply and barely. Wherefore if a man having a Ring upon his Finger, ſtrikes another, or lifts up his hand, he is guilty according to the written Law, and has done an injury; though in reality he has done none. And this is Equity. If then what we have ſaid be Equity, it is apparent what things are equal, what not, and who are men of Equity. For where pardon is allowable, there is alſo Equity; nor is it equal to judge offences and injuries, and injuries and misfortunes worthy of equal puniſhment. Now misfortunes are ſuch things as happen contrary to expectation; and not through improbity: Offences ſuch things as happen, not contrary to expectation, yet not out of a wicked intention: But injuries happen from a wicked inclination, according to expectancy. For what proceeds from deſire, proceeds from wickedneſs. And it is but equal alſo to pardon human frailties; and not to have a reſpect to the Law, but the Lawgiver; not to the words but the ſenſe and meaning of the Lawgiver; not to the act, but the pre-election; not to the part, but to the whole; not what a man is now, but what a man was always, or for the moſt part; and to remember to what good things his inclination leads him, then to what bad things: And the benefits he has receiv'd, then what he has done; and his patience in ſuffering injuries, and his deſire to be judg'd rather by words then deeds; and rather to refer himſelf to Arbitration, then go to Law and Tryal. For an Arbitrator conſiders Equity; a Judge looks upon the Law, and therefore an Arbitrator is choſen; that Equity may prevail: And thus much concerning things Equal.

CHAP.

CHAP XIV.

Of the greater or leſs Injury.

THE greater Injury is that which proceeds from the greater Injuſtice. Wherefore ſometimes the leaſt crimes ſeem to be the greateſt; as when *Calliſtratus* accuſed *Melanopus*, for taking three ſmall Veſſels of inconſiderable value from the Builders of the Temple, becauſe the Veſſels were ſacred. But in Juſtice, 'tis quite contrary. For thoſe other things ſeem ſo to be, becauſe they exceed in the virtual conſequences; in regard, that he who would ſteal three ſacred Veſſels of ſmall price, would do a greater injury. And ſometimes it is ſo indeed the greater, ſometimes it is ſo judged according to the harm that enſues: And where the puniſhment is not equal, but every way leſs, and for which there is no remedy; for that is terrible, and almoſt impoſſible, and where the ſufferer can receive no recompence, in regard no remedy can be found. For judgment and puniſhment are the remedies: And if the ſufferer cannot brook the Ignominie. Moreover if he that did the injury more deſerves the puniſhment; as *Sophocles* pleading for *Euctemon*, becauſe he that could not brook the indignities kill'd himſelf, affirmed that he would not have meaner thoughts of the contumely, or think it deſerv'd leſs puniſhment, becauſe he that had ſuffer'd had puniſh'd himſelf. Or if a man does an injury alone,

alone, or firſt of all, or engag'd with a few: And to commit the ſame injuries often, is a great injuſtice. Great are alſo thoſe crimes for the prevention of which great puniſhments and torments, are ſought and invented, and Priſons built for their reſtraint. And among the *Argives* he is fin'd and amerc'd, who occaſions the making of a new Law. The moſt Beſtial injury alſo is the greater, and that which is premeditated: And which they, who when they hear it, are more afraid of, then pity. And where we contemn or tranſgreſs many juſt things, as oaths, pledging of Faith, and Conjugal Vows. For it is an exuberancy of many injuries. Alſo their crimes are not mean, which are commited where the unjuſt are puniſh'd; ſuch are falſe Witneſſes; for who may be counted Offendors, if not they who offend in Courts of Juſtice: Alſo thoſe which the greater ignominy attends. Alſo they that injure their Benefactors. For he multiplies injuries, as well in doing ill, as in not doing well. And they that act againſt the Laws unwritten; in regard it is better to be juſt when uncompell'd. Now the written Laws were made through neceſſity, but not the unwritten. For he that aw'd by fear, and liable to puniſhment, commits an injury, will not ſcruple to do worſe where no puniſhment hangs o're his head. And thus much concerning the greater and the leſſer injury.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

Of Unartificial Proofs.

WE are now to ſpeak of proof which is Unartificial; which is proper in judicial cauſes. Now there are five things that make up this ſort of proof; the Law, Witneſſes, Compacts, Examinations and Oaths. And firſt of the Laws, what uſe is to be made of 'em, as well by him that diſſwades, as by him that perſwades; by him that accuſes, as by him that defends. For it appears, that if the written Law be contrary to the fact, the common Law is to be made uſe of, and equity, as being more juſt. For he proceeds according to the beſt advice, who does not always make uſe of the written Laws. For Equity always remains and never changes, no more then the common Law, as being according to nature; but the written Law changes often. As it is ſaid in *Sophocles*'s *Antigone*, that ſhe had acted contrary to the Laws of *Creon*, but not contrary to the unwritten Law.

Which neither now, nor yet of Yeſterday,
But ſtill in all mens minds perpetual ſway
Has born; and for that reaſon did deride
Not only this, but all mens Laws beſide.

Seeing then, that juſt is ſomewhat which is true and profitable; but that which ſeems ſo is not; therefore

therefore that which is written is no Law, becauſe it does not perform the duty of Law. Moreover, the Judge is like him that eſſays both Silver and Gold, to diſcern what is truly juſt from what is adulterate: And beſides, it is more becoming the Character of a judicious man, to make uſe of unwritten then written Laws, and to ſtick cloſe to them. Whether this unwritten Law be contrary to ſome approv'd Law, or oppoſite to its ſelf, as when the one commands all contracts to be firmly obſerv'd; and the other forbids any contracts to be made contrary to the Laws. Or if it be ambiguous, that he may weigh and conſider, to what part to accommodate the juſt, and to what the profitable; and ſo to make the beſt uſe of it. And if the grounds and reaſons upon which the Law was made, are ceas'd, but the Law is ſtill in force; this muſt be endeavour'd to be explain'd; to ſhew the repugnancy of the Law to its ſelf. But if the written Law be agreeable to the occaſion or the fact, then it is rightly and truly to be ſaid, that the Law was not made for the Judge to act, for the ſake of what is contrary to the Law; but leaſt he ſhould perjure himſelf, being ignorant of the Law; and becauſe no man chooſes what is barely good, but all make choice of what is good for themſelves; and becauſe there is no difference, whether there be no Laws, or whether no uſe be made of any; and becauſe that in diſeaſes, it ſignifies nothing to cavil againſt the Phyſitian; although the error of the Phyſitian is nothing ſo prejudicial, as to accuſtom our ſelves to diſobey our Rulers. And becauſe the beſt Laws forbid any man to ſhew himſelf wiſer then the Law. And thus much concerning the Laws.

The

The Witneſſes are ſometimes ancient, and ſometimes modern, ſometimes participant of the danger, ſometimes out of all hazzard. I call the ancient Teſtimonies, ſuch as the Poets and other famous men, whoſe judgments and ſentences are approv'd, as the *Athenians* made uſe of *Homer*, for a witneſs about *Salamina*; And the *Tenedians* of *Periander* the *Corinthian*, againſt the *Sigæans*, *Leophron* made uſe of *Solon*'s Elegies againſt *Critias*, to ſhew that his Family had been infamous, for ſo long time, for uncleanlineſs. Otherwiſe *Solon* had never ſaid,

Pi'l Critias *vaunting in his Golden Locks,*
Obedient to his Parent, ſhun the Rocks
Of Youths Intemperance———

Theſe are therefore Teſtimonies concerning things paſt; but as to future things, the Interpreters of the Oracles, as *Themiſtocles* alledging, that wooden Walls ſignify'd to the *Athenians* to make themſelves ſtrong in their naval force. A Proverb alſo is a kind of Teſtimony. As if a man deliberating whether to ſeek the friendſhip of an Old Man, meets with the Proverb, *Never place a benefit upon an Old Man.* He that deliberates whether to kill the Children with the Parents, meets with another Proverb. *A Fool is he, that once the Children ſlain, the Father ſaves.*

Alſo the Evidence of modern Teſtimonies being of good credit, are uſeful in ſuits at Law. As *Eubulus* urg'd in a Trial, a certain Sentence of *Plato* againſt *Charetas*, which *Plato* had urg'd againſt *Charibius*. That it was all long of him that the People confeſs'd themſelves all wicked in the City.

Some

Some are participant of the danger if they ſeem to ſwear falſe. But theſe are only Witneſſes of things of this Nature, as whether done, or not done, and whether it be or be not; but not at all of the quality, as whether juſt or unjuſt; profitable or not profitable. However ancient Teſtimonies may be us'd to prove the quality; for not being to be corrupted, they are moſt undeniable Evidence. And therefore they who have no other Evidence, make uſe of this aſſiſtance, which is to be judg'd from Probabilities. For that is an excellent method of judging; that probables cannot be corrupted with money; and are never accus'd of giving falſe judgment; which Teſtimonies he that has, will make uſe of againſt him that has not, becauſe that probable will delay the ſentence: In regard there would be no occaſion of Witneſſes, could the matter be prov'd by reaſon.

Now Teſtimonies, ſome relate to our ſelves, ſome to the adverſary; ſome to the matter, ſome to the Circumſtances. Whence it is apparent, that we never can be in want of profitable Teſtimony. For it will relate to the matter, either for us or againſt our adverſaries: Or the Circumſtances of reputation; what our own, what the repute of our adverſary.

In reference to Contracts, there is this uſe of Oration, to increaſe or extenuate, to ſhew their credibility or incredibility. For if the probability and credibility be on our ſide, 'tis for us; if not 'tis againſt us. But he that will ſhew the probability or improbability of things, muſt conſider what we have already ſaid concerning the Witneſſes. Now if it be granted there was ſuch

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a contract; then Amplification muſt be us'd on our ſide. For a contract is a private Law in reference to the particular part. However the Laws are not confirm'd by contracts, but contracts are confirm'd by the Laws: And the Law is abſolutely a certain agreement. And therefore he that will not believe, but overthrows a contract, ſubverts the Law. Alſo exchange of Commodities to an again; alſo whatever we do voluntarily, we do by agreement. Therefore he that endeavours to render contracts invalid, deſtroys all commerce and converſation among Men. But if theſe things are on the Adverſaries ſide, all things are firſt to be urged to invalidate the force of the contrary Law. For if the Laws do not appear to be rightly made, but ſalaciouſly impoſed by the Law makers, it would be an abſurd thing to believe our ſelves not bound to obedience; but yet that it was of neceſſity to ſtand to the contract. Moreover becauſe a judge is a diſpenſer of Juſtice, and therefore he is not to conſider what is juſt, but what is moſt juſt. For it is not for Juſtice to be perverted, either by fraud or through neceſſity: For it is natural. But contracts may be made by perſons deceiv'd, or in neceſſity. Therefore it is to be conſider'd whether they are contrary to any written or common Law, or to what is juſt and honeſt: Or whether to any former or latter contracts: for either the latter ſtand good, and the former are cancell'd, or the former ſtand good and the latter are void: And ſo we muſt plead what is moſt for our turn: then we are to conſider, whether they may be any way prejudicial to the Judges; or whatever elſe may occur of the ſame nature.

Exami-

Examinations alſo and Torments are a ſort of Teſtimonies, and they ſeem to be of ſome credit, becauſe they are conſtrain'd. And therefore it is no difficult thing to underſtand their force, and how far uſe may be made of 'em. Which if they prove for us, then we are to amplify, as if they were the only true Teſtimonies; if againſt us, and for the Adverſary, then to invalidate the Evidence, by ſpeaking generally of Torments. For that they who are conſtrain'd, ſpeak far more untruths then truths. Enduring, on purpoſe to conceal the truth; and readily lying, to be out of their pain: And for collateral confirmation, examples are to be brought which the Judges know.

Concerning Oaths, the conſideration is fourfold. For in this caſe, there is either giving or taking, or neither, or both. Another way thus, whether the thing be ſworn, and whether by this or by that perſon. The reaſon is, becauſe men eaſily forſwear themſelves; nor does the ſwearer reſtore; beſides, he believes judgment will paſs without any Witneſs to ſwear, and becauſe there is leſs hazard to commit himſelf to the Judges; for he confides in them, not in the Witneſs.

The other then again will not take, becauſe he deteſts to be brib'd to ſwear: becauſe that if he were a Villain he would ſwear; and better it would be to be a Villain for ſomething then nothing; for by ſwearing he ſhall get nothing, and therefore he refuſes the money, not to avoid ſwearing, but out of a vertuous Inclination. Whence that of *Xenophanes*, that the challenge is not equal of an impious perſon againſt a man

of Religion and Honesty, but as if a strong lusty person should challenge a weak Impotent Cripple to fight him. If he takes, 'tis because he confides in himself and not the Giver. So that inverting the saying of *Xenophanes*, we may say thus, that it is the same thing whither the wicked offer, or whether the Vertuous person swearer: for it is a hard thing that he should refuse in those things, concerning which they think fit to give sentence upon his Oath. But if he gives as willing to commit his cause to the Gods; or because he has no need of appeal to any other Iudges, he offers to him, that he may be his Judge: And because it is absurd that he should refuse to swear to such things, which others are thought worthy to swear, and will be sworn to. And thus as it appears what is to be done in singulars, it is as apparent also what is to be done in Copulatives. As if the same person will give, but not take; or take and not give, or if he be ready to give and take or refuses to do either. For by what has been said of necessity, they must be coupl'd; as must their Reasons and Consequences also be. Hence it is apparent, that if a Man be deceiv'd by his Adversary, 'tis no Perjury. For Injury proceeds from the Will, and Perjury is an Injury; but such things as are done by Violence and fraud are not voluntary. Hence Perjury appears to be in the Mind and not in the Mouth. Wherefore if the Adversary swear that he subverts all things who will not stand to his Oath, the Answer is at hand. For this reason it is that you subvert the Law in Swearing: Cry you, we think it just that you should abide by your Oaths, and submit

to

to our Judgment; but we will not abide by our Oaths: or whatever elſe may be ſpoke by way of Amplification. And thus much concerning in artificial Proofs.

Ariſtotle's RHETORIC TO Theodectes.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

That the Affections of the Auditors are to be mov'd.

NOW becauſe *Rhetoric* is all for the ſake of Judgment; (for Men judg of Deliberations, as Judgment belongs to the Seat of Juſtice) therefore it will be neceſſary to ſhew how it is adapted, not only to accompliſh two ends of Demonſtration, and gaining Belief; but alſo to render himſelf and the Judg ſo and ſo qualified. For

For chiefly in Deliberations, and then in Judgments it mainly avails to the gaining Belief, that the Speaker may ſeem to be ſo quallifi'd, and by the Hearers be thought to be ſome way or other affected toward 'em, and farther that they be in ſome meaſure affected toward him. Now that the Perſon of the Orator ſhould be moſt regarded, is moſt proper in matters of Deliberation; but that the Hearer ſhould be affected, is moſt proper in Courts of Juſtice. For the ſame things do not appear to thoſe that love and hate; nor to the haſty and the mild; but another thing altogether, or as it is in bigneſs. For to a Friend, he that is to give the Judgment ſeems to none or but very little wrong; but with an Enemy 'tis quite otherwiſe. Alſo to him that hopes and deſires well, if what is expected be pleaſing, it ſeems both that it will be, and that it will be a happineſs if it come to paſs. Quite otherwiſe it will be to him that deſpiſes and fears the Iſſue. There are three things therefore which render an Orator worthy of Credit, beſides Demonſtration, Prudence, Vertue, Benevolence. Wherefore they who ſpeak or debate, fail either for want of all theſe, or for want of ſome one of theſe. For either through folly they do not rightly think, or if they think aright, for want of Honeſty, they do not ſay as they think; or though they gueſs right and are vertuous, yet are they eaſily thought not to give the beſt advice, though they knew how to do it, becauſe they are not accounted Benevolent. Theſe are the three things, for want of which they only fail. Therefore if they be but thought to be endow'd with all theſe Vertues, of neceſſity he muſt be thought a Perſon of Cre-

dit by his Hearers. Now how Men may come to be thought Prudent and Vertuous, is to be gathered out of what has been discours'd concerning the Vertues; for from thence he may learn to make not only himself, but another so. We are now to speak of Benevolence and Love, and in general of the Affections.

The Affections therefore are those things, wherewith Men being mov'd, make a different judgment of things. Which affections are attended either by Pleasure or Pain; as by Anger, Pity, Fear, and the like, together with their Opposites. To every one of which there belongs three Considerations: as in reference to Anger, how Men affected with that Passion become Angry, with what things they are accustom'd to be angry, and in what sort of things. For if we aim at one or two, and not all of those things, it will be impossible to move the Hearers to anger. And so of the rest.

CHAP. II.

Of Anger.

ANger is therefore the desire of apparent Revenge, accrewing from a distaste, by reason of some appearing, tho' undeserv'd contempt of themselves, or their Friends. Which being Anger, of necessity when any one is angry, he must be angry with some one in particular, as with *Cleo*: tho' not with the Man; otherwise then because he

he did or would have done ſomething to himſelf, or ſome one of his Friends. So that always ſome Pleaſure attends upon all Anger, in hopes of revenge; for it is a pleaſure for a Man to think he ſhall obtain what he deſires: ſince no Man ſeeks after Impoſſibilities. wherefore an angry Man covets Poſſibilities. Wherefore it is rightly ſaid of Anger,

That it encreaſes in the anger'd Breaſt
More ſweet then Honey, that ſo charms the Taſt.

For it is attended by a certain Pleaſure, as well for the reaſons alledg'd, as alſo for that Men dwell upon the Imagination of Revenge, which Imagination is like to the Pleaſure we have in Dreaming.

Now in regard Contempt is the operation of Conceit about that which ſeems to be of no value (for we do not ſlight either good or bad things, or their Conſequences, but we never value thoſe that are none at all, or the leaſt) there are three ſorts of Contempt; ſlighting, vexation, and affront: For he that ſlights another, contemns him; ſeeing that what Men have but little value for, that they ſlight: but they contemn things of no value. And he that vexes another, ſeems to contemn him. For vexation is when any Man becomes a hindrance to another Man's Will: not to gain any thing himſelf, but to prevent the other. And therefore not aiming at any Profit to himſelf, he deſpiſes the other. Which is apparent from hence, that it will be no dammage to himſelf; (for if he did he would be afraid and not contemn the Perſon) nor advantage

to the other in any thing of Moment. Otherwiſe he would be careful to ſeek his Friendſhip. And he that offers an affront to another, deſpiſes him. For to affront, is to vex and trouble another in ſuch things, wherein it is an Indiginty to him to ſuffer; not that he aims at any thing more then what he does, but only that he delights in the Act. For they that return the Injury, do not affront but take revenge. But it is a pleaſure to him that offers the affront, to think that in doing the Injury he excells the other, and ſhews himſelf to be the better Man. Therefore young Men and Rich People are Contumelious, believing it ſhews their Superiority to give an affront. For it is the nature of Contumely to diſgrace; and he that diſgraces another, contemns him: For whatſoever is worth nothing, has no eſteem or repute either of being good or evil. Therefore ſays *Achilles* in his Fury,

——The affront my Honour ſtains
While he my Valours Guerdon thus detains.

And that other,

As if ſome Deſpicable Runagate.

Which were the reaſons of his Provocation. Now Men think it convenient to be exalted above their Superiours, becauſe of their Birth, their Strength, their Vertue, and briefly in every thing that is an excellency in others: as the wealthy excells in Riches; the Eloquent in the gift of utterance; he that commands him that is commanded, and he that is thought worthy to govern,

vern, excells him that is not thought worthy. And therefore it is ſaid,

Great is the wrath of Jove *deſcended King's*

And in another Place,

Deep in his breaſt his brooding Anger lyes,
To perfect what is fury ſhall deviſe.

For they impatiently brook affronts, in regard of their high dignity and ſuperexcellency, Others by reaſon of the benefits they have done, or do, either by themſelves, or their friends, or will or would do for his ſake. And thus it is Apparent how men come to be angry with whom and for what cauſes they are angry. For ſome are angry when they are aggreiv'd. For he that is aggreiv'd deſires ſomething whether it be by any Oppoſition directly made againſt him; as to hinder a man from drinking that is a thirſty; or not directly, as if a man does not oppoſe, yet does not lend his Aſſiſtance; or if any other greivance happen, all theſe things raiſe anger in a man. And therefore, ſick People, Poor People, Lovers, thirſty People, and in a word all that deſire, without obtaining their deſires, are angry and eaſily provok'd, eſpecially with thoſe that diſpiſe their preſent Condition. As thoſe that are ſick with thoſe that upbraid; or whatever is the cauſe of their Diſtemper: The Poor are angry with their Poverty; the Warriour with his ill ſucceſs; the Lover, for want of his ſatisfaction; and ſo of the reſt; ſeeing that every one is prepar'd for his Paſſion by the diſturbance

ſturbance that is within him. Moreover if the perſon expected things contrary. For what is great and unexpected cauſes a greater greivance; as it cauſes greater delight, when a thing happens contrary to expectation. Hence it happens that ſeaſons, hours, ages, and diſpoſitions make it apparent who and which are moſt Subject to anger, and when and where and which overruling render the Tempers of men more froppiſh and teſty. They alſo are angry with thoſe that laugh, deride and ſcoff at 'em: for ſuch affront 'em: and with thoſe that offend 'em in ſuch things as are the ſigns of contumely; of which number are thoſe things which are done to no end, and are no way profitable to thoſe that give the Offence: and therefore they are contumelious. People alſo are angry with thoſe that ſlight and ſpeak ill of thoſe things wherein they cheifly delight: as when they ſpeak evil of Philoſophy before ſuch as ſtudy to excel therein: or if another diſpraiſe the ſhape of ſuch a Mans Body, which they think handſom: and ſo in other things, more eſpecially if they ſuſpect themſelves to want thoſe Perfections which are tax'd to be wanting in others. But if they are confident of their own parts and beauty, they never mind what others ſay. Alſo men take theſe things more unkindly at their friends hands then at the hands of others; as expecting at their hands more civility and reſpect. Alſo with ſuch as were wont to reſpect and honour 'em, but forbear their former civilitys: for then they think themſelves contemn'd; otherwiſe they would continue their friendſhip. Alſo with thoſe that ſhew themſelves ungrateful, and do not return

Quid

Quid for *Quo*; and with ſuch as act quite contrary to what they do, eſpecially if their Inferiours. For all theſe things are lookt upon as contempts, the one of Inferiors, the other by Inferiors. More eſpecially if they be contemn'd by thoſe who are of no eſteem themſelves. For Anger riſes from a contempt that no way becomes the Contemners: now it does not become Inferiours to deſpiſe their Superiours. And friends are no friends, if they do not ſay and do well; much more if they act or ſay quite contrary to their friends, and if they are not ſenſible of their wants, as was *Antipho's Plexippos* with *Meleager*: for it is a ſign we are not ſenſible of the diſreſpect we ſhow: for where we are careful of our behaviour, we conſider what we do. People are alſo angry with thoſe that rejoyce at their Misfortunes, more eſpecially if they ſport with their Calamities: for both are ſigns of contempt or Enmity. Alſo with them that care not whether they be troubleſom or no. Wherefore they are angry with thoſe that tell 'em ill news: and with thoſe that hear of or ſee their Misfortunes without being concern'd, for they reſemble Enemies or Contemners. For friends condole with friends; and all men grieve at their own Misfortunes: People are alſo angry with five ſorts of men: with thoſe with whom they ſtand in Competition for honour; thoſe whom they admire; with thoſe by whom they would be admir'd, with thoſe whom they reverence, and with thoſe by whom they are reverenc'd.

For if they are deſpis'd by any of theſe, they are more Paſſionately incens'd. And if they are contemn'd by thoſe whom they are oblig'd to aſſiſt

aſſiſt; as Parents Children, Wives, Subjects. And with the ungrateful: for ſuch a contempt is unbeſeeming: and with ſuch as diſſemble toward ſuch as are ſerious. For Diſſimulation is affrontive. And with thoſe that are liberal to others, not to them: for it argues contempt to be only thought unworthy. Forgetfulneſs alſo cauſes anger, as of names, tho' it be a ſmall matter; for it proceeds from negligence, and negligence denotes contempt. Thus it is manifeſt that an Orator ought to frame his Auditors to ſuch a Temper as they uſe to be in when they are angry, and the Adverſary to be guilty of ſuch things which provoke their anger, and to be ſuch with whom they have juſt cauſe to be angry.

CHAP. III.

Of Mildneſs.

NOW in regard that to be Angry is contrary to be Mild, and anger oppoſite to mildneſs, we are to conſider the temper of mild People, what things render 'em ſo, and towards what ſort of Perſons they ſo carry themſelves. Mildneſs therefore is a ſuppreſſion and ſedation of anger. Since then men are angry with ſuch as deſpiſe, and deſpite is Spontaneous, it is apparent that they are mild and gentle toward ſuch as do none of thoſe things or unwillingly, or elſe are ſeemingly ſuch: or with ſuch as would do contrary to what they have done: and with ſuch whoſe

whoſe behaviour is alike to others as to themſelves; for no man deſpiſes himſelf; or toward ſuch as make an acknowledgement, and repent. For looking upon it as a Peice of Juſtice done 'em that the other repents, and is ſorry for what he has done, they ceaſe being angry. Which is apparent from the Chaſtiſement of Servants. For men chaſtiſe more deſervedly the ſtubborn, and ſuch as deny the fact: but when they confeſs themſelves to be ſeverely puniſh'd, we forbear. For it is a peice of imprudence to deny thoſe things that are manifeſt; and imprudence is a contempt: and therefore we deſpiſe thoſe we do not reverence.

Therefore alſo we are mild toward thoſe that carry themſelves ſubmiſſively and do not contradict us in our anger. For they ſeem to confeſs themſelves our inferiors; but inferiors ſtand in fear, and therefore not worth anger.

Now the very Dogs are a demonſtration that our anger ceaſes toward thoſe that humble themſelves; who never bite thoſe that ſit ſtill. We are alſo kind to thoſe that are ſerious when we are ſerious. For then we ſeem to be obſerv'd, not contemn'd. Alſo toward thoſe who have been greatful in a greater matter; and toward thoſe that beg and intreat: for they ſeem to be the more ſubmiſſive: alſo toward ſuch as are neither contumelious, Scoffers, or contemners, either of any Perſon, or of none but the wicked, or of ſuch as are no way like to themſelves. In general thoſe things that pacify and aſſwage are to be conſider'd by their contrarys. Alſo toward ſuch as we fear and reverence.

For men in that temper are never angry.

For

For it is impoſſible to reverence the ſame Perſon and be angry with him at the ſame time; For ſometimes when men have done a thing in paſſion, we are either not angry at all, or very little mov'd: in regard they did not ſeem to have done the thing out of contempt: for no man contemns that is angry. For grief never accompanies Contempt, as it does Anger. Men are alſo mild to thoſe that reſpect 'em. Moreover thoſe that carry themſelves quite contrary to thoſe that are angry, may be ſaid to be mild; as in Play, in Jeſting, at Feſtivals, in Felicity, in Succeſs, in Plenty, and briefly in all manner of Indolency, in harmleſs pleaſure, and honeſt hopes. Alſo toward thoſe by whom they have not been moleſted for a long time; for Time appeaſes Wrath. Revenge alſo taken formerly of another pacifies the fiercer Anger of ſome men. Wherefore *Philocrates* being ask'd by another why he did not clear himſelf before the enrag'd People? anſwer'd it was not yet ſeaſonable. When then, ſaid the other. When I have ſeen another, Condemned before me, replied *Philocrates*. For they grow tame, when they have ſpent their Anger upon another. As it happen'd to *Argophilus*; whom the people abſolv'd, tho' they were more enrag'd againſt him then againſt *Callisthenes*, becauſe they had firſt condemn'd *Callisthenes* to death. Alſo when the offenders have ſuffer'd more dammage then they receiv'd from thoſe thatwere anger'd; for they believe ſuch a one ſufficiently puniſh'd. Or when they believe themſelves to have done unjuſtly, and to ſuffer juſtly: For anger never proceeds from what is lawfully done or ſaid. Therefore when Men believe they ſuffer undeſervedly

deſervedly, they are to be reprov'd in words; which is Anger. Therefore we are more gentle to Servants that brook their Chaſtiſement patiently. Or if they believe them not ſenſible of the offence done 'em, or for whoſe ſake they ſuffer'd. For as it appears by the definition, Anger is againſt particular and ſingular Perſons. Wherefore *Ulyſſes* is rightly call'd *A Deſtroyer of Cities.* As if he would not have taken his Revenge unleſs he had been ſenſible both of the *from whom*, and *for what.* Therefore we are not angry with thoſe that are not ſenſible, as for example never with the dead. Which was the reaſon that when the Poet would appeaſe *Achilles*'s Anger toward *Hector* then dead, he us'd this expreſſion;

For all this fury is but ſpent in vain
On the Deaf Earth; therefore thy rage refrain.

Hence therefore it is apparent that if we deſign to appeaſe wrath we are to ſpeak from theſe Topics, ſo as to render the Auditory qualifi'd to our minds; and to ſhew that they with whom they are diſpleas'd, are either to be fear'd, or to be reverenc'd or ſuch as have well deſerv'd, or ſuch as offended unwillingly, or are ſorry for what they have done.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of Friendſhip and Love, and their Contrarys.

TO Love is to wiſh what is truly beneficial to another, for the ſake of that Perſon, and not for his own ſake that wiſhes, and to uſe his utmoſt endeavour to bring thoſe things to paſs.

A friend is he that Loves and is belov'd again; and they are ſaid to be friends, between whom there is this mutual Correſpondency. Which being granted, a friend muſt be ſuch a one as rejoyces at his friends felicity, and condoles with him in his Misfortunes; not for any other reaſon but becauſe they are ſuch either good or bad, which happen to their friend. For all men are glad if things fall out according to their wiſhes; if otherwiſe, they grieve and are ſorry. Wherefore Gladneſs and Sorrow are the ſigns of good or bad wiſhes. Moreover they who accompt the ſame things good or evil, who have the ſame friends and the ſame Enemies. For of neceſſity theſe muſt wiſh the ſame things. Now he that wiſhes the ſame things to another as to himſelf, for that very reaſon ſeems to be his friend. For they love thoſe that have either done them kindneſs, or thoſe that are under their care; eſpecially if the kindneſs were great, if frank and free, if ſeaſonable, and for his own ſake: or whoever they believe have a good will do them good.

Alſo

and thoſe that love whom they love, and thoſe that are beloved by them, who are belov'd by themſelves, and their friends; and hate thoſe whom they hate, and Enemies to their Enemies. For they believe the ſame things to be beneficial to all theſe as as well as to themſelves; ſo that they wiſh no other to themſelves then what their friend enjoys. Alſo thoſe that are liberal of their purſes, and for their ſecurity. Therefore we love the Liberal, the Stout, as alſo the Juſt. And ſuch they believe thoſe to be that live by their Labour, Husbad men, and good neceſſary Tradeſmen. Alſo ſuch as are temperate, becauſe they are not unjuſt: and ſuch as are not given to meddle with other People's buſineſs for the ſame reaſon. And ſuch whoſe friendſhip we would deſire, if they would but ſeem to deſire it; ſuch are thoſe that ſurpaſs in vertue, and are famous either among all Men, or among the beſt of Men, or among thoſe whom they admire. Alſo ſuch as are pleaſant and merry in dayly Converſe. Such as are facetious and harmleſs in their Diſcourſe, neither reproving the faults of other Men, nor contentious, nor obſtinate. For all ſuch are given to ſtrife. And ſuch as are contentious never ſeem to wiſh the ſame, but contrary things. And ſuch as are quaint in giving and taking Jeaſts. For in both theſe things men ſtrive to be facetious, as well he that gives as he that takes the Jeaſt. And ſuch as praiſe the preſent felicitys, eſpecially thoſe which they are afraid to looſe at the ſame time themſelves. And ſuch as are neat in their Dreſs and Habit, and ſuch as never reproach the Miſcarriages of others, nor the good Turns which

they have don'em; for both are ſigns of Contention. And ſuch as never bear injuries in mind, nor obſervers of other mens faults, but ſuch as are eaſily reconcil'd. For as we find e'm to be to others, ſuch we believe they will prove to us. And ſuch as are never given to ſlander, neither underſtanding their own nor the failings of others, but only their Vertues. Alſo ſuch as never contradict ſuch as are in Paſſion or Serious; for theſe are accounted Contentions. And thoſe who are ſo affected toward us, that they reſpect us, believe us vertuous and delight in our Company: and are chiefly ſo affected with us in thoſe things which we moſt delight to follow and take pleaſure in, and for which we are moſt eſteem'd whether for pleaſure or profit. And ſuch as are of the ſame Calling and Profeſſion, unleſs they ſeem to interfere one with another according to that of the Proverb, *The Potter envys the Potter.* And ſuch as deſire the ſame things, if there be a poſſibility of their partaking: if not, the reaſon proceeds from the ſame Proverb of *Heſiod.* Alſo thoſe who ſo behave themſelves toward all men, as not to be aſham'd to diſcover their Opinion, yet not to the contempt of others: and ſuch as are aſhamed to diſcover their real infirmities and miſcarriages committed. And ſuch between whom their is a generous Emulation, yet they deſire not their Envy, but either are or would be their friends. And whoſe good they ſtudy, leaſt greater Miſchiefs ſhould befall themſelves, and ſuch by whom they are belov'd as well preſent as abſent. And ſuch as are firm to their friends and never forſake 'em; for among all bleſſings, men love chiefly true and good

friends

friends. And ſuch as never feign ſtories of themſelves; ſuch are they that proclaim their own Vices. For it is ſaid, among friends, we are never aſham'd of our Reputation. If therefore he whom we are aſham'd of, does not love us, he of whom we are not aſham'd may, be ſaid to be like one that loves.

All ſuch as are not to be fear'd, and in whom we confide: For no man loves the Perſon that he fears. Now Society, Famliarity and Kindred are ſorts of Friendſhip. Now that which creates Friendſhip is favour, and the doing of a kindneſs not requir'd, and not divulging it when it is done. For ſo he ſeems to have done the kindneſs for his own, and not for his friends ſake.

But as for Enmity and hatred, we muſt look upon 'em as proceeding from contrary Effects. For the Effects of Enmity and Hatred are Anger, Detraction, and Calumny. Now Anger is reckon'd among thoſe things that are in the Perſon himſelf; but hatred is diſtinct from the Perſon himſelf: For if we believe a Man to be ſuch a one, we hate him. Anger alſo has a reſpect to ſingular Perſons, as to *Callias*, *Socrates*, &c. but hatred to many and in general. For every man hates a Thief, or a *Sycophant*. And the one is curable by time, the other incurable. The one offends by giving trouble, the other by doing miſchief. He that is angry deſires to make the other ſenſible of his Anger; the other takes no ſuch care. Now all things troubleſome, are of that nature, that men are ſoon ſenſible of the inconvenience. And what are the greateſt evils are leaſt perceptible, as injuſtice, imprudence; for the preſence of Vice is no offence. The one

is with trouble, the other without. For the Paſſionate man is troubl'd in his thoughts, he that hates finds no ſuch diſturbance. The one compaſſionates where the effects of his Anger are too great, the other never minds the greateſt miſfortunes of thoſe he hates. Hence it is apparent, that by theſe things we may find who are Friends and who are Enemies, when they are ſo, and what will make 'em either, when they are not ſo: what will diſſolve contracted friendſhip; and inforce men either to Friendſhip or Enmity, when there is any Controverſie between 'em.

CHAP. V.

Of Fear and it's Contraries

FEAR is a perturbation of mind out of an apprehenſion of ſome future Evils at leaſt ſuch as are capable to produce great miſchiefs, or deſtruction it ſelf; not ſuch as are ſeen at a diſtance, but neer approaching. For miſcheifs a far off are not much fear'd: ſince all men know they ſhall dye, but becauſe they know not the time, they are not much troubled. If this then be Fear, of neceſſity thoſe things muſt be dreadful, which appear to have a great power to deſtroy or to cauſe ſuch miſcheif as bring along the greateſt Moleſtations and diſturbances. Therefore the ſigns of ſuch things are dreadful. For that which is dreadful appears nigh at hand; and therefore danger is the Approach of a thing dreadful. Such are the Enmity and Wrath of thoſe that are able to Execute: for it is

is apparent that when they both are reſolv'd and are able, they are not far from acting. Therefore is Potent Injuſtice fear'd. For becauſe a man chooſes to be unjuſt, therefore he is unjuſt: Alſo Valour injur'd when it has power: For it is manifeſt that as it always chooſes to act, when it is provok'd. Alſo the fear of ſuch as are able to execute. For of neceſſity they muſt prepare before hand. Nevertheleſs, becauſe ſome men are worſe then others, and more covetous of gain, and fearful to hazard, it is to be fear'd that he may depend upon other aſſiſtance, who intends the miſchief. Therefore they who are Aſſociates with another in any hanious Villany are to be fear'd, leaſt they ſhould diſcover or deſert the Principal. Alſo they who are Potent to do injuſtice, are always dreadful to thoſe that are lyable to ſuffer the Injuſtice, as unable to defend themſelves. For generally men do an injury, when they find themſelves able. And ſuch as are injur'd, or ſo believe, for they always wait an opportunity. And they who have done an injuſtice, when it was in their power are to be fear'd, for they are ſtill in fear of Retaliation, as being that which they dreaded at firſt. And they who are Competitors for the ſame things, when they cannot both be equally ſatisfy'd; for that breeds a perpetual Quarrel. And they who are dreaded by their Superiours, are more dreadfull to their Inferiours ſince it lyes in their power to do more miſchief to their Inferiours then Superiours: and ſuch whom their Superiours ſtand in fear of for the ſame Reaſon: and ſuch who have ſlain their Superiours: and ſuch as make attempts upon Inferiours; for either they are to be fear'd

already, or else when they grow into Strength and Power. And among those who have suffered injury, and as among Enemies and Adversaries, not those who are Hasty and Choleric, and liberal of their Menaces, but the Close, the Soft, the Dissemblers, and the Malicious: for they that are at hand, lye conceal'd. They that are open, seem to be at a distance, and they prevent the Storm by their own Blustring. But of all things formidable, those are most to be dreaded, where the Miscarriages are never to be corrected; but altogether impossible to be recovered, as being not in their own, but in the power of their Enemies. Also such things for which there is no help, or very difficult to be obtain'd. In a word all those things are to be dreaded, which when they do or shall happen to others are lamentable in their Consequences. And these are the chiefest things that are dreadful to men, and of which they stand in fear. Now let us see, how men are affected, when they are afraid.

Seeing then that fear proceeds from the Imagination of some destructive Chance, it is manifest that no man is afraid when he believes he shall suffer nothing; nor of those things which he does not expect; nor of those persons. But therefore those persons have most reason to be afraid, who believe that they shall suffer something, and from such Persons, and in such things, and at such a time. They do not believe they can be afraid of any thing who possess ample Fortunes, and therefore they are apt to contemn, to be injurious, and to be bold in all their violent proceedings. Their props are Riches, Strength, Power and multitude of Friends.

Nor

Nor do they fear who believe they have ſuffer'd the utmoſt of Miſery, whoſe hopes are extinct, and they as it were dead and buried in Calamity, like thoſe that have endur'd the torments of the Rack. Only they might have ſome hopes before, that they might have eſcaped. Which is demonſtrable from hence, that fear induces men to conſult. For no man conſults when he finds there is no farther hope. Wherefore, when it is requiſite to ſtrike a fear into the Minds of the Auditors, we ought to render 'em ſuch and ſo prepare their Ears, that they may believe they may ſuffer thoſe things, when greater then they have ſuffer'd the ſame; and to produce Examples of ſuch as do or have ſuffered the ſame things from ſuch as they never expected; and ſuch things and at ſuch a time, when they leaſt dream't.

Now as confidence is the contrary of Fear; ſo what we confide in is contrary to what we are afraid of. So that Hope is accompanied with animagination of Safety and Security being athand; and that there is nothing to be dreaded, or elſe at a very remote diſtance. That which breeds confidence is the hope of danger being at a diſtance; and Proſperity at hand; As if there be ways to amend miſcarriages, and Aſſiſtances at hand, either many or conſiderable, or both together. Alſo if they never did, nor receiv'd, any Injury; if they have no Enemies, or ſuch as are no way powerful; or if they have power, yet are equal'd by the other party in friends by them oblig'd, or to whom they are oblig'd. Alſo it is of great importance whether more are engag'd or better or both. They alſo are confident who have done many noble acts, and never ſuffer'd: or that have

run themſelves into many dangers, but ſtill eſcap'd. For men become two ways ſcornful of danger, either through inxperience, or aſſurance of aid; as in dangers at Sea, they who are unexperienc'd, are confident, becauſe they know not the danger, and the expert know how to help themſelves, and are therefore aſſur'd. Sometimes equality leſſens the dangers, ſometimes thoſe that are Inferiors ſcorn it, at other times men think themſelves above it. In all which caſes ſurpluſage of Money, ſtrength of Body, wealth of the Country, warlike preparations and the like make men confident; Religion alſo and Piety toward the Gods, and the Anſwers of the Oracles make men confident. Alſo heat of anger begets confidence; for to be injur'd, when a man does no injury raiſes choler. And God is alſo thought to ſuccour thoſe that are injur'd. And when being the firſt Aggreſſors, they believe they have done well, and ſhall receive no injury thereby.

CHAP. VI.

Of Shame and want of Shame.

SHame is a perturbation of the mind proceeding from evils either paſt, preſent or future which procure diſgrace. Want of ſhame or impudence is a contempt and inſenſibility of thoſe things.

Shame being therefore what we have ſaid, of neceſſity we muſt be aſham'd of thoſe evils which

which are a diſgrace either to our ſelves or thoſe for whom we have a kindneſs. Of this nature are a Souldiers looſing his Arms, or Flight, as proceeding from fear: the denyal of a truſt repos'd, as proceeding from Injuſtice. To lye with Women with whom he ought not, where and when he ought not, as proceeding from luſt. Alſo Paltry and ignominious Gains, and from the Impotent, as from the Poor and the Dead: becauſe it proceeds from a baſe and covetous mind. Whence the Proverb, *To rob the dead.* Alſo not to aſſiſt with a man's purſe when he is able, or with leſs then he is able, and to borrow of thoſe that are Poorer then himſelf. To take up at intereſt and yet ſeem to beg; to beg, and yet ſeem to demand; and to praiſe a thing in hopes it will be given him; theſe are the acts of a ſordid and covetous Spirit: as alſo to beg and be refus'd. To praiſe a man to his face, to ſet too high a value upon what is good, and to ſpeak againſt his knowledge when requir'd to give his Judgment of what is bad: to condole beyond meaſure with him that is in Greif; theſe are ſigns of Flattery. Not to endure the labour which his Elders, his Betters, and thoſe that are much weaker endure; Theſe are all ſigns of Effeminacy. To receive kindneſs from another, and reproach another with his own favours, Theſe are ſigns of Puſillanimity. To brag of a mans ſelf, to promiſe Mountains and never perform, to aſſume other mens works to himſelf, Theſe are ſigns of Arrogancy. Like to theſe are the Acts and ſigns in all other vices of human manners. For they are ignominious and procure ſhame. Alſo to be ignorant of thoſe things

things both profitable and vertuous, of which all men, or all his equals, or moſt are well vers'd in. Equals I call thoſe of the ſame Nation, City, Age, Kindred, and in a word all that are alike in condition and Eſtate. All which things are the more ignominious, if his ignorance appear to be the Effect of his own negligence and ſloth. Alſo they that ſuffer, or have ſuffer'd, or ſhall ſuffer any thing to be done or ſaid to their ſcandal or reproach have reaſon to be aſham'd; whether in reference to their own Bodys, or any other ignominious Acts, whether venereal or otherwiſe, whether voluntary or by Compulſion. Alſo in reſpect of courage, where a man ſuffers himſelf to be abus'd and through ſloath or Cowardice refuſes to defend himſelf. And thoſe are the things of which men have generally reaſon to be aſham'd.

Now becauſe ſhame is an imagination proceeding from ſome injury done to Reputation, for Reputations ſake, and not of the Events that happen; and becauſe no man would have any care of his Reputation but becauſe of that eſteem which generally men have of it; of neceſſity a man muſt eſteem that which all men value. Now they who eſteem, eſteem thoſe whom they eſteem, and thoſe by whom they would be admir'd; all thoſe with whom they have an honourable Emulation, and whoſe good fame they do not contemn.

By theſe therefore they would be admir'd and reſpected, and they reverence thoſe who have any thing of Vertue or Honour; or are maſters of thoſe perfections which they earneſtly covet; as

it

it is the nature of Lovers. But Men contend for honours with their equals; and they reverence the prudent for their Truth: such as are their Seniors and their Masters. Also what they behold in the Countenance, openly. Whence the Proverb, that shame is seated in the sight. Therefore men give grater respect to those that are present, and such as are their Tutors, because they are still in view. And such who are not guilty of the same Offence; for they know themselves to be not in so good a Condition: and such as are not apt to forgive: for where a man is apt to transgress himself, he does not take it amiss to see the same faults punish'd in others.

Also such as are given to tell abroad what they know. For 'tis the same thing not to seem bad, and not to be so reported. Now they that are oppress'd with Injury, tell it abroad, because they have had occasion to observe the particulars: and Backbiters, who being ready to slander the Innocent will never spare the Guilty. And such as make it their business to spy and pry into the faults of others; as your Satyric Poets and Comædians: who are a sort of Backbiters and prone to twattle. As also those from whom they never were deny'd what they ask'd: for they are of the same Nature with their Admirers. Therefore, men are asham'd the first time they ask, because they never ak'd a Curtesy before; and therefore could not believe themselves to have the Repute of a Friend. But on the other side those that ask the first time, are respected, beeause they never beg'd a Courtesie before; such are those that make

their

their firſt Addreſſes for Acquaintance and Friendſhip: as having ſeen ſomething Extraordinary in the Perſon. Wherefore the Anſwer of *Euripides* to the *Syracuſans* was well. And old familiar Friends, if t axt of no Trangreſſions. Therefore men are aſhamed not only of things ſaid, but alſo of their ſigns: So we are not aſham'd only of the Act of Venery, but Venereal Poſtures, and Laſcivious diſcourſe. Nor are they only aſham'd of ſuch looſe Perſons but of their Acquaintance and Friends.

But we are not aſham'd of thoſe things, where many miſdoubt the Truth of the Reporters: for no man is aſham'd of Childrens Report. Nor are we aſham'd of the ſame things among our Acquaintance, and thoſe we know not. For among our Friends we are aſham'd of nothing but what is true; among Strangers opinion and prejudice by Report hath ſome prevalency. But they are thus affected who are aſham'd. Firſt if they be ſuch as we have already ſaid we ought to be aſham'd of. Theſe were they who make a wonder, or are wondr'd at, or ſuch as by whom they would be admir'd at, and from whom they want ſome thing, which they ſhall obtain, as being infamous, and of no Credit, and theſe are ſuch as are in ſight; as *Cydias*, who at the debate about the Diviſion of the Lands in *Samos*, ask'd the *Athenians*, to ſuppoſe all the *Greeks* to be ſtanding round about, not only as hearers, but ſuch as ſaw their Decree: Such then may either be at hand, or may be otherwiſe ſenſible of the thing. Therefore they who are under a Cloud, are unwilling to be ſeen by their Emulators, for thoſe that Emulate make a wonder

wonder: Alſo when they lye under ſuch Circumſtances and have done ſuch an Action, as taints their own and the Reputation of their Friends and Relations, and altogether ſuch as of which they themſelves are aſham'd. To theſe may be refer'd the Teachers and Adviſers of ſuch things, or of whom they were the Teachers and Adviſers. Alſo if others be their equals with whom they contend in Honour. For in thoſe caſes People out of ſhame will do, and refuſe to do many things. Alſo when men muſt be ſeen and expos'd abroad, their Conſciences ſtrike them with ſhame. Wherefore *Antipho* the Poet, being ſent to *Execution*, when he ſaw thoſe that were to be Executed with him, pull their Caps over their Eyes, as they paſs'd along; *Why d'ye hide your faces*, ſaid he, *Who will ſee you to morrow*? And thus much for ſhame. Impudence will appear by its contraries.

CHAP. VII.

Of Favour and Charity.

CHarity is that whereby men are ſaid to do any kindneſs *Gratis*, to him that deſires it; not for any reward, nor for any advantage to him that gives, but to him that is in want. Now theſe favours are very great, either becauſe of the great wants of him that deſerves, or becauſe the favours deſir'd, are very great and difficult

to

to be granted, or elſe in hard and difficult times, or or elſe in reſpect of the Perſon, being the only, the firſt, and for whoſe ſake chiefly. But Indigences are deſires of thoſe things, the want of which cauſes ſadneſs ad inconvenience: ſuch are the deſires of Love, and our deſires in pains and dangers of the body. Therefore they that relieve men in beggery and flight, though the relief be but ſmall, yet conſidering the preſſure of the neceſſity and the ſeaſonableneſs of the relief, it may be great, as the gift of the poor man, that gave a Matt to the *Lyceum*. And therefore relief is neceſſary in ſuch Exigencies, or in ſuch as are equal, or in greater. Since then it is apparent from hence, when, and what ſort, and to whom Charity is neceſſary, it is likewiſe from hence manifeſt, that we demonſtrate that others are, or were, in like diſtreſs, and that others ſupply'd thoſe Perſons in thoſe neceſſity's by ſuch and ſuch manner of ways. Hence alſo it appears where Charity may be diſgrac'd, and who may be rendred uncapable of it, either becauſe they relieve, or have reliev'd for their own ſakes, and then it is no Charity: or elſe it was done by Chance or by Compulſion; or elſe they only reſtor'd, and did not give, whether they knew it or no: for either way it is but *quid* for *quo*: and ſo neither would this be Charity. Therefore it is to be conſider'd through all the predicaments; for Charity is either this, or ſo much, or ſuch, or when, or where. But if he has done leſs then at another time; or given to an Enemy, theſe, or equal or more conſiderable reliefs; theſe are ſigns they were not done for our ſakes. Or if he knew the relief to be of no value, for no man

confeſſes

confeſſes his craving from Indigency it ſelf. And thus much concerning Favour and Charity.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Pity and Compaſſion.

PIty is a certain Sorrow proceding from ſome apparent deſtructive Miſchief, cauſing ſadneſs in one that deſerves not to ſuffer, or in any of his Relations, and this ſuch as appears to be nearly reſembling the ſadneſs of him that ſuffers. For of neceſſity, he who would be thought to be Compaſſionate, muſt be ſuch a one, as believes he ſuffers the ſame evil either himſelf or ſome one of his friends, and ſome evil of the ſame nature, like to that in the definition. Therefore they that are utterly loſt never take Pity; for they have ſuffer'd as much as they can. Nor they who believe themſelves in full Felicity; for they generally laugh at others Miſerys. For while they believe they enjoy compleat happineſs, 'tis apparent they believe they can ſuffer no evil. But there are ſuch who believe they may ſuffer, as having ſuffer'd and eſcap'd, and theſe are of the number of thoſe that Pity; Alſo Old men by reaſon of their Prudence and Experience; and the weaker ſort, as being more timerous. The Learned alſo, for they argue from Reaſon. Alſo they who have Parents, Wives and Children; And ſuch as are not over Power'd with Anger or Confidence: for they have no Conſideration of

of the future: Alſo they they that are given to Contumely: for they do not think themſelves lvable to ſuffer. Therefore always they that keep the *Medium*. Nor they who are not extreamly timerous. For they being once terrify'd Pity none but themſelves. Alſo they that believe that there are ſome good Men; for they who believe there are none think all deſerve alike. And in a word ſuch as can call to mind that the ſame Misfortunes have happen'd to them and theirs, and be Sollicitous for themſelves or their friends in reference to the future. Theſe are the qualifications of thoſe that take Pity. What things are miſerable appears from the definition. For they are of that ſort which procure ſadneſs, are deſtructive and have Power to deſtroy. Of the ſame Nature are all conſiderable Calamities occaſion'd by Fortune. The deſtructive and efficient cauſes of Sadneſs and Grief are Death; Stripes, Afflictions of the Body, old Age, Diſeaſes, Hunger. The Miſeries occaſion'd by Fortune are want of Friends, and therefore to be torn from Friends and Acquaintance is a Miſerable thing. Alſo Deformity, Weakneſs, Lameneſs: and where we expected Good to find Evil, and that frequently: and when Comfort comes too late. Like the relief ſent to *Diopithis* by the King, which arriv'd after he was dead. And where no relief comes; or if come, no Power to enjoy it. Theſe are in general what things are lamentable, with ſeveral of the ſame Nature.

Now men Pity their Acquaintance, ſo they be not too nerely related; for with ſuch we ſhare, as if the Miſerys were our own.

Thus

Thus *Amaſis* when he ſaw his Son led to death, never ſhed a tear; but he wept when he ſaw his friend beg. The latter is miſerable, the firſt terrible. For terrible is a different thing from miſerable, and expels Commiſeration, and therefore more uſeful ſometimes to the adverſary. Alſo men take Pity, upon the approach of any thing terrible we pity our Relations alſo, according to their Ages, Conditions, Endowments, Quality and Birth. For in every one of theſe things we may be highly damnify'd. For this is a Maxim, That whatever men are afraid ſhould happen to themſelves, they are by theſame things mov'd to compaſſion when they befal others. But in regard thoſe Miſeries are moſt prevalent upon our affections, that are moſt viſible to the ſight, whereas the ſtories of what happen'd ten thouſand years ago, or Propheſies of what ſhall happen ten thouſand years hence little move us, as being paſt our remembrance, and out of the fear of expectation; therefore of neceſſity thoſe things that are repreſented to us by Poſtures, by the Voice, by the Habit, and Action, make the Miſeries ſeem the greater, as being by thoſe means expos'd nere at hand to the Eye. And of the ſame nature are thoſe things lately done, or which ſhall ſuddenly happen: as alſo the Poſtures, Actions, and Habits of thoſe that lately ſuffer'd: or the Speeches and behaviour of Men at their Executions; eſpecially, if look'd upon as Men of Vertue and Religion. For all theſe things approaching the Eye, more effectually move Compaſſion.

CHAP. IX.

Of Indignation.

OPpoſite to Compaſſion lies chiefly that which is call'd Indignation. For to grieve by reaſon of Adverſity undeſervedly happening, is in a manner oppos'd to it, and proceeds from the ſame Inclinations that cauſe us to be ſorry when we ſee men proſper undeſervedly. And both theſe are perturbations of honeſt Inclinations. For it beſeem's us to condole when any one is unjuſtly vex'd, as alſo to be offended at their ill uſage. For what is contrary to deſert, is unjuſt. And therefore Indignation is attributted to the Gods themſelves.

Envy alſo ſeems to be oppos'd to Pity in the ſame manner, as neareſt to it, and almoſt the ſame thing with Indignation. But it is another thing: for Envy is a troubl'd ſorrow and repining at the Proſperity of one that is unworthy of it, but onethat is in the ſame ſtate of Equality and Similitude of parts and conditions. But Indignation ariſes, not becauſe ſomething of adverſity happens to himſelf, but becauſe it befals his friend. For, as they ſay, there ought to be an equal diſtribution to all men. For if a man be perplex'd, as fearing leſt ſome evil ſhould betide himſelf from the happineſs of another, this is no longer Indignation, nor Envy, but Fear: and it is manifeſt, that contrary Paſſions will follow theſe. For

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he that is offended at the evils which befall the undeſerving, will certainly be glad, or at leaſt not be ſorry, when thoſe that deſerve ill, are puniſh'd according to their merits; ſuch as Parricides, or Murderers, whoſe deſerved Executions no good man pities. For it behoves us to rejoyce at the puniſhment of ſuch, as we do at the rewards of the Vertuous: there being an equal Juſtice in the two different ſorts of Recompences. For of neceſſity we ought to wiſh the ſame good fortune to thoſe that are like our ſelves, as to our ſelves. All theſe things therefore proceed from the ſame conſtitution of mind: but the contrary to theſe, from contrary diſpoſitions. For, to rejoyce at other mens Misfortunes, is the ſame thing as to be Envious: ſince that whenever a man is offended at a thing that is or may be, of neceſſity he muſt rejoyce at the privation or deſtruction of that thing. Therefore all theſe things expel pity, but they differ one from another as has bin ſaid: wherefore they are all alike effectual to render things uncapable of pity.

Now then if Indignation be a Vexation of mind to ſee an undeſerving Perſon do well in the world; firſt, it is thence manifeſt, that we ought not to Stomach all good things in the ſame Perſon. For we ought not to take it ill if a Perſon otherwiſe undeſerving, be juſt or courageous, or be endu'd with any ſort of Vertue. Nor does compaſſion conſiſt in the contraries to theſe: but men are offended at the Riches, the Power, and ſuch like Advantages of Perſons undeſerving: as alſo at thoſe advantages which they have by Nature, Beauty, Birth, and the like. And becauſe Antiquity ſeems to approach near to na

tural, they who have been of long continuance in proſperity, diſdain thoſe that are newly ſprung up; For they who are lately become wealthy, are more troubleſome, then Perſons of ancient Eſtates by deſcent. And the ſame may be ſaid of men in authority, men powerful, men begirt with friends, full of Children, and the like; and ſo if any other Advantages happen by means of thoſe already mention'd. For Perſons newly enrich'd become more troulbeſome, as being advanc'd to Power by reaſon of their Riches, then ſuch as have been long in poſſeſſion of wealth; and ſo of the reſt. The reaſon is, becauſe the latter ſeem to enjoy their own, the other, not. For what ſeems to have been long in the ſame condition, ſeems to be true. Wherefore new upſtarts do not ſeem to enjoy their own: and becauſe every man is not worthy of every good thing; but that there is a conſideration of Proportion and what is fitting: as Beautyful Armor is not proper for the Juſt, but for the Stout; nor Noble Matches for upſtarts, but ancient Nobility: Therefore if any Perſon of vertue happens to enjoy what is not proper, men preſently Stomack him, as alſo the Contentions of Inferiors with their betters. Eſpecially where the ſubject of the diſpute is the ſame. And therefore ſaid the Poet,

Therefore did he in ſingle Combat ſhun
To grapple the bold Son of Telamon:
For his preſuming Pride did Jove *offend,*
That with a better Man he durſt contend.

Or whither he be Vertuous or Noble or no, let him

him be who he will, if an Inferior: as if a Muſician contend with a juſt man; For Juſtice is better then Muſick.

Now they that are moſt prone to indignation, are they that are moſt deſerving, and enjoy what they deſerve: for it is not juſt to believe them worthy of the ſame benefits, who are not alike in deſerts: In the next place if they are not only vertuous but ſerious and conſiderative. For then they judge aright, and hate what it unjuſt: or if they are Ambitious of Honour, and deſirous to perform ſuch or ſuch atcheivements, and ſeek after thoſe things to which others undeſervedly have attain'd. And generally who ever think themſelves worthy of certain things of which they believe others unworthy. And therefore ſervil minds, evil men, and contemners of honour are voi'd of Indignation; not believing themſelves worthy of any thing of that nature. Hence it is apparent what ſort of Perſons thoſe are, at whoſe Misfortunes, or Croſſes in the world, as not thriving, or miſſing their Aims, we ought to rejoyce at, or be ſorry for. For from what has been ſaid, the Oppoſities are apparent. So that unleſs an Orator do ſo prepare the Judges, that he may be able to demonſtrate when they are petition'd to for Compaſſion, with reaſons alleadg'd, who are unworthy, who worthy to obtain it, he ſhall never obtain his end.

CHAP X.

Of Envy.

ENVY is a trouble of the Mind by reaſon of thoſe happineſſes ſeemingly enjoy'd by their Equals, not ſo much becauſe they are not enjoy'd by themſelves, as becauſe they are enjoy'd by others. For the Perſons that will envy, are ſuch, as to whom ſome others are equal, or ſeem ſo to be: I mean equal either in Birth, or Kindred, or Age, or Conditions, or Repute, or Riches; and ſuch as want but little of being Poſſeſſors of all together. Therefore they who perform great Actions and are Proſperous in their undertakings are more ſubject to envy others: for they believe every thing their own that is given to others: and ſuch as are particularly honour'd for ſome particular Excellency, as Wiſdom, or Felicity; and thoſe who are ambitious of honour are more envious then they who are not ſo; and ſuch as have an opinion of their wiſdom; for they are ambitions after wiſdom; and in a word, they who ſeek for honour in any profeſſion whatever envy all others that vie with 'em in the ſame. And puſillanimous Perſons for to them all things ſeem to be great. And thus much for the Happineſſes which breed envy in men. For in whatever undertakings, men love glory, and contend for honour, to gain the Applauſe and opinion of Men, and in all the Effects of good fortune there is envy, eſpecially as to ſuch

ſuch things as men deſire, and believe to be but the rewards of their deſerts; or of which they either exceed in the enjoyment, or are but a little defective. And it is no leſs apparent whom they envy, that is to ſay, thoſe that are their equals in time, in place, in age, in glory, and eſteem. Whence it is ſaid,

For Kindred is to envy prone.——

And thoſe with whom they contend for honour, who are ſuch as are living at the ſame time. For men never contend with ſuch as liv'd ten thouſand years ago, or ſhall live ten thouſand years hence, or with the Dead; or with thoſe that live beyond *Hercules's Pillars*; nor with thoſe whom they believe by many degrees their ſuperious, or as much their inferiours. But becauſe men chiefly contend with their Rivals and Competitors, and ſuch as aim at the ſame ends, therefore they cheifly envy theſe Perſons, whence the Proverb of

The Potter envys the Potter.

And ſuch as have ſpeedily, or are within a little of obtaining their deſires: and thoſe who tho' they do enjoy, or bring a thing to Perfection it becomes a diſgrace to 'em: in regard theſe are near alike. For it is manifeſt that they did not gain by their own merits, and that breeds envy. Thoſe alſo that enjoy or have thoſe conveniences and enjoyments they ought to have or once had. Therefore Old men envy young people. Alſo they who have lay'd out much money, envy thoſe that have lai'd out but lit-

tle about the ſame thing. Hence on the contrary it is manifeſt, what ſuch ſort of people rejoyce at, with what ſort of people they are affected, and how they themſelves are qualify'd. For as they that miſs of enjoyment are ſorry, ſo they that gain are pleas'd with the contraries. So that unleſs they be ſo prepar'd, and that they who are deem'd worthy of Compaſſion, or to obtain any other requeſt, be ſuch as theſe are ſaid to be, they ſhall never obtain pity from the Judges.

CHAP. XI.

Of Emulation.

EMulation is a certain diſturbance of mind, by reaſon of an appearing enjoyment of honourable happineſſes, which it is not impoſſible for him alſo to attain, in things naturally alike; not becauſe they are enjoy'd by another, but becauſe they are not enjoy'd by himſelf: So that Emulation ſeems to be a vertue, and about vertuous things: but envy is evil and evil things are the ſubject of it. For the one through Emulation endeavours to attain to good things; the other endeavours to prevent his neighbour from attaining thoſe good things through Envy: and therefore thoſe that emulate, muſt believe themſelves to be worthy thoſe good things which they have not: For no man deems himſelf worthy of Impoſſibilities; therefore are young men and Magnanimous

nimous Perſons of this ſort. And ſuch as enjoy thoſe accompliſhments which are deem'd worthy men of honour, as Riches, Favour, Authority, and the like. For as if it concern'd 'em to be vertuous, becauſe theſe are felicities belonging to the vertuous, therefore they emulate theſe vertues in others. Alſo ſuch as others eſteem Perſons of worth; or ſuch whoſe Anceſtors, Kindred, Acquaintance, or Country are famous, ſtrive alſo to emulate their Accompliſhments; for they believe thoſe to be their own, and therefore believe themſelves worthy of 'em.

Now then if good things which are honourable are the Subject of Emulation, of neceſſity vertue muſt be of the ſame nature, and whatever things are profitable to others and aſſiſtant to Liberality. Alſo thoſe happineſſes which men enjoy, as Riches, Beauty, Health, *&c.* theſe are ſuch as are proper Objects of Emulation: For they are the Perſons that enjoy theſe felicities and ſuch like, as Fortitude, Prudence, and Dominion. For Princes are able to beſtow many favours upon many Perſons. Alſo ſuch whom many deſire to be like, ſuch as have many friends and acquaintance, ſuch whom many admire, and themſelves among the reſt. Alſo ſuch whoſe praiſes and atchievements are ſet forth by Poets and Hiſtorians. Theſe men they Emulate the contrary they contemn. For contempt is contrary to Emulation. And to contemn and to Emulate are contraries. Of neceſſity therefore they who are ſo qualify'd as to Emulate ſome, and to be Emulated by others, muſt be ſo temper'd as to contemn thoſe who are noted for

thoſe

thoſe imperfections which are contrary to the Objects of Emulation.

Wherefore oft times they contemn the Fortunate, in regard that good fortune is not always attended with thoſe perfections which are of greateſt value. Thus how the affections are mov'd, and with what things, and how they are allay'd, alſo whence Proof and Credit ariſes, hath been ſaid.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Affections and Habits of Youth.

I Call the Affections Anger, Deſire, and the reſt, of which we have already diſcourſed. The habits are vertues and vices, of which already has been ſpok'n; as alſo which every one chooſes, and practiſes. Ages are Youth, Manhood, and Old Age. I call Fortune Nobility, Riches, Power, and their contraries, and in a word, Proſperity or Adverſity. Young men are in their natures prone to deſire, and ſtrong to act for the obtaining their deſires. But cheifly they are led by thoſe deſires that are venereal, in which they are incontinent. They are inconſtant in their deſires, and apt to loath what before they lov'd. They ardently deſire, ſoon grow cold. Their wills are eager, not impetuous, like the hunger and thriſt of ſick people. Alſo prone to anger, and vehement, and apt to follow their moſt eager Appetites. They are overcome

come with paſſion, as not brooking contempt through Ambition; and are impatient when they believe they have receiv'd an injury. Ambitious alſo of honour, but more of victory. Youth covets to exceed; and victory is a certain exceſs: and therefore they covet both theſe, rather then money; which is that they leaſt mind. For as yet they have not experimented want; according to the Elogy of *Pittacus* upon *Amphiaraus*. Not Malitious, but downright: as not having much us'd themſelves to Intrigues of ſubtlety. They are alſo credulous, as not having been often deceiv'd. They are alſo naturally hot, like men heated with Wine. Full of hopes alſo, for hope reſpects the time to come; Memory relates to what is paſt. And to Young Men, the future is Long, Paſt time, ſhort. Therefore eaſy to be deceiv'd, becauſe they eaſily hope. The more ſtout therefore, becauſe they are eaſily anger'd and hope well. The one makes them fearleſs, the other confident. For no man fears when he is angry, and becauſe he hopes the beſt, he is confident. They are alſo modeſt, for they look upon things to be honeſt no otherwiſe then through the Opticks of natures Simplicity, and know nothing but what the Law has inſtructed 'em. They are alſo Magnanimous, as not having been depreſs'd by the Misfortunes of life, but altogether unexperienc'd in neceſſity. Now for a man to deem himſelf worthy of great things is Magnanimity; which is the effects of good hopes. And they rather chooſe to practiſe things honeſt then Profitable. For they live more by cuſtom, then by reaſon. Now reaſon looks at profit, Vertue at honeſt Actions. They

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are alſo much more deſirous of Friends and Companions then other Ages. For they rejoyce in Society, as judging nothing yet by the Rules of profit, not ſo much as ſeeking advantage in Friendſhip. For they do all to exceſs, and tranſgreſs more violently, contrary to the ſaying of *Chilo*. For they act to exceſs, they love to exceſs, they hate to exceſs. In other things temper'd equally. They believe alſo and affirm they know all things; the reaſon, that they always over-do. They injure others out of Contumely, not out of Malice. They are compaſſionate, becauſe they believe all men good and honeſt. For they meaſure other men by their own Innocency: wherefore they believe ſuch people ſuffer undeſervedly. They love merriment, as being facetious: For Jeſts are polite Contumelies. Thus much for young Men.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Affections and Habits of Old Men.

THE Diſpoſitions of Men ſtricken in years and aged Perſons are for the moſt part quite the contrary. For having liv'd a long while, they have been frequently deceiv'd, often err'd; and becauſe moſt things are evil, they ſlowly affirm any thing, and put a leſs value upon things then they ought: for they do nothing, but ſtuff their diſcourſes with *perhaps*'s and *if*'s and *and's*, and ſo conclude nothing. Alſo they are moroſe and ill-natured for it is a ſign of ill nature

ture to interpret every thing in the worſt ſence. Alſo they are ſuſpicious, becauſe incredulous, & incredulous, becauſe experienc'd. For the ſame cauſe they neither love to exceſs, nor hate to exceſs; but according to the Precept of *Bias*, they love as if they would hate, and hate as if they would love. They are Puſillanimous, as having felt the hardſhips of life: nor do they covet what is great or pompous, but only what is neceſſary: nor are they over liberal. For one of their neceſſary things is their Eſtate: and as they are experienc'd, they know how hard it is to get, how eaſie to looſe an Eſtate. They are fearful, and affraid of all things; for Old Age opens a way to fear, as being cold: for fear is a kind of Refrigeration. They are deſirous to live, eſpecially when neareſt their ends; as covetous of what they ſhall leave behind; and what we think we ſhall moſt want, we moſt covet. They are more querulous then needs; which proceeds from their Puſillanimity. They live according to the rules of profit, not of honeſty. For profitable is to themſelves advantageous; Honeſty but a Good in it ſelf. They are rather Impudent then modeſt; for having a different eſteem of profitable and honeſt, they little value the ſemblance of Honeſty. They are apt to deſpond, as having but ſmall and fluid hopes, by reaſon of their Experience. For which reaſon, and becauſe they are fearful, they frequently come by the worſt. They live more by Memory then by Hope; for the remainder of their days is but ſmall; the longeſt part is paſt; which is the reaſon of their Loquacity, for they love to talk of old Stories, as taking delight in remembrance. In their anger vehement, but feeble.

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In their deſires impotent, only in the deſire of gain: and therefore they ſeem to be temperate: remiſs in their luſts, and Servants to their avarice. They live rather by reaſon then cuſtom: and their Injuries are miſcheivous, not contumelious. They are alſo compaſſionate, but not for the ſame reaſon as young Men; theſe, out of humanity; they, through Infirmity: For they think the miſeries of others near themſelves: whence they become querulous, but not facetious: nor do they mind jollity or mirth. For to whine and moan are contrary to mirth and laughter. Theſe are the ſeveral Diſpoſitions of young and old Men. Wherefore ſince all approve Orations adapted to their own Diſpoſitions, it is hence apparent how an Orator is to frame his Oration to ſuite with this variety.

CHAP. XIV.

Of the Diſpoſitions of middle Age.

BEtween theſe two lye the Manners of middle Age, pruning off the Exceſſes of both. For they are neither over confident, which is raſhneſs; nor over timorous; but fairly in a medium between both. Neither confiding in all men, nor miſtruſting all Men: but rather judging according to the Truth: neither living altogether according to the Rules of Bravery, nor altogether following profit: but between both: Neither parſimonious, nor luxurious; but according to what is laudable and convenient. Obſerving

ſerving the ſame meaſures both as to anger and deſire; temperate with courage, and couragious with Temperance. Which things are divided in Youth and old Age. For young Men are ſtrong and Intemperate; old Men temperate and cowardly. So that to ſpeake in a word, whatever Youth and Age divide apart between 'em, as to what is profitable, that middle age enjoys entire. Where they exceed or are defective, middle Age obſerves the Medium, and the moderate. Now the Body is in its full vigor from thirty to five and thirty; the Soul from thirty to nine and forty. And thus much for the three Ages of Man.

CHAP. XV.

Of the Humours of Noble Men.

AS to the humors of Noble Men, moſt certain it is, that he is moſt covetous of honour who poſſeſſes it. For all Men deſire to add to the heap which they have. Now Nobility is the honour due to Anceſtry. Therefore Noble Men are apt to deſpiſe thoſe who are like their Progenitors: For remote Renown is more venerable then honour newly got, and more fit to be boaſted of. Now *Noble* proceeds from the vertue of Lineage: Generous, is that which does not degenerate from Nature: Which does not frequently happen to the Noble; but ſometime they become Perſons of mean and abject Spirits. For there is a fertility in the Progenies

genies of Men, as in the products of the Earth. Sometimes a fertile Stock bears a race of Illuſtrions Perſons; but then the Stock being worn out, the Fruit degenerates. And many time the offspring of ſublime Anceſtry corrupts into cruelty and inſaneneſs; like thoſe that deſcended from *Alcibiades* and *Dionyſius*: and mild *Genius*'s ſink into ſloth and effeminacy, like the Deſcendants from *Conon*, *Pericles* and *Sorates*.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the Humonrs of the Rich.

THE Humors that attend upon the Rich, are eaſie to be diſcern'd by all Men. For they are Contumelious, and exceſſively Proud, as being ſwell'd up with their Wealth. As if they look'd upon themſelve to enjoy all the Happineſs in the World. For Wealth is a Price whereby to value other Men. Therefore they believe all things vendible to themſelves. They are alſo voluptuous, and profuſely laviſh. The firſt, to ſhew their Riches, and make an Oſtentation of their Felicity. The latter, becauſe men love to gratifie their darling humours, and pleaſe themſelves with what themſelves admire; believing that all other men admire what they do. And in ſome reſpects it does 'em a kindneſs; in regard there are many, who want what others have; and therefore *Simonides* being ask'd by *Hiero*'s Queen, whether it were beſt to be a Rich

Rich or a Wiſeman, reply'd, I have ſeen Wiſe men wait at Rich mens doors. Another Reaſon is becauſe they think themſelves worthy to govern. For they have that, for the ſake of which they believe themſelves worthy to govern others. And indeed the humors of the Rich, are the humors of the happy Madman. But there is a great difference between the Cuſtoms of Perſons newly enrich'd, and ſuch as were born to Wealth. For as they are more wicked, ſo are they more wickedly wicked. For the Wealth of him that is newly enrich'd is wild and untam'd. Nor do they do injuries through Malice, but either through Contumelie, or Intemperance.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Manners of the Potent and Fortunate.

IN like manner the Cuſtoms of men in Power are plain to be diſcover'd: For they are partly the ſame with Rich Men, partly better. For men in power are more Ambitious, and more ſtrenuous; becauſe they covet to execute what their Power authorizes them to act. Alſo they are more diligent; as being conſtrain'd to take care of what belongs to their *Authority*. And more Majeſtic then moroſe; for their Dignity begets 'em reſpect. And Majeſty is a kind of compos'd and decent Gravity: and if they do an Injury, it is not in ſlight matters, but in things of Importance. Good Fortune alſo has a

great ſhare in the parts of theſe manners. For the cheifeſt of Fortunes Proſperity's are referr'd to theſe things. Good Fortune alſo is the cauſe that we are in a better Condition, both in reſpect of our Offspring and other Corporeal Happineſſes. Therefore they are more proud and leſs conſiderate by reaſon of their Proſperity. But one excellent cuſtom attends good Fortune, that it makes 'em Religious, beleiving thoſe *Goods* of Fortune, to be the gift of the Deity. And thus much concerning the cuſtoms and manners of Ages and Fortune: from whence the contraries may be eaſily collected.

CHAP. XVIII.

That there are ſome things common to all kinds.

NOW becauſe the uſe of perſwaſive Oratory relates to Judgment (for what we know and have judg'd of needs no farther Explanation of Speeches) and becauſe, though it be but one alone whom the Orator ſeeks to perſwade or diſſwade; as they do who ſeek to admoniſh or exhort, yet that one Perſon is a Judge; therefore of neceſſity care muſt be taken to ſubvert contraries, againſt which, as againſt an Adverſary the Speech is directed. And ſo likewiſe it is in demonſtratives. For the Oration is directed to the hearer as to the Judge, and to ſpeak in general Terms, he is a ſingle Perſon; but to ſpeak ſimply, he is a Judge, who determines what is controverted in a civil contention. For

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in all things about which diſputes or conſultations ariſe, the general Inquiry is how the caſe ſtands. Now then to ſpeak of things that are common, all men of neceſſity muſt make Uſe of *Poſſible* and *impoſſible* in their Orations. Others muſt endeavour to ſhew that the thing will be; Others that it has been. Alſo the magnitude of a thing is to be enquir'd into in all Orations. For all Men make uſe of Diminution and Amplification, as well they who conſult, as they who diſſwade or perſwade: as well they who praiſe as they who diſpraiſe; as well they who ſue, as they who defend.

CHAP. XIX.

Of things Poſſible and impoſſible.

FIRST then let us ſee what things are Poſſible, what Impoſſible. If therefore the contrary may be, or be done, the contrary may alſo be poſſible. For if it be poſſible that he may be cur'd, it is poſſible he may be ſick: ſince that is the Power of contraries, *quatenus* contraries. Alſo if like may be poſſible, ſo alſo may be unlike. Alſo if what be more difficult be poſſible, in like manner what is leſs difficult. For it is more difficult to make a ſtately Houſe, then a Houſe. Alſo where the beginning is Poſſible the end is poſſible. For never any Impoſſibility will ever be done, or be begun to be done; thus no man will ever begin to make a diameter Simmetrical. Alſo where there may be an end there was a beginning. For all things

ariſe from the beginning. Moreover if what is poſterior in ſubſtance and original may be Poſſible, alſo that which is Prior. Thus if it be poſſible for a Man to be, it is alſo poſſible for a Boy to be, or if it be poſſible for a Boy to be, in like manner for a Man. As alſo ſuch things for which we have a natural love or deſire. For, no man loves, or really deſires impoſſibilities. Alſo ſuch things of which Arts and Sciences take cognizance; for all ſuch things are poſſible. Alſo theſe things whoſe Principle of ſo being, is in thoſe things to which we can either conſtrain or perſwade, as Betters and Superiors, Lords and Maſters, or Friends. Alſo where the whole is poſſible, there the parts; if the Garment, then the Sleeves; If the kind, then the form; if the form then the kind. For example, if a Ship then a Fly-boat, or Galley; if a Fly-boat, then a Ship. Alſo if the one of two things mutually agreeing between themſelves, then the other; as if the whole, then the half; and if the half, the double. Alſo if a thing may be done without Art and care, much more by Art and Inudſtry. Wherefore it was ſaid by *Agatho*,

Some things there are which men by Fortune do;
And ſome by Art, by need conſtrain'd thereto.

And it if be poſſible for men every way inferior, and more Inconſiderate, certainly their contraries will find it as poſſible: As *Socrates* ſaid, it would be a ſtrange thing if he could not find out what *Euthymius* learnt. Thus much of Poſſibility. What is Impoſſible, is manifeſt from the contraries to Poſſible.

Now

Now from hence we are to conſider whether the thing be done or no. For if that was done which was leſs probable in nature, alſo that which is more. And if it were wont to be done afterwards, it was done before: as if a man has forgot, that time was when he learnt what he forgot. Alſo if he had a will and could, he did it. For all men act, if they can, when they have a will: at leaſt there is no impediment but that they may: and if he could and deſir'd; and if he could, and it was a pleaſure to him. For all men act, if they can, according to their Pleaſures The debauch'd, as being pleas'd with their intemperance. Men of Integrity, as deſiring juſt and honeſt things. Alſo if he went about it; for 'tis probable he did what he went about. Or if thoſe things are done which precede the doing of any thing; as if it Thundred, it Lightned: or if he endeavour'd, he did it.

Now of all theſe things, ſome are through neceſſity, others ſo in themſelves. As for what was not done, it appears by the contraries; nor is it leſs manifeſt from thence, what will be: for what is in the Power and the Will to be, will be: and what is in the deſire, in Paſſion, and the conſideration of profit, where there is a Power. Alſo if a man be carry'd on with precipitation to do a thing which an opportunity offers to act, 'tis probable that will be done: and ſometimes things that will be, happen ſooner then things preſently deſigned. Alſo if thoſe things were done before which nature orders to precede, as if it be cloudy, 'twill rain. Or if that be done which is done for the ſake of a thing, as if the Foundation, then the Houſe. As for Magnitude

and ſmallneſs, greater or leſs; as alſo great things and little things it is manifeſt what they are, from what has been already ſaid. Now becauſe every Oration propoſes for it's end what is good, profitable and honeſt, Amplifications muſt therefore be taken from all theſe Topics. For beſide theſe things, to ſeek after any thing in reference to Magnitude and excellency ſimply, would be a vain Diſpute. For ſingulars are more proper for uſe then Univerſals.

CHAP. XX.

Of Example.

HAving thus ſpoken of Proper Proof, it remains to ſpeak of Common Proof. Which is two-fold, Example and Enthymeme. For a ſentence is part of an Enthymeme. But firſt of example; For example is like Induction, and Induction is a Principle.

Of Examples there are two ſorts. The one, that ſpeaks of things paſt; the Other, that feignes the ſame thing; and of this the one part is Similitude, the other Fables, like thoſe of *Æſop* and *Lybicus*. Example therefore is, as if any one ſhould ſay, Forces ought to be rais'd againſt the King, and not to ſuffer him to reduce *Egypt* into his Power, becauſe *Darius* did not croſs over the Sea before he took *Egypt*, but when he had croſs'd the Sea he took *Egypt*; ſo he that will take *Egypt* muſt croſs over the Sea; and therefore

therefore he is not to be ſuffer'd to croſs the Seas.

A Socratic Similitude is as if a Man ſhould ſay, that Magiſtrates choſen by Lot ought not to govern. Alſo as if a man ſhould chooſe Wreſtlers by Lot, not ſuch as were fit for ſervice; or as if a man ſhould chuſe a Pilot to ſteer a Ship by Lot, and not for his experience. A Fable is like that of *Steſichorus* to *Phalaris*; and *Eſopus* concerning the Popular Leader. For when the *Imereans* had choſe *Phalaris* for their Captain with full and abſolute Authority, and were about to give him a Guard for his Body, *Steſichorus* among other things told 'em, that there was a horſe which held poſſeſſion of a whole Medow by himſelf, at what time there coming a Hart and ſpoyling the Graſs, the horſe deſirous to be reveng'd of the Deer, came to a Man and ask'd whither he might not be able with his Aſſiſtance to puniſh the Hart? The man anſwer'd him, Yes, upon condition he would ſubmit to be bridl'd and let him get upon his back. But when the horſe had accepted the condition, inſtead of puniſhing the Hart, he was forc'd to be a Servant to his Rider. Wherefore ſaid he, do you beware, leaſt while you are ſtriving to be reveng'd of your Enemies, you come to ſuffer like the horſe. You have already accepted a Bridle in chooſing a general with abſolute Power. But if you allow him a Guard, and permit him to get upon your backs, you will certainly be *Phalaris*'s ſlaves.

Eſopus alſo in *Samos*, pleading for one of the Cheif Leaders of the people accus'd of High Treaſon, told the Aſſembly, That a certain

Fox going to croſs a River, fell into a Ditch; where after he had layn in great Miſery, not being able to get out, many great Flies came and fix'd their ſtings in his Skin; at what time, a Hedgehog paſſing by, ask'd him whether he ſhould pull out the Flies: which when the Fox refus'd to let him do, in great admiration he demanded the Reaſon; to whom then the Fox, If thou drive away theſe, there will come others half faniſh'd that will ſuck out all the remainder of my blood. Thus, O men of *Samos*, this man now enrich'd will do you no more harm. But if you put him to death, other Perſons poorer then he will ſtep into his room, and ſuck away all the wealth of your City. Fables therefore of this nature are appoſitely made uſe of in Popular Harangues; and they have this particular Excellency, that when Reall Examples are not to be found, it is an eaſy thing to feign Parables; Though the examples of Reall Tranſactions are more profitable in deliberation and conſultation. For, for the moſt part things to come are like thoſe that are paſt. And therefore when we want Arguments, we are to make uſe of Examples by way of demonſtration; but where Arguments are not wanting, Examples are profitable after Arguments, by way of Peroration.

For when they are firſt made uſe of, they are like to Inductions; but Induction is very improper for a Rhetorical Harangue, unleſs it be ſometimes. But being laſt made uſe of, they ſerve inſtead of Teſtimonies: and then one ſingle Example is ſufficient: ſeeing that one Witneſs, if credible, is of great uſe.

CHAP

CHAP. XXI.

Of a Sentence.

A Sentence is an Enunciation, Apophthegm, or Maxim, not of ſingulars, as what ſort of Perſon *Iphicrates* was; but of Univerſals, as that ſtreight is contrary to crooked; or concerning which there are certain actions to be made choice of or avoyded. Wherefore becauſe Enthymemes are Syllogiſms concerning thoſe things, as well the Concluſions of Enthymemes, as the beginnings, the Syllogiſm being ſet apart, are Sentences; as thus; It behoves a prudent Perſon not to breed up his Children overmuch in wiſdom. This therefore is a Sentence: to which if the Cauſe and the Wherefore be added, it becomes a perfect Enthymem. For beſides that ſloth to which men are otherwiſe inclin'd,

Malevolent Envy on themſelves they draw.

And this other,

In all things there is no man to be found
That doth in perfect Happineſs abound.

And again,

There no man lives who is compleatly free.

This

This a Sentence, to which add that which follows, and it becomes an Enthymeme.

For either to his Wealth that Fortune gives,
Or else to Fortune's self a slave he lives.

Seeing then a Sentence is what we have describ'd, of necessity there are four sorts of Sentences. For either they are accompanied with a Reason to illustrate 'em, or not. They that have need of Demonstration, are accompanied with an illustrating reason, as being a kind of Paradoxes: otherwise they need no reason for illustration's sake. Of these, such as are known before, need no demonstration. As thus.

To me of blessings Health does seem the best.

For this is apparent to all men. Others there are which being spok'n together are manifest only to them that consider. As thus,

——No man was ere in Love,
But he will still a Lover prove.

Of Sentences with illustration, some are parts of an Enthymeme, As,

Ill it beseems the Person truly wise.

Others are Enthymematical, but not part of the Enthymem, which are most approv'd. Of this sort are those wherein the Cause is apparent; as thus,

Since

Since Mortal, in thy Mortal breſt
Let not Immortal Anger reſt

Like to which is that other,

Let Mortals only Mortal matters mind,
And leave Immortal things to Heav'n reſign'd.

Hence it is apparent how many ſorts of Sentences there are, and how they are to be accommodated: that is to ſay, either to things Ambiguous, or new, or paradoxicall, or wanting illuſtration, where the Sentence is to be added to the concluſion by way of illuſtration. As if a man ſhould ſay, Becauſe I would not be ſubject to Envy, nor be accounted Idle, think learning unneceſſary. Or elſe the laſt may be firſt affirm'd, and the firſt afterwards. But ſuch things as do not ſeem to be Paradoxes, yet are uncertain, are to be utter'd conciſely with the Wherefore. To which Laconic Brevity, and Riddles are properly accommodated; as if a man ſhould ſay, what *Steſichorus* ſaid to the *Locrians*, That they ſhould not be contumelious, leſt the Graſhoppers ſhould Sing.

Now Sentences and Apophthegms are moſt proper for men ſtrick'n in years, concerning things of which they have particular Experience. For where a man cannot pretend to Gravity, Sentences will ill become him. And he that ſpeaks without Experience, is a fool and illiterate. For which this is a very good Teſtimony, for that your Husband-men are the cheif Proverb-mongers, and have 'em ſtill at their Tongues end.

To ſpeak Univerſally that which is not Univerſal,

verſal, is proper cheifly for Lamentation, or Amplification; and then either at the beginning or after Demonſtration. But vulgar and common Sentences are to be made choice of, if they be needful. For becauſe they are common, yet granted by all, they ſeem to be true. As when we would exhort thoſe that have not ſacrific'd, to run into danger,

'Tis the beſt Omen of Succeſs, that we,
Fight for our Country, and for Liberty.

And to thoſe that are Inferior in number,

The Chance of War is doubtful——

Or if we would exhort the Souldiers to ſlaughter our Enemies Children who have done us no harm,

'Tis but meer folly, once the parent kill'd,
In tender pity then to ſpare the Child.

Alſo ſome Proverbs are Sentences and brought as teſtimonies, as that of an *Athenian ſtranger*. On the other ſide, we ought to call thoſe Sentences alſo which are frequent in the Mouths of the Multitude: and I call theſe ſuch as are frequent in the mouths of the Multitude *Know thy ſelf*; *Nothing to exceſs*; when either our diſpoſitions would appear better, or that the thing be ſpoken Pathetically: and that is ſpoken pathetically, as when a man in his anger ſhould ſay, That it is falſe that a man ought to know him ſelf: for ſuch a one, if he knew himſelf, would never think himſelf worthy to govern.

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The manners or diſpoſition appear better in this manner; We ought not, as they ſay, to love as one that intended to bear malice, but to hate as one that intended to love. And by that ſaying We ought to make our choice apparent; if not, then to declare the cauſe: as in ſaying thus, we ought to love, not as they ſay commonly, but as one that always intended to love: Otherwiſe 'tis but the love of a treacherous Perſon. Or thus, The ſaying does not pleaſe me; For a true Friend, as a Lover ought to love always: nor does that ſaying pleaſe me, of nothing to exceſs. For we ought to hate the wicked to exceſs. Now theſe Sentences bring great aſſiſtance to Orations, partly becauſe they take greatly with the Auditors. For they are mightily pleas'd, when any one ſpeaking generally, falls into ſome particular Opinion of their own. Now what I ſay will thus be manifeſt; as alſo which way to tickle their fancies. For a Sentence, as has been ſaid, is a general Enunciation: and therefore they are pleas'd, when a thing is ſpok'n generally, of which they have a good opinion in particular. As if any one had bad neighbours or wicked Children, he would be pleas'd with theſe Sentences.

Then Neighbours nothing more troubleſom.
Nothing a greater ſign of Madneſs then to beget Children.

Therefore we are to conſider how they ſtand affected, and what were their former thoughts, and then ſo to ſpeak in general concerning thoſe things. This is one uſe of *Sentences*, and there

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is yet another, which is better: for they fill the Oration with Morality: thoſe Orations being Moral, where the will and pre-election of the ſpeaker is apparent. Which is the property of Sentences to do; in regard that he who ſpeaks a Sentence utters ſomthing in general concerning thoſe things that are to be made choice of. Wherefore if the Sentences be good, they make the ſpeaker to appear vertuous. And thus much concerning Sentences and their uſe.

CHAP. XXII.

Of an Enthymems.

NOW let us diſcourſe in general concerning *Enthymemes*; how we are to find 'em out; and then the *Places*: for there is a different ſort of both of theſe. Now that an Enthymeme is a certain ſort of Syllogiſm, has been already ſaid; how it comes to be a Syllogiſm, and how it differs from a Logical Syllogiſm. For neither muſt we make a Collection from too great a diſtance, nor be too nice in taking all things together. For the one creates obſurity by being too prolix: the other meer Trifling, as ſpeaking of things already known. This is the reaſon that the illiterate are more prooper to perſwade among the Multitude, then the learned; as the Poets ſay, that the illiterate ſpeake more adaptly to the vulgar. For theſe ſpeak things common and general; the other what they know, and what are

are near at hand. Wherefore we are not to diſcourſe of all things that are probable, but from things that are certain and fix'd; as either to the Judges, or thoſe whom they approve. And this becauſe they by that means appear perſpicuous either to all or the moſt part: nor are we only to gather from Neceſſaries, but from things that are moſt commonly and univerſally ſo. Firſt therefore we are to conſider concerning what we are to ſpeak, and to conclude either by a Political Syllogiſm or any other, that it is neceſſary to retain either all or at leaſt ſome of thoſe things that are contain'd therein: for having nothing, no collection can be made from nothing. For examples ſake, as if we were to adviſe the *Athenians* whether to enter into a War or not, how could it be done, unleſs it be known what their ſtrength is by Sea or Land, or both; what their Revenues, who their friends, and who their Enemies. Moreover what Wars they have wag'd, and how they were carry'd on, and the like. How could we commend 'em, unleſs we knew their victories at *Salamine* and *Marathon*, or their famous Acts for the Offspring of *Hercules*? ſeeing that all men raiſe their Applauſes either from things that are, or which appear to be noble and brave. In like manner they diſprove and diſcommend from the contraries, conſidering what there is in them that may be, or ſeem to be ſo. As that they reduc'd the *Greeks* into Slavery, and ſubdu'd the *Eginetans* and *Potideats*, who aſſiſted them againſt the *Barbarians*, and behav'd themſelves with great Courage; or whatever other errors they committed. In the ſame manner Complainants and Defendants, while they conſider

der what things are contain'd in the Accuſation or defence, produce their matter from thoſe things. Neither is it material whether we ſpeak of the *Athenians*, or *Lacedemonians*, of Men or of the Gods. Therefore if a Man were to counſel *Achilles*; to praiſe, to diſcommend, or defend him; thoſe things are to be taken of either ſide which are or ſeem to be, as in praiſing or diſpraiſing, what is honourable, what unworthy is to be aſſum'd. In pleading for or againſt, what is juſt, or unjuſt: In counſelling, what is profitable, what pernicious. The ſame rule holds in every thing elſe: as concerning Juſtice, whether good or not good, muſt be diſcours'd from thoſe things that are inherent in Juſtice and Goodneſs. So that ſeeing all men ſeem to take this way of demonſtration, whether they argue more accurately or more remiſsly (for they do not take from all things, but from thoſe things that are included in the Subject) it is apparent that demonſtration can be made no other way. Whence it is neceſſary, as in the Topic's, to ſelect the moſt probable and proper out of every one: and as to thoſe things that happen of a ſudden, to make the ſame inquiry, not regarding things Indefinite, but really included in the matter, and comprehending the moſt and the neareſt. For the more things are included, the more eaſie will the Demonſtration be. And the nearer they are, the more proper and leſs Common. We call thoſe common things, as to praiſe *Achilles*, becauſe a Man, becauſe of the Race of the Semigods, becauſe he fought at the Siege of *Troy*. For theſe things belong alſo to others: and the ſame Perſon praiſes *Achilles* no more then

then *Diomed.* But Proper things are thoſe things that never happen'd to any other then to *Achilles*, as to kill *Hector*, the Stouteſt of all the *Trojans*; and *Cycnus*, who being invulnerable, hindred all others from landing; and becauſe that being very young he fought uncompell'd as a volunteer. And therefore there is but one Place of Election and that is topical. Now concerning the Elements of *Enthymemes*.

I take the *Place* and the *Element* of an *Enthymem* to be all one: and of *Enthymemes* there are two ſorts.

The firſt is demonſtrative, whether the thing is or is not. The next for Confutation. And they differ as in Logic the *Syllogiſm*, and the *Elenchus* or the *Probation*. The Demonſtrative *Enthymeme*, collects together thoſe things that are not conceded. Therefore for the moſt part there are *Places* relating to every one of theſe forms both profitable and neceſſary; out of every one of which the propoſitions are Selected.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the Places of Enthymemes.

THere is one place of Demonſtrative *Enthymemes* from contraries. For we are to conſider whether the contrary be in the contrary. For if it be not, it refuſes; and confirms if it be. As when we ſay Temperance is a good thing becauſe Intemperance is evil. Or as in

the *Meſſeniacs*. If War were the occaſion of their preſent Miſeries, they are to be recover'd by Peace. Or like that of the Poet,

If juſt it be not, Anger ſhould chaſtiſe
Thoſe that againſt their will do inquiries
Nor are they to be prais'd that here do well
Unleſs neceſſity or force compel.

Or thus,

If falſhood among men ſuch Credit gains
As oft by ſoft perſwaſion to deceive;
On th' other ſide we ſafely may maintain,
There are more Truths that men will not believe.

Another *Place* is taken from Similar Caſes. For it muſt be included or not included in the thing, as if we ſhould ſay, That what is juſt is not alone good: for then what is juſtly done would be done well; but to do juſtly is not always deſirable.

Another *Place* from thoſe things that are relative one to another; as if it be in the one to act and do juſtly, in the other it may be to ſuffer juſtly; and if to have Commanded, to have ſubmitted to Command. As *Diomedon* the *Publican* ſaid concerning the cuſtoms. If it be no ſhame for you to ſell, it is no ſhame for us to purchaſe. For if he that has ſuffer'd, has ſuffer'd juſtly and well, therefore he that acted; and if he that acted, therefore he that ſuffer'd. But here may a Cavil ariſe, for if a man be juſtly ſlain, he may have juſtly ſuffer'd, but not at your hands. And therefore it muſt be ſeperately conſider'd whether he were worthy to ſuffer, who ſuffer'd, and to act,

act, who acted; and then to proceed as shall seem most conveuient. For this sometimes differs, and hinders nothing, as in *Theodectes's Alcmæon.*

Did never any Mortal hate thy Mother?

To which the Aswer is,

Distinctly this must be consider'd.

Alphesiboea also demanding, Wherefore said she, have they doom'd thee to dye, me not to put to death?

Or like the Judgments pronounc'd upon *Demosthenes* and those that slew *Nicanor.* For because they were adjudg'd to have slain him rightfully, he was adjudg'd to be justly slain. Also as to the Person who was slain at *Thebes*, concerning whom judgment was requir'd, whether he were worthy to dye; as if it were contrary to Law, to kill him that deserves to dye by the Law.

Another Place is taken from *More* or *Less.* As thus, If neither all the Gods know, much less men. This shews that where the *more* is not, the *less* cannot be. But this, he beats his neighbours, who beats his Father, proceeds from hence, that if the *Less*, the *Greater* is included, and it is requisite to demonstrate both ways, whether it be or be not.

Again, when neither the *More* nor the *Less* is included: As for example.

Thy Father is become
Compassion's object for his Children lost.
But no man pities Oenus *Loss, a Son*
Who made all Hellas *ring with his renown*

Alſo if *Theſus* did no Inquiry, neither *Alexander*. And if neither the *Tyndaridæ*, neither *Alexander*. And if *Hector* equall'd *Patroclus*, *Alexander* equal'd *Achilles*. And if other Artiſts are not evil, neither the Philoſophers. And if Commanders are not bad becauſe often overcome, neither Sophiſters. And if it behoves private Perſons to have a care of their honour, you ought to be careful of the Reputation of *Greece*.

Another *Place* is taken from Conſideration of Time. As *Iphicrates* for *Harmodius*. If before I acted I had deſir'd a Statue, and you had granted my requeſt before I acted, will ye deny it me now I have acted: Never promiſe therefore in expectation of a benefit, and deny when the benefit is receiv'd. And again, as to that whether the *Thebans* ſhall permit *Philip* a paſſag into *Attica*, for if he had demanded that Paſſage before he aſſiſted againſt the *Phocians*, they would have certainly granted it; and therefore it was abſurd to deny him when he had forgiven 'em and believ'd 'em.

Another Place is taken from things ſaid and retorted upon the Speaker, as *Iphicrates* againſt *Ariſtophon*, with whom he treated to betray the Ships for money, which he denying to do; Therefore ſaid He, thou being *Ariſtophon* wouldſt not betray the Ships, and ſhould I being *Iphicrates* have betray'd 'em? For he muſt be thought to have been more criminal, otherwiſe it will appear ridiculous, as if any one ſhould have ſaid the ſame thing againſt *Ariſtides* being the Accuſer. But to detract from the Credit of the Accuſer. For the Accuſer would always be better

then

then the Perſon accus'd. Therefore this Place is for abſolute evincement, that it is a poſitive abſurdity for any man to object that againſt others which he does or would do himſelf; or to perſuade another to do that which he neither does or would do himſelf.

There is another *Place* from the *Definition*. As if a man ſhould ſay *Dæmonium* is nothing elſe but God, or the work of God. Now whoever thinks there is a work of God, the ſame Perſon muſt of neceſſity believe there is a God. And as *Iphicrates*, ſaid that he is the moſt generous, who is the beſt: for there was nothing of Generous, that could be attributed either to *Harmodius* or *Ariſtogiton*, till they had acted generouſly. And for that he is the neareſt. For my Actions are nearer to the Actions of *Harmodius* and *Ariſtogiton* then thine. And as in *Alexander*, we muſt certainly confeſs that the Fruition of one Body does not content the Intemperate. Which was the reaſon that *Socrates* deny'd to go to *Archelaus*, ſince he thought it a diſhonour, that he who had receiv'd a benefit could not retaliate it. For all theſe Perſons when they have defin'd and conſider'd what the thing is, then they diſcourſe of what they propound. Another *Place* ariſes from the multiplicity of manners by which a thing may be.

Another from Diviſion. As if all the reſt are injur'd for the ſake of thee, or this or that Man, or that thing. And for the ſake of two it was impoſſible: and for the ſake of the third, they themſelves confeſs he could not.

Another from Induction; as from *Peparethia*, That women every where make a true diſtinction

of Children. Thus the Mother declar'd to *Mamias* queſtioning the Legality of her Son at *Athens*. And at *Thebes Iſmenia* and *Stilbone* having the ſame Controverſy, *Dodonis* confirm'd the Boy to be the Son of *Iſmenia*. And ſo he was afterwards reputed. Alſo by the Law of *Theodectes* men never truſt their own Horſes to thoſe that have ill us'd other men's: nor to ſuch as have caſt away other mens Veſſels, does any man commit the charge of his own. Which holding true in every thing elſe, no man truſts himſelf with one that neglects his own ſafety. And as *Alcidamas* argu'd, All men honour wiſe men; the *Parian's* honour *Archilochus* though abuſive; The *Chiot's* honour'd *Homer* though none of their Country-man. The *Mitylenæans* honour'd *Sappho* though a Woman; and the *Lacedæmonians*, though no great admirers of Philoſophers, yet admitted *Chilo* into their Senate. The Latins honour'd *Pythagoras*; and the *Lampſacenes* buried *Anaxagoras* magnificently, and honour him to this day. The *Athenians* alſo, ſo long as they obſerv'd *Solon's* Laws were happy; and the *Lacedemonians* ſo long as they obey'd thoſe of *Lycurgus*. *Thebes* alſo was govern'd by Philoſophers, and then flouriſh'd.

Another *Place*, is taken from a Judgment made of the ſame thing or ſome thing like, or contrary to it; eſpecially if by all and always; or the moſt and good men: or if the Judges or their favourites: or Perſons againſt whom there is no Judgment to be given, as Princes: or ſuch againſt whom it would be a ſhame to give Judgment, as God, a Parent or a Teacher; as *Autocles* argu'd againſt *Mixidemides*: If it were lawful

ful for the *Furies* to give judgment in the *Areopagus*, why not for *Mixidemides*? Or as *Sappho* argu'd, that Death was an Evil. For unleſs the Gods had ſo adjudg'd it, they themſelves would dye. Or as *Ariſtippus* reply'd to *Plato*, whom he look'd upon as too dogmatical; but our Companion, ſaid he, affirms no ſuch thing, meaning *Socrates*. *Egeſippus* alſo having firſt conſulted the Oracle of *Olympus*, came to *Delphos*, and demanded of *Apollo*, whether he were of the ſame judgment with his Father, deeming it ignominious for the Gods to contradict each other. Or as *Iſocrates* wrote, that *Helena* excell'd in vertue, if *Theſeus* ſo adjudg'd it. And *Paris*, whom the Goddeſſes prefer'd. And that *Euagoras* excell'd in vertue, as ſays *Iſocrates*, becauſe that *Conon* in his Calamity, rejecting all others, went to him.

Another *Place* is taken from the *Parts*; as in the *Topics* what ſort of motion the Soul is? either this or that: of which there is an example in *Socrates* of *Theodeſtes*. What Temple did he violate? What Gods did he not worſhip among thoſe which the City ſo eſteem'd?

Another *Place* from *Connexion*. Becauſe in moſt things it ſo happens that they are attended by good and bad, there it is proper to perſwade or diſſwade by the Conſequences; to praiſe or diſpraiſe, to accuſe or defend by the Conſequences: for example Envy attends learning, which is an evil: and wiſdom, which is a felicity. Therefore learning is not to be acquir'd: becauſe Envy is not to be contracted: Therefore learning is to e acquir'd, Becauſe wiſdom is to be covered. This *Place* was the Invention of *Callippus*, which in-

cluded Poſſibility, and thoſe other things, as has been ſaid.

Another place ariſes from Oppoſites, when perſwaſion or diſſwaſion lyes concerning two Oppoſites, and the foregoing *Place* is to be made uſe of in both. The difference is, that in the one, things that offer themſelves by chance are oppos'd; in the other, contraries. As when the Preiſt forbid his Son to ſpeak on Oration to the People. For if thou uttereſt things that are juſt, men will hate thee, if things unjuſt, the Gods. On the other ſide it behov'd him to ſpeak to the People. For, ſaid he, if thou uttereſt things that are juſt, the Gods will love thee; if what are unjuſt, Men will admire thee. This is the ſame with the Proverb of *having Oyl and Salt.*

Another from the twofold Opinion of men; when we do not openly and privately praiſe the ſame things, but openly thoſe things that are juſt and honeſt; privately, thoſe things that are more profitable. And this *Place* cheifly prevails in Paradoxes.

Another place ariſes from Analogy, becauſe it agrees with Porportion. As *Iphicrates* ſaid to the Magiſtrates that would compel his younger Son to publick Duties, becauſe he was Big of Age, If they thought great Boys to be Men, they were to decree little Men to be Boys. And *Theodectes* in the Law you have made Citizens *Strabaces* and *Charidemus*, tho' Stipendiary and Penſioners, by reaſon of their honeſty, and will ye not exterminate from your City thoſe that behav'd themſelves amiſs.

Another from Conſequences, as *Xenophanes* ſaid, they were equally Impious to affirm the Gods

Gods to be born, as they who affirm'd 'em to dye. For the Conſequence of both is, that the Gods at ſome times ceaſe to be. And the Conſequence from both is always to be taken, as that which always follows. You will judge not by *Socrates*, but by the ſtudies which he profeſſes, whether he be a Philoſopher or no. That to *Give* Earth and Water is to ſerve: and to participate of Common Peace, is to obey commands. But we are to conſider which is moſt advantageous.

Another from this, that the ſame Perſons do not always chooſe the ſame things, after or before, but by Turns, as in this *Enthymene*; If being in Exile we fought that we might return, now we are return'd ſhall we go into Exile that we may avoyd fighting. For one while they choſe to fight, that they might ſtay; another while, not to be at home, leaſt they ſhould fight.

Another *Place* is to affirm a thing to be, or to be done for the ſake of that thing of which it might be the cauſe, though it be not. As if a Man ſhould give to another, that he might diſoblige the ſame Perſon, by taking the ſame gift away again. Whence that ſaying,

To many Fortune, not in kindneſs giving,
On many large Proſperity beſtows

That their Calamities, at laſt, their greater woes
May prove——

And

And that of *Antiphon*, out of *Meleager*,

Not coveting ſo much the Beaſt to ſlay
But that their Teſtimonies might diſplay
Meleager's *courage over wondring Greece,*

And that of *Ajax* in *Theodectes*, That *Diomede* made choice of *Ulyſſes*, not for the honour which he bare him, but that his Companion might be his Inferiour: For it might be, that he might do it for that Reaſon.

Another place is common to Pleaders and Counſellers, to conſider what is diſwaſive, what perſwaſive, and thoſe things for the ſake of which men act or avoyd. As if poſſible, if profitable, if eaſie to himſelf or his Friends; if hurtful to his Enemies; and whether the loſs greater then the profit. Theſe are perſwaſive, their contrarys diſſwaſive. Diſſwaſives are us'd in Defences; Perſwaſives in Accuſations; This place is wholly attributed to *Pamphilus* and *Callippus*.

Another from thoſe things which we ſee done, yet are incredible, becauſe they would not ſeem to be, unleſs they were nigh; for men believe thoſe things that are, or which are probable. Yet if credible nor probable, it ſhall neither be true: for it does not therefore ſeem to be true, becauſe probable, or credible, as when *Androcles* of *Pythia* found fault with the Law, and was exclam'd againſt, when they heard him ſay, *The Laws want a Law to correct 'em*; he anſwered, juſt as Fiſh want Salt. And yet it is neither credible nor true, that becauſe they live in the Salt Sea, that therefore they want Salt. And Olives may be ſaid to want Oyl. And yet it is not credible that the fruit

fruit from which Oyl is prels'd ſhould want Oyl.

Another Argumentative, concerning Repugnances either in time, fact or words, as thus, He ſays he loves ye and yet conſpir'd againſt ye with thirty men. This ſeparately as to the Adverſarys. Then again ſeparately as to the Perſon himſelf. He calls me litigiou, yet cannot prove that ever I ſued any man. Then with reference tothe Adverſary and himſelf. This man never lent any Money but I have ranſom'd many of yours. Another, from men and things of which there is a bad opinion conceiv'd,which ſeems to ſpeak the cauſe of the ſuſpition. For there is ſomething to be ſaid why it ought to ſeem ſo. As when a certain Woman was accus'd becauſe ſhe kiſſ'd her Son, ſhe lay under a Suſpition of lying with the young Man, but the cauſe being explain'd, the Accuſation fell. And as in *Theodectes*'s *Ajax*, ſays *Ulyſſes* againſt *Ajax* I am Stouter then *Ajax*, yet it does not appear.

Another from the cauſe which if it be, the thing is, if there be no cauſe, there is no ſuch thing. As *Leodamas* defending himſelf againſt the Accuſation of *Traſibulus*, that he was noted with Infamy when plac'd in the caſtle; but had wip'd it off among the thirty Tyrants; made anſwer that his Suſpition did not hold, For then the thirty Tyrants would have put a greater Confidence in him in regard of the hatred conceiv'd againſt him by the People.

Another place ariſes from a conſideration whether it were poſſible or beſt, which the Son adviſes, does, or has done; for if they appear to be ſuch, it is apparent that he either advis'd or acted: ſince no man willingly and knowingly adviſes

adviſes or acts for the worſt: only he may be miſtaken; for many times it appears that a thing might have been better done.

Another is to conſider, ſomething may be done contrary to what has been acted, As *Xenophanes* anſwer'd the *Tegeates*, who deſir'd to know of him whether they ſhould ſacrifice to *Leucothea* and put on mourning, If, ſaid he, you think her a Goddeſs, never mourn; if a mortal, never ſacrifice.

Another to accuſe or defend from things ill done. As in the *Medea* of *Carcinus*. Theſe accuſe *Medea* for killing her Childern, becauſe they do not appear. For *Medea* was miſtaken about the ſending away her Sons: but ſhe defends her ſelf, that ſhe had not kill'd her Sons, but ſlain *Jaſon*. For unleſs ſhe had done that, ſhe had done amiſs, ſince ſhe had done the other.

Another from the Name, as *Sophocles*,

Well mayſt thou ſteel be call'd, thou bear'ſt the Name

Thus *Conon* calls *Thraſybulus*, bold Adviſer. Thus *Herodicus* ſpeaking of *Thraſymachus*, Thou art always *Thraſymachus*, ſaith he, or *Bold in fight*. And of *Polos*, thou art a true *Polos* or young Colt. And of *Draco's* Laws, that they were not the Laws of a Man, but a *Dragon*, in regard of their ſeverity. Or as *Hecuba* in *Euripdies* ſpeaking of *Venus*.

Well does thy Name become thee
Goddeſs of madneſs as thou art.

And

And as *Cheremon*, was call'd *Pentheus*, or the *Mourner* form his future Calamity.

Now Argumentative *Enthymemes* are more approv'd then demonſtrative. For a convincing *Enthymene* is a ſhort Collection of contraries; and thoſe things which are couch'd cloſe together are moſt apparent to the Auditor. But of all Syllogiſms as well for convincement as demonſtration, thoſe are moſt troubleſome that do not appear conſpicuous at the beginning.

For men are pleas'd to find themſelves able to fore-judg what the Orator will ſay, and that they can underſtand him as ſoon as he has ſpoken.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the Places of ſeeming Enthymemes.

NOW becauſe it happens, that this is a Syllogiſm and that is not, but only in appearance, of neceſſity, ſometimes this muſt be an *Enthymem*, and that not, but only ſeemingly ſo.

Therefore the firſt *Place* of ſeeming *Enthymemes* is in utterance. And of this one part is, when the Perſon does not conclude in a *Syllogiſm*, but ends in ſomething like it, as it is not this or that, therefore this or that. For what is ſpok'n in *Enthymemes* collectively, and by way of Oppoſition, that appears to be an *Enthymem*. And ſuch an *Enthymem* ſeems to proceed from the Figure

Figure of Speech. And therefore it is requiſite to ſpeak after a Syllogiſtical form, to recite the heads of ſeverly Syllogiſms. Theſe he has ſav'd, others he has offer'd to his revenge, but he has reſtor'd the *Greeks* to their Liberty. For every one of theſe require a different demonſtration; but being conjoyn'd, ſomething appears to be made out of the whole.

The other part conſiſts in the reſemblance of names call'd *Homonyma*. As if we would argue there is ſomething of Excellency in μῦς, a *Mous*, from whence is deriv'd the moſt excellent of all Ceremonies: For Religious Miſteries are the moſt venerable of all Ceremonies. Or if any one ſpeaking in praiſe of a Dog, ſhould comprehend the *Celeſtial Dog*; or of *Pan*, becauſe *Pindarus* thus ſpeaks,

Ὦ μάκαρ ὄντι μεγάλας θεῦ
Κύνα Παῦλο δαπὸν καλέσαν Ολύμποι.

Or to aver *Mercury* to be the moſt ſociable of all the Gods, becauſe he is call'd ſociable *Mercury*.

Another in ſpeaking things disjunctive, conjunctively; and things conjoyn'd, disjunctively. For becauſe it ſeems to be the ſame thing which is not the ſame thing, therefore which is moſt profitable that is to be done: And this is the Argument of *Euthydemus*. As, to know that there is a Gally in the *Pyreum*, which every one knows: and he that knows the Elements of Poetry, knows there is verſe: and becauſe twice as much is ſickly, therefore the ſingle unſound. For it is abſurd to think that two things being good

good, one of them ſhould be evil, and this Argument is convincing, but thus demonſtrative; For it is impoſſible there ſhould be two good things of which the one ſhould be evil. But this place is only for thoſe that love Cavilling.

Again, what *Polycrates* ſaid of *Thraſybulus*, that depos'd the thirty Tyrants, which is Conjunctive. But that of *Oreſtes* in *Theodectes* is disjunctive. It is juſt that ſhe ſhould dye who kill'd her Mother: but it is as juſt that the Son ſhould revenge the Fathers death; which being conjunctively ſpoken, would perhaps be unjuſt.

Another place, is to confirm or leſſen by Aggravation: Which is done, when the Perſon amplifies, before he has giv'n any demonſtration of the matter. For thereby he makes it appear how either he has not done the fact, when he that defends the cauſe amplifies; or how he has done it, when the Accuſer is incens'd. Therefore it is no *Enthymem*. For the hearer falſely collects, that he has, or has not done, the thing being demonſtrated.

Another *Place* is from the *Signe*. Yet neither is this a Syllogiſm. As if a Man ſhould ſay, lovers are profitable to Cities. For the Friendſhip of *Harmonius* and *Ariſtogiton* ruin'd the Tyrant *Hipparchus*. Or as if a man ſhould affirm *Dionyſius* to be a Theif, becauſe he was a wicked Perſon. For neither is this a Syllogiſm, in regard every wicked Perſon is no Theif; but every Theif is a wicked Perſon.

Another from the *Accident*: according to what *Polycrates* ſaid of the *Mice*, that they were aſſiſtant, in gnawing the Bowſtrings. Or if a man ſhould ſay, It was a moſt honourable thing to be invited

invited to ſupper. For that becauſe *Achilles* was not invited, he was enrag'd againſt the Greeks in *Tenedos*: but the true reaſon was, becauſe he was ſlighted: which happen'd, becauſe he was not call'd.

Another from the conſequence: As in *Paris*, that he was Magnanimous; for that contemning the applauſe of the Multitude, he liv'd by himſelf in *Idea*: in regard that ſuch being Magnanimous, he was alſo Magnanimous. And becauſe he ſpruc'd up himſelf, and made his viſits by night, therefore he was a Whoremaſter, in regard the cuſtom of Whoremaſters is ſuch. In like manner alſo becauſe the Poor both ſing and dance in the Temples; and becauſe Exiles may live where they pleaſe. Now then becauſe theſe things are ſigns of being happy, they who enjoy theſe priviledges are happy. But there is a difference in the manner, which makes the Argument defective.

Another from the *Cauſe* which is not, but as it were the cauſe; as when the thing which was don together or afterwards, is taken as if it fell out for that reaſon: eſpecially by them that manage Affairs of State. As *Demades* averr'd the Management of *Demoſthenes* to be the cauſe of all the Miſchiefs, becauſe the War enſu'd.

Another, where there is a deficiency in the *When* and the *How*. For *Paris* did not Raviſh *Helena* wrongfully, in regard the choice was given her by her Father: not always perhaps, but at firſt. For till then, ſhe was in the Power of her Father. Or if a man ſhould ſay, it was ignominious for Freemen to be ſtrick'n; though not always: but when the one has not provok'd

vok'd the other. Moreover as among Wranglers, there is a ſeeming Syllogiſm, from that which is ſimply, and that which is not ſimply; as in Logic, That *non Entitie*, is *Entitie*, for *non Entitie*, is *Entitie* not in *Entitie*: and what cannot be known, may be known; for when a thing cannot be known, we may know that it cannot be known: Thus in Rhetoric, there is a ſeeming *Enthymeme* from that which is not ſimply probable, but a certain kind of Probability: And this not univerſally according to that of *Agatho*

Perhaps ſome one may think it probable,
That many things improbable to Mortals Happen-

For that happens, which is beſide Probability. Wherefore that is probable which is beſide Probability. So that if that be true, that which is not probable ſhall be probable, but not ſimply, but as in brangling, the *Secundum quid*, or the *ad Aliquid*, or the *How*, not being added, makes the Fallacy; thus here the *beſide* Probability is not ſimply Probability, but a certain kind of Probability. And from this *Place* was *Corax's* Art compos'd. For whether the perſon be not lyable to the Crime; as he that is infirm has an eaſie plea againſt a Battery: becauſe it ſeems unlikely: or whether he be lyable to the Accuſation, as being ſtout and ſtrong, he has the ſame defence, unleſs the Probability appear: and ſo in other things. For of neceſſity a man muſt be either obnoxious to the Crime or not: and both appear probable: and that is probable, this not ſimply probable, but as has been ſaid. And this is

to make the Inferiour Reaſon Superiour; which was the reaſon that men ill brook'd the Reaſon of *Protogoras*, as being falſe and not true, but ſeemingly probable

CHAP. XXV.

Of Diſſolutions.

Enthymemes are diſſolv'd by oppoſing another *Enthymeme*, or bringing an Objection. Therefore when we oppoſe another *Enthymeme*, it is apparent that we may do it from the ſame Places. For Syllogiſms are made out of Probables, and there are many Probables that are contrary one to another.

Objections, as in the Topics, are brought four ways: either from the *ſame*, or the *like*, or from the *contrary*, or from things *adjudg'd*. I call *from the ſame*; as if the Enthymeme were concerning Love, as being to be applauded; the objection is twofold. For you ſhall either ſay ſay Univerſally that all Indigency is evil; or particularly, that the Proverb of *Caunias Amor* had never been brought into Uſe, if Love were not ſometimes Beſtial and unlawful in ſome Perſons.

An Objection is brought from the *Contrary*, as if the Enthymeme were; that a good man is kind to all his friends, the anſwer ſhould be; That neither the Wicked do ill to all men. From the *like*, as if the Enthymeme were that they who

who receive an injury, always hate, the anſwer ſhould be, That neither they who receive kindneſſes always love.

Things adjudg'd proceed from men of Fame and Reputation. As if the *Enthymeme* were, That Drunkards are to be pardon'd; for that they ſin unwittingly. The objection is, that then *Pittacus* is to be diſcommended, whoſe Laws are no leſs ſevere againſt the drunken then the ſober offender.

Now becauſe *Enthymemes* which are deduc'd from four things; Probable, Example, Demonſtration and Sign, and for that thoſe *Enthymemes* which are deduc'd from thoſe things which for the moſt part either are or ſeem to be, are deduc'd from probables; And thoſe from Example, which raciocination collects by Induction from one or more things alike, when any aſſuming univerſally, concludes particularly; Thoſe from Argument which are infer'd from one neceſſary appearance: and thoſe from ſigns, when we collect from what is Univerſal or particular, whether it be or not be; and probable is that which not always, but for the moſt part appears; ſuch Enthymemes are to be diſſolv'd by bringing an Objection, and the Diſſolution will be ſeeming, but not always true. For the Objector does not always diſſolve the Probability by denying it to be, but denying it to be neceſſary. And there it happens that the Defendant is always in a better Condition then the Accuſer by reaſon of this deception. For becauſe the Accuſer fetches his Proofs from Probabilities, and for that the Solution is not the ſame, either that it is not probable, or that it is not neceſſary; as alſo

for that he is ready to object that which is for the moſt part, and that it is not only probable but always and neceſſary, the Judge being ſo deceiv'd, believes, that either it is not probable, or not to be by him adjudg'd; for he is not only to judge from Neceſſaries but from Probabilities, which is to judge moſt judiciouſly. Therefore the diſſolution is not to be made by proving it not neceſſary, but by proving it not to be probable, which will be done, if it be objected, that it frequently uſes to be ſo. Which Objection may be twofold, either as to the time, or to the things themſelves: but then it is moſt prevalent, if it hold good in both. For the more and the oftner the more probable. Signs and Enthymems drawn frome ſigns are diſſolv'd as we have already demonſtrated in our *Analyſis*. Enthymemes from Example are diſſolv'd in the ſame manner, as theſe from probabilities. For if we produce any thing which has not ſo happen'd, it is diſſolv'd as not being neceſſary; or becauſe more things have happen'd otherwiſe and oftner. If then more and oftner, then we are to argue it is not the thing in controverſy, that it is not like, or not in like manner, or that there is ſome difference. But Demonſtrations, and Enthymemes drawn from Demonſtration cannot be diſſolv'd becauſe they do not collect Syllogiſtically; and therefore we are to prove that it is ſo as it is ſaid. Which if it appear to be ſo, and to be a Demonſtration it is not to be diſſolv'd, ſince there is nothing more certain then Demonſtration.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Aggravation and Extenuation.

BUT Aggravation and Extenuation are not the Elements of an *Enthymeme*. I call an Element, and a *Place* the ſame; and an Element or place is that into which many Enthymemes happen. But amplification and diminution are *Enthymemes* to demonſtrate that the thing is great or little, good or bad, juſt or unjuſt and ſo of the reſt. All which things are the Subjects of *Enthymemes* and Syllogiſms. So that if none of theſe be the Place of an Enthymeme, then neither Aggravation nor Extenuation. Nor are thoſe things that diſſolve *Enthymemes*, any ſpecies of an *Enthymeme* that avail to confirmation. For it is manifeſt that he who demonſtrates or brings an objection, diſſolves. On the other ſide there is a contrary demonſtration of oppoſites, while the one proves it was not, the other that it was done; ſo that here can be no difference, for they uſe both the ſame *Enthymemes*, that it is, or is not. But an objection is no Enthymem, only a certain opinion, whence it will become perſpicuous, that the Perſon has either not Syllogiſtically concluded, or aſſum'd ſomething that is falſe.

Ariſtotle's RHETORIC TO Theodectes.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of the Parts of Rhetoric.

WE are now to diſcourſe of Elocution. For it is not enough to have in Stock what we ought to ſpeak, but to ſpeak what we have as we ought; to which it much conduces that the Oration ſhould appear Garbate and Polite. And firſt we are to enquire according to the order of nature, what thoſe things are that are capable to perſwade. In the ſecond place, to diſpoſe theſe things for utterance, The third thing which is of

of greateſt efficacy, yet never hitherto explain'd, concerns Action and delivery: as being but of modern uſe in Tragedies and Comedies; in regard that formerly the Poets rehears'd their own works themſelves. And it is manifeſtly the ſame thing in *Rhetoric* as in Poetry; of which others have diſcours'd eſpecially *Glauco* the *Teian*.

Now Pronuntiation conſiſts in the voice, how to make uſe of it according to every affection, as when low'd, when Soft, when between both: and what accents to make uſe of, and what meaſures are proper. For there are three things to be conſider'd, magnitude, Harmony and number. And theſe are the things which generally carry away the priſes at the publick Tryals of Skill. And as the Actors in the Poetical conteſts are more valu'd then the Poets themſelves, ſo likewiſe in the Civil, becauſe of the Corruption of Common Weals. Nor is it yet reduc'd into an Art, in regard that Elocution is but a Novelty and ſeems to be but a ſlight thing, if rightly examined.

But in regard the Study and Practiſe of *Rhetoric* depends upon opinion, we muſt not neglect it, as being a thing more neceſſary then uſeful: ſince there is nothing to be deſir'd in ſpeaking, more then to avoid being troubleſome and unpleaſant: for that when we contend about things and matters, all things elſe except demonſtrations are needleſs. And yet they greatly prevail upon deprav'd Auditories. And that which concerns Elocution, has ſome little kind of neceſſity to be obſerv'd in all kind of learning. For it is of uſe to manifeſt whither the Perſon ſpeak ſo or ſo? yet not ſo much; for indeed all theſe

things depend upon fancy, and are referr'd to the Auditory. And therefore no man Teaches Geometry like an Orator; yet Pronunciation when it comes to be us'd there will prove as Effectual as when it is heard upon the Stage. Some however have attempted to say something concerning it, as *Thrasymachus* in his Treatises entitl'd *Elei*. Besides nature is more prone to action, as less addicted to Art; But Elocution is altogether Artificial and therefore rewards are given to those that prove themselves most excellent at that, as to Orators that excel in gesture and Action. For Orations prevail more, being well spoken, then well written. Therefore the Poets were the first that promoted Action. For names are but Imitations; which was the reason that *Rhapsodeis* and Stage treading became Arts. Now because the Poets though speaking frivolous things, have seem'd to gain honour by their manner of Delivery, therefore Poetic Elocution was first receiv'd, as that of *Gorgias*. And now many illiterate Persons believe themselves great Authors upon this Subject. But the Pronunciation of Prose and Verse is quite different, as is manifest from the event. For the Tragedians now no longer use that manner; but as they have left *Tetrameters*, and betaken themselves to the *Iambic* as being the most proper among other measures for speech, so they have lay'd aside all names not agreeable to custom, which formerly and still in *Hexameters* the Poets made use of as Ornaments. And therefore it is ridiculous to imitate 'em, in those things which they have lai'd aside, as disagreeable.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of Elocution.

NOW then the vertue of Elocution is to be plain; which that it is ſo, this is a ſign, that if the Oration do not make plain and apparent, it does not do it's work. Nor muſt the ſtile be low, nor exceeding the dignity of the Perſon, but according to *decorum*. For a Poetic ſtile may not be low, yet not Proper for a Proſe Oration. Names alſo and words which are Proper render an Oration proſpicuous, yet not mean but polite and graceful. Variety of words renders the Oration alſo more Majeſtic. For like the converſe of men with ſtrangers and Forriegners, ſuch is the pleaſure we take in Novelty of words. Therefore words the moſt unuſual are to be made uſe of: For men admire Novelty, and what we admire is pleaſing. Therefore in meeter there are many words made uſe of to this purpoſe, and there aptly enough in regard the things and the Perſons are there more lofty and great which are diſcours'd of. But fewer ſuffice in proſe where the Subject is of leſs concern. For there, if a Servant or a very young Perſon ſhould ſpeak too politely of little things, it would be an *Indecorum*; though in thoſe meaner things there is a decent contraction and dilatation of language. Therefore while we do that, we ought to lye cloſe, that we may not ſeem to ſpeak fictitiouſly

ouſly but naturally. For the one gains credit, the other the contrary. For from one that lyes upon the Watch men Guard themſelves as from mix'd Wines. And as the voice of *Theodorus* in reſpect of the voices of the other Actors; for his ſeem'd to be the voice of the ſpeaker; theirs the voices of other men. And he is well conceal'd that in his compoſing, chooſes out of the common and cuſtomary dialect. Which *Euripides* does, and was the firſt that ſhew'd the way. But ſeeing that an Oration conſiſts of names and words, and that there are as many ſorts of words as we have ſet down in our Art of Poeſy, obſolete, reiterated and made words are ſeldom and in few places to be us'd: for it makes a change in the Oration too misbecoming. But Proper, Domeſtic and Metaphor only become the Elocution of Proſe. Which is Apparent becauſe that all men make uſe of theſe only, ſince all men uſe Proper, Domeſtic words and Metaphor. Whence it is manifeſt that if a man rightly obſerve theſe things, the Oration will ſeem clear and unuſual; and yet why unuſual, ſhall not be diſcover'd. Which is the excellency of Rhetorical Oration. Homonymous words are moſt uſeful for Sophiſters: for by means thereof, they impoſe their fallacies. Synonymous are moſt uſeful for Poets. I call Proper, and Synonymous, as to *go, and to walk, journey* and *Travel* both theſe words being Proper and Synonymous one with another.

Proſpicuity, pleaſantneſs and what is unuſual more eſpecially appear in *Metaphor.* Nor is Metaphor other where to be fetch'd. But both Epithites and Metaphors ought to be congruous, which

which will proceed from proportion. If not, the Indecorum will appear, in regard that contraries then moſt cheifly appear, when put together. Therefore it is to be conſider'd as Purple becomes a young Man, what befits an old Man; for the ſame habit does not agree with both. And he that will commend, muſt deduce his Metaphors from the beſt in their kind; he that would diſpraiſe, from the worſt. Thus I ſay becauſe there are contraries in the ſame kind, that a Beggar, Prays; and he that Prays begs. For becauſe both are *Petitions*, it is expedient to do as we have ſaid. As *Iphicrates* call'd *Callias Metragyrten*, or Collector for the Goddeſs, not *Daduchius* or Torch Bearer, to which the other reply'd, that he was not initiated, and therefore he ought to have call'd him *Daduchus*, and not *Metragyrten:* ſince both related to the ſame Goddeſs: only the one was honourable, the other, not. Thus the flatterers of *Dionyſius* call'd themſelves his *Artiſts*. Both which are Metaphors, the one from what was ſordid, the other from what was honourable. Thus Robbers at this day call themſelves *Merchants*. Therefore it is lawful to ſay, that he who does wrong, commits a crime, and he that commits a crime does wrong: and he that Steals, both takes and Robs. But there is an *Indecorum* in that which *Telephus* in *Euripides* ſpeaks, *Raigning over the Oares, he landed in Myſia.* For the word to *Raign* exceeding the Dignity of the matter, render'd the *Metaphor* vicious.

There is alſo an Error in Syllables if they are not pleaſing. As *Dionyſius* of *Chalcis* in his Elogies calls Poeſie the *Clamour* of *Calliope*; for both

both are words; but the words not being ſignificant, the *Metaphor* is frivolous.

Moreover a Metaphor is not to be far ſetch'd, but from words as it were next akin, agreeable; and words anonymous ought to be expreſs'd by Metaphor, and that being underſtood, they may appear to be the next in kind; as in that celebrated Riddle.

A Man I ſaw Braſs Sodering to a Man
With fire.——

The Act it ſelf is *anonymous*: but both together infer a certain addition: So that ſodering intimates the application of the Cupping Glaſs. And indeed in Riddles that are well compos'd we ſhall find many Proper Metaphors. For Metaphors make Riddles. So that if the Riddles be true the Metaphors muſt be well choſen. Now the grace of the word conſiſts, as ſays *Lycimnius*, in the ſound and ſignification; as in like manner the Turpitude of the word. Add to theſe a third that diſſolves Sophiſtical Argumentation. For it is not, as *Bryſon* ſaid, That no man ſpeaks leudly, if the ſame things ſignifie as well this as that; which is falſe when another word is more Proper, more like, and more fit to ſet the thing before our Eyes.

Therefore that which is alike does not ſignifie both this and that, ſo that even in this manner one word is to be eſteem'd more graceful, another more deſpicable then the other. For both ſignifie *graceful* and *deſpicable*; but not *quatenus* graceful, nor *quatenus* deſpicable. Or elſe they ſignifie the ſame, but more or leſs.

Epithites

Epithites alſo are to be deriv'd from handſome things. But they differ; and it is better to ſay the *Roſy Morn*, then the *Purple Morn*, worſt of all to ſay the *Ruddy Morn*. Epithites alſo are to be drawn from things wicked and ſhameful: therefore *Matricide* is worſe then *Parricide*: and then again from the better, as *Revenger of his Parent*. And *Simonides*, when the Victor with Mules had given him a ſmall reward, refus'd to compoſe a Copy of Verſes in his praiſe, becauſe he did not think it became him to ſpeak in the praiſe of Imperfect Creatures. But when the Muleman had given him more, he cryed.

Hail Daughters fair of whirlewind-footed ſteeds.

The ſame thing may be done by way of diminution; which extenuates good as well as evil, as *Ariſtophanes* in his *Babylonic*, by way of *Sarcaſm*, plays with the diminutives of Gold, and Garment, and ſickneſs, not to be expreſs by us but by ſome Epithite of contempt. But a man muſt be wary, and obſerve a Mediocrity in both.

CHAP. III.

Of Frigids.

FRigid happen four ways. In compound words, as in *Lycophron*, *the many fac'd Heaven's*, the *Huge-neck'd Earth*, the *Narow-haven'd ſhore*. Or as *Gorgias* calls one Poor mus'd Flatterer. Or as *Alcidamas*, *his ſoul was filled with*

Fury,

Fury, and his face all fiery Choler: to end-brought Joy: the to *end-brought force of his Oration*: and *the Purple-coloured Pavement of* Theſſalus. For all theſe, as being compounded ſeem Poetical. This is one failing. Another to uſe obſolete ſayings as in *Lycophron, Xerxes*, a *Pelorian* man: and *Sthiron* a *Vaſt man*. In *Alcidamas, The Boys play of Poetry, The Stupidity of Nature*; and *exaſperated with the burning anger of his mind*.

A third in Epithites either tedious, or unſeaſonable, or too frequently us'd. For in Poetry to call Milk *White*, is allowable. But in Proſe they are either indecent, or if too frequent they turn the Proſe into Verſe. But becauſe Epithites are uſeful ſometimes (for they render the ſtile the more unuſual) there is a Mediocrity to be obſerv'd otherwiſe the Miſchief is worſ then if they were ſpoken in vain: for as the one ſort of Elocution is not good, the other is bad. Therefore the Writings of *Alcidamas* ſeem to be frigid. For he does not make uſe of his Epithites as junkets, but as ordinary viands, frequent, open, and greater then the ſubject requires. For he does not only ſay *Sweat*, but *moiſt ſweat*. Not by running, but by the *Curribund violence of the mind*. Not the Laws, but *Law the Queen of Citys*. Not care, but ſad care. He hid him not with boughs, but with *the boughs of the Wood*: and *Diſpenſer of pleaſure to the Auditory*: and Deſire, the *Anti-Rival of the Soul*. Which is both together as well Compound as an Epithite. Therefore they that thus ſpeak Poetically, together with indecorum are ſubject to Frigidity and ridiculouſneſs, beſides that their Loquacity renders 'em obſcure. For he that crouds too much upon the

the underſtanding of the Hearer, darkens the perſpicuity which he deſigns.

We alſo uſe compound words, when the things anonymous, and the word apart for Compoſition, as *Time-waſting*, which is if it be done too frequently is altogether Poetical. Therefore compound words are moſt proper for *Dithy-rambis*; as making a great noiſe: Obſolete words for Epic Poems, as being lofty and Majeſtic. Metaphors for Iambics.

There is alſo a fourth Frigidity in Metaphors. For ſome are ridiculous, which the Comedians uſe; others too high flown and Tragical: Alſo they are obſcure if too far fetch'd. As that of *Gorgias*, *Green and Bloodleſs things, which thou haſt ſhameful ſown and ill reap'd.* For it is two Poetical. And as *Alcidamas*, Philoſophy, the Bulwork of the Law. And *Ulyſſes*, the bright Looking-glaſs of human life. Theſe things little avail to perſwaſion, for the reaſons already alledg'd. But that of *Gorgias* upon a Swallow which muted as it flew toward him was extreamly Tragical, *Impudently done, O Philomela.* For if he ſpoke to a Bird, it was no Impudence: if to a Virgin, it was a piece of Impudence. Therefore he might have ſome reaſon to be angry, remembring ſome paſt accident not the preſent.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of Repreſentation.

REpreſentation is a kind of *Metaphor* differing little from it. For when we ſay, *Achilles ruſhed in like a Lyon*, it is a Repreſentation; but to ſay a *Lyon ruſhed in*, is only a Metaphor. For becauſe they are both ſtrong, he calls *Achilles* a Lyon by a Metaphor.

Now Repreſentation is very uſeful in Oratory; but not frequently as being Poetical. And they are drawn from the ſame things as Metaphors. Repreſentatations therefore are like that which *Androtio* makes of *Idrieus*, *That he was like a Dog let looſe from his Chains*: For they bite all they meet. Or as *Theodamas* liken'd *Archidamus* to *Euxenus*, who knew nothing of Geometry. And, that of *Plato*, they who rob the Dead are like to Dogs that bite the Stones, but never touch them that throw the Stone: and that of *Demoſthenes*; That the People are like a Steerſman ſtrong indeed, but very deaf; and ſpeaking againſt the verſes of the Poets, that they were like fair women without Beauty. For neither the one when their Beauty's faded, not the other when diſſolv'd into Proſe appear alike: and that of *Pericles* upon the *Samians*, That they were like Children, that take their Bread, crying, and upon the *Bœotians*, That they were like Flints: for as Flints were broken one by another,

ſo

ſo the *Bœotians* by fighting among themſelves. And *Democrates* likened Orators to Nurſes; who ſwallow'd the Meat and anointed the Children with the ſpittle. Or as *Antisthenes* liken'd *Ctephiſodotus*, being a Lean man, to Frankinſence, which delights while it conſumes. Which may be ſaid to be both Repreſentations and Metaphors. So that whatever are approv'd as Metaphors, certain it is, they will be Repreſentations; and Repreſentations will be Metaphors without Reaſon. Note alſo that the Metaphor muſt proportionably relate to the other part, and in thoſe things which are of the ſame kind. For if a Beaker may be call'd the ſheild of *Bacchus*; a ſheild may be alſo call'd the Beaker of *Mars*. And of theſe things it is that Oration Conſiſts.

CHAP V.

Of Elegancy of Language.

NOW the Principle of Elocution, is property of Language, which conſiſts in five things. Firſt in the conjunctions, if they be ſo aſſign'd, as naturally to precede and follow in their proper places as *Indeed*, and *I indeed*: *but* and *But He*. Which are therefore ſo to be plac'd, that they may be eaſily retain'd in memory, as to relate one to another not at too great a diſtance; nor muſt another conjunction be ſet before another neceſſary conjunction: for the conjunction is proper but in ſuch and ſuch places; as thus.

But I, after it was told me (for Cleo *came begging and intreating) went, when I had taken thoſe along with me.* Here are ſeveral conjunctions interpos'd, before the conjunction concluſive. So that if the conjunctions had been at a farther diſtance between *I went*, the Oration had been obſcure. So that one thing is the orderly diſpoſition of the Conjunctions. The next thing is to ſpeak in Proper Terms, and not with circumlocutions. The third thing is not to ſpeak ambiguouſly: unleſs it be done for the nonce; as they do, who having nothing to ſay, yet pretend to ſay ſomething: for ſuch men ſpeak thoſe things on purpoſe; like *Empedocles*. For Circumlocution deceives, if it be much; and the Hearers are affected, as many are by the Southſayers; who when they ſpeak ambiguouſly, pleaſe their admirers.

Cræſus croſſing Halys ſhall overturn a great Empire.

Therefore becauſe the miſtake is the leſs, the Southſayers ſpeak of the thing in general. For in the play at *even or odd*, a man ſhall ſooner ſpeak truth, by ſaying *even or odd*, then *How many*: and that *it will be*, rather then *when*. And therefore the Southſayers never determine the *when*: but all theſe things are a like: and therefore they are to be avoided unleſs it be for ſome ſuch purpoſe.

The Fourth, as *Phythagoras* divided the ſeveral ſorts of words into Maſculine and Feminine, and Inſtruments. For theſe things muſt be rightly diſtinguiſh'd to the underſtanding. *She coming and diſcourſing departed.*

The fifft in rightly naming many, few, and one. *But they, when they came, ſtrook me.* more eſpecially

eſpecially what is written ought to be eaſily legible, and eaſy for utterance. The ſame is that which has not many Conjunctions. Alſo where the points are not eaſy to be diſtinguiſh'd, like the Writings of *Heraclitus*. For it is a hard matter to gueſs at his Points. As in the beginning of his Book, where he ſays, *Of Reaſon exiſting always Men are Ignorant*. Now it is a hard matter to tell, whither to point *always* to *exiſting*, or to *Men*. Moreover it cauſes a Soloœciſm, not to diſtinguiſh, unleſs there be joyn'd to both that which is agreeable.

As to *Noiſe* and *Colour*, *Seeing* is not a common word. But *perceiving* is common to both. So that there muſt be obſcurity, from inſertion of many things, unleſs thoſe things be ſet for moſt which ought to be for moſt: As for Example. *My deſign was, when I had diſcours'd to him theſe and theſe things, to go.* But not thus, *I* deſign'd to go, and then to tell how he had theſe and theſe things to ſay.

CHAP. VI.

Prolixity.

TO Prolixity theſe things conduce. To make uſe of the Reaſon of the thing, inſtead of the Name. As, not to ſay, *a Circle*, but a Superficies equidiſtant from the Center. The contrary conduces to conciſeneſs, that is, to uſe the Name inſtead of the thing. Alſo to demonſtrate

by Metaphors and Epithites, avoyding what is Poetical. Alſo to multiply one thing into many, like the Poets. Who when they intend but one Port, cry the *Grecian Ports.* Alſo not to conjoyn, but to joyn one to one, another to another. *This Woman, our Wife.* Which might be more conciſely ſaid, *our Wife.* Alſo to ſpeak with a conjuction, *I went and then diſcours'd him*, which might be more conciſe without the conjuction, *Going, I diſcourſ'd him.* Alſo by ſpeaking thoſe things which are not neceſſary, like *Antimachus* concerning *Teumeſſus*

There is a windy certain little Hillock.

Thus a man may enlarge *ad infinitum*, and that as well in good as bad things; and it is convenient to diſtinguiſh in both how it is, or is not. Whence the Poets deduce thoſe words, ſtringleſs and harpleſs Harmony. Which is prov'd by Metaphors taken from proportion, as if a man ſhould ſay, The Trumpet is a ſtringleſs Inſtrument.

CHAP. VII.

Of Decorum.

Decorum in Elocution is, if it be moving, if Moral and Sententious, if accommodated and proportionable to the buſineſs. For it will not be porportionable, if it neither ſpeak *extempore* and ſlightly of great things; nor loftily

of mean things, nor beſtow too much Trimming upon an ordinary word; for that will appear comical; as *Cleophon* does, who ſpeaks many things, as if a man ſhould ſay, *Moſt venerable Colliflowre* (in the worſt ſence.)

Pathetic conſiſts in this, that the Injury be recited in the Language of the angry Perſon. When things impious or ignominious are to be repeated to ſpeak with a modeſt deteſtation; when praiſe worthy acts are rehears'd, to ſpeak with admiration; when Lamentable accidents, to recite ſubmiſſively and affectionately: and ſo in other caſes. For this proportionable Language renders the thing Probable, For when the Auditors conſider that thoſe are the affections of men in ſuch conditions, they are deceiv'd. So that although it be not as the Orator ſays, yet they believe it to be ſo. And the Hearer is affected with him that ſpeaks paſſionately, tho' he ſpeak nothing to the purpoſe. So that many confound their Hearers by making a noiſe. Demonſtration from ſigns is alſo moral; for it is agreeably applicable to every Kind and Habit. I mean by Kind, Age, Sex and Nation, as Boy, Man, Old Man, Woman, Virgin, *Lacedæmonian*, *Theſſalian*.

By Habit, according to what every man is in his life and converſation. For all lives are not affected according to all habits. Therefore if a man give proper names to every habit, he will be able expreſs all ſorts of manners.

For it is not for a Farmer and a learned man to ſpeak after the ſame manner. However the Hearers are affected with what Orators frequently make uſe of. Who knows not this? why, all

men know it. Therefore the Hearer out of meer ſhame acknowledges, that he may be a partaker of what all others partake. Now when it is ſeaſonable, when not ſeaſonable to make uſe of theſe things, is common to all kinds: where the common Proverbe is ſtill a common cure for all *Hyperbole's*. Therefore it is but requiſite, that every Orator ſhould correct himſelf; For by that means it ſeems to be true, what he ſays, though the ſpeaker be not ignorant of what he does.

On the other ſide all things proportionable are not to be made uſe of at once: for by that means the Auditor is alſo deceiv'd. I mean, that if the words be harſh, yet muſt not the voice or Countenonce, nor thoſe other things convenient be ſuch as to expreſs that harſhneſs. Otherwiſe it will manifeſtly appear what every of theſe is: but if this be obſerv'd, the other not, it can never be diſcover'd, though his Judgment may be the ſame. For if ſoft things be ſpoken harſhly, and harſh things gently, they will loſe their probability of perſwaſion. But Epithites and compound words the more, and the more unuſual they are, are the fitteſt to perſwade. For we are apt to forgive one that is enrag'd, when he talks of ſome Heaven-reaching, or *Pelorian* miſcheif; and then eſpecially when he hath already mov'd the Auditors, and put 'em into a fury, either by praiſing or diſpraiſing, by hatred or by love. Which *Iſocrates* does in his *Panegyric* toward the end, making uſe of Fame, and memorials of what they ſuffer'd. For things that are alike they generally bawle out, who are in a heat; which they who are alike diſpos'd are willing to

hear

hear. Wherefore they are agreeable and Proper for Poetry. For Poetry is a kind of Enthusiasm. Therefore this must be the way, or else with an Irony, as *Gorgias* did, or as we find done in *Phædrus*.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Number.

THat figure of speech is most approv'd, which is neither in measure, nor without number. For the one is not apt to perswade, as seeming to be feign'd, and calls off the attention; while we are in expectation that the like will return again.

That which is without measure is boundless. But it ought to be bounded, but not with feet, which is unpleasant: and that which is boundless is difficult to be understood: Yet all things are bounded with Number. And the Number of the Figure of speech is *Dimension*, of which Measures are the *Segments*. Therefore Oratory Prose ought to have *Dimension*, but not Feet; for then it will be a Poem. Nor Number exactly, but after a manner. Now of Numbers, the *Heroic* is majestic, adapted for reading, and void of Harmony. The *Iambic* is for the reading of the Multitude. And therefore *Iambics* are naturally spoken *extempore*. But Oratory Prose ought to be more lofty, and more inciting. The *Trochaic* is more fit for Comical Dances. Which

is manifeſt from the *Tetrameters*. For *Tetrameters* are a voluble ſort of Meter: The *Pæanic* remains, which came firſt in uſe, beginning from *Thraſymachus*: yet they could not tell what it was. But there is a third ſort of *Pæanic* which is *three to two*; Whereas of the other two, the one is *one to one*; the other *two to one*: of theſe proportions conſiſts the *Seſquiterce*; and this is the right *Pæanic*, which is to be made choice of, in which alone of all the Numbers are uncertain; and therefore leaſt to be diſcover'd. Now therefore they make uſe of one *Pæan* at the beginning. But it is requiſite that the end ſhould differ from the beginning. Since then there are two ſorts of *Pæanic* oppoſite one to another, of which the one is proper for the beginning as they uſe it; This is *one long and two ſhort*. - ◡ ◡.

Delogena, & Auricome O Hecate nate Jovis.

The other three ſhort, and one long ◡ ◡ ◡ -. And this is proper for the end. For becauſe the ſhort ſyllables are imperfect, they cauſe a lameneſs; from which being ſeparated by the long Syllable, the end appears: yet not by the Writer, nor by the Paragraph, but by the dimenſion of Feet.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of Diffus'd Oration and it's contrary.

ELocution of neceſſity muſt either be diffus'd, and one in a Link; as the *Dilatations* or extenſions of the Dithyrambics, or turn'd, and like the Antiſtrophs of the ancient Poets.

Diffus'd Oration is very ancient, firſt made known by *Herodotus* the *Thurian*: Which at firſt all Writers; now not many make uſe of. I call it *diffus'd*, becauſe it has no end of it ſelf, until the matter treated of be brought to a concluſion; which is unpleaſant, becauſe tedious and boundleſs. For all men are willing to ſee a concluſion; as being tir'd out of breath toward the end of the Goal, or Stage, and are willing to turn again. But when they ſee the end, they are not a weary, before they arrive at it.

Turn'd Oration is diſcern'd by the Period. I mean by the Period, that Oration which has a beginning and an end of it ſelf, and a magnitude eaſily diſcernable: and ſuch a one is delightful and eaſy to be learnt. Delightful, as being contrary to that which is boundleſs; and becauſe it is always thought to tickle the Ears of the Reader, when he ſtill comes to a full ſtop. But where nothing is foreſeen, nor any thing illuſtrated, the hearer becomes tir'd, and diſpleas'd. It is eaſie to be learnt, becauſe eaſily retain'd in memory: and that becauſe there is Number in the

Periods. Which is the reaſon that Verſes are more eaſily remember'd then Proſe. Now the Period muſt be terminated by the Sentence, and not left broken, as in the *Iambic* of *Sophocles*.

Calidon this is, the land where Pelops raign'd.

The contrary would appear, ſhould it be ſaid, *Calidon* is in *Peloponneſus*.

Now of Periods one conſiſts in the members, the other is ſimple and pure. In the members there is a perfect and diſtinct Sentence, eaſily comprehended in one breath, not divided, but entire, and the member is one part of it.

By *ſimple* I mean a Sentence but of one member. But neither the Periods nor the members muſt be curtaild, nor tedious. For being curtaild they put the Hearer to the ſtumble. For of neceſſity, when the Sentence ſtretches out in length, and the Meaſure which is bounded comes to be drawn back, the Hearer muſt be put to the ſtumble by the juſtling of the Sentence and the Meaſure together: and they leave the Hearer, as thoſe that get ground leave thoſe that walk'd together before. Whence that jeſt of *Democritus* the *Chian* upon *Melampotides*, making excurſions inſtead of Antiſtrophs.

This Man frames miſcheif for himſelf, inframing miſcheif for another.

For long ſuſpence is a miſcheif to him that cauſes it; which may be truly apply'd to long member'd, and long winded Sentences. But Sentences that are too ſhort member'd, are

no

no Periods, for they carry the Hearer headlong.

But of Elocution in members, the one ſort is diſtinct, the other oppoſite. Diſtinct, as thus; I have often admir'd thoſe who ſummon'd aſſemblies, and inſtituted the *Gymnic* excerciſes.

Oppoſite is that wherein through both members, either contrary is compos'd with contrary, or the ſame is joyn'd to contraries. As for example, they were profitable to both, as well thoſe that ſtay'd behind, as thoſe that follow'd. For the one purchas'd more then they had at home; and for the other they left ſufficient to ſupport 'em at home. Here *ſtaying* and *following* are contraries, *ſufficient* and *more*: and as to thoſe that wanted Money, and were willing to enjoy it, the will to enjoy is oppos'd to fruition. Moreover it often happens that Wiſe Men are unfoortunate and Fools proſper. Preſently they obtain'd the rewards of ſtout men, and ſoon after they took upon 'em the command of the Sea. Alſo, *he Saild upon the Land, and travell'd on foot by Sea: for he joyn'd the two Shores of the* Helleſpont, *and digg'd through* Mount Athos. Alſo, *and they who were by nature Citizens, by Law were detriv'd of their City, for ſome miſerably periſh'd, others were ſhamefully exil'd.* Or, *Privately to make uſe of Barbarians in our families, but publickly to deſpiſe many of our Allies that are in ſervice. Either we will have 'em alive, or leave 'em Dead.* Or what one ſaid againſt *Pitolaus*, and *Lycophron* in open Court, *They ſold you remaining at home; but coming to us, they were bought.*

For in every one of theſe is to be obſerv'd what we have ſaid. But this ſort of Elocution is delightfull, becauſe contraries are moſt notorious,

and

and being parallell'd together, are yet more easie to be taken notice of; as also because they resemble Syllogisms; for an Argument is but a Collection of opposites: such therefore is opposition. But, *Adequation* is when the members are equal: *Assimilation*, if both the members have the same extreams. Which of necessity must be either at the beginning or the end. In the beginning the Assimilation consists in words. At the end, in the last Syllables of the word, or cases of the same word, or the word it self. In the beginning thus.

Land it was, but Land untill'd, which he receiv'd from him. Atton'd with gifts, and mollify'd with good words, they departed. In the end thus, *They did not think he had brought forth a Boy, but they thought him to be the cause of the birth. In great cares, but little hopes.* In the case of the same word, as thus; *Can he be worthy of a brazen statue, who is not worthy of Brass? Thou in his life time, spok'st 'ill of him, and now writest ill of him being dead.* In the Syllable thus; *How terribly hadst thou suffer'd, hadst thou seen a slothful Man prefer'd,* Sometimes *Opposition, Adequation, Assimilation,* and *Ending a like* concur in the same. Nevertheless there are also false Oppositions, as in that of *Epicharmus*; *Sometimes I was with 'em, sometimes among 'em.*

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Of Feſtivity and Urbanity.

TO learn readily is naturally delightful to all men: ſeeing then that words ſignifie ſomething, whatever learning we attain to moſt eaſily from words, that is the moſt pleaſing. Therefore obſolete words are unknown, proper words we know. Metaphor alſo more eſpecially conduces. For when we compare old age to ſtubble, we are taught learning and knowledge from the kind: For they are both decay'd.

The Reſpreſentations of the Poets are alſo uſeful, which being rightly made uſe of, will appear Urbane and Polite.

Alſo thoſe Enthymemes and that Elocution muſt be urbane that imprint a quick apprehenſion of things. And therefore Vulgar Enthymemes are to be rejected. I mean by Vulgar, ſuch as are obvious to every one, and have nothing that need inquiry after. Nor ſuch ſayings as are altogether unknown; but ſuch as of which, when once pronounc'd, there is a quick knowledge, though not before, yet after a ſhort pauſe of the underſtanding. For thus there ſeems to be a kind of inſtruction, the other way none. There ſuch Enthymemes are approv'd according to the underſtanding of the thing ſaid, but according to Elocution, in the Figure, if it be oppoſitely ſpoken, *What to others they thought Common Peace,*

Peace, to their own they look upon to be *War.* Where War and Peace are oppoſites. Urbanity alſo in words conſiſts in Metaphors, neither uncouth, which are difficult to be underſtood; nor Vulgar, which affect little or nothing. Alſo if they ſet things before the Eyes, as if they were acted at the ſame time. For we more eaſily diſcern what is acted before our Eyes, then that which lyes under a future proſpect.

Three things are moreover to be conſider'd, the Metaphor, the Oppoſition, and the Beginning. Now becauſe there are four ſorts of Metaphors, thoſe are more eſpecially approv'd which are moſt proportionable. As when *Pericles* ſaid, *That youth ſlain in War, was ſo taken from the City, as if we ſhould take the Spring out of the Year.* And as *Leptines* ſaid of the *Lacedæmonians, That they would not permit the other Eye of Greece to be pull'd out.* And *Cephiſodotus*, when *Chares* labour'd to give an accompt of the *Olynthiac* War, *That while he endeavour'd to give the People an accompt, he kept 'em in an Oven.* Or as when *Iphicrates* reprov'd the *Anthenians* for making a League with the *Epidaurians* and the Sea Coaſt, and told 'em, *They had depriv'd themſelves of the Food of War.* Thus *Pitholaus* call'd the *Athenian* Galley *Paralos* the People's *Herculan Club*: and *Seſtos* the *Granary* of the *Pyræum*: And *Pericles* adviſing the deſtruction of *Agina*, call'd it the *Eye ſore* of the *Piræum.* Thus *Eſion, They pour'd Greece into Sicily.* Thus *Cephiſodotus* calls Men of War, ſo many *Bridewells.* All theſe are Metaphors, and as it were in ſight. Thus *Iſocrates* in his funeral Oration, It was *but juſt*, ſaid he, *that Greece ſhould be ſhav'd by the death*

of

of thoſe that were ſlain at Salamina, becauſe that then together with the *Grecian* valour their Liberty was alſo buried. Where Valour and Liberty has a certain kind of oppoſition. Thus *Iphicrates*, *The road of my Oration lyes through the midſt of Chares's Actions.* Which is a Metaphor from Analogy; and *through the midſt* ſets the Metaphor before the Eye. And that ſaying, *To exhort dangers to ſuccour dangers*, is a Metaphor in ſight. And as *Leucoleon* ſaid upon *Chabrias*, *Neither reverencing his Suppliant Statue of Braſs.* Where Statue being ſaid to ſupplicate, an inanimate is brought as it were to life, by the remembrance of the famous Acts which the City perform'd in his time.

No leſs proper, *God kindl'd a ſight of underſtanding in our Souls.*

Thus Urbanity is drawn from Analogous Metaphor, and lively Elocution, that ſets the thing ſmartly before the Eye.

CHAP. XI.

What it is to ſet before the Eye.

THEY ſet before the Eyes, who ſignificantly demonſtrate the Action of a thing. As to ſay, that a Good Man is a *Tetragon*; which is a Metaphor; yet true; becauſe both are perfect Bodies. But this Metaphor ſhews nothing of Action. That which follows demonſtrates Action in a flouriſhing condition. *The Grecians now free,*

free, and ſhaking their Heels, which is both an action and a Metaphor; And as it is frequent with *Homer* to enliven inanimate things, and then to ſhew ſomething done to the life is highly commendable, as in the following Examples.

——Then ſtreight again.
The ſhameleſs Stone roll'd back upon the ground.
—— Away the Arrow flew
Eager to reach the breſt.——
With Bodies fix'd upon the Earth they ſtood,
Eager to gorge themſelves with humane blood.
—— Thirſty of blood then through his breſt
The pointed blade made way.——

In every one of theſe, inanimate things ſeem to act like things living. For *ſhameleſs*, and to *make way*, and the reſt, are Actions, all which the Poet has apply'd by Analogous Metaphor. For as the ſtone is to *Siſyphus*, ſo is imprudent to the ſtone which imprudently vexes *Siſyphus*. The ſame does *Homer* alſo in approv'd Repreſentations of Inanimates.

Swelling and foaming then the Waves roll'd on.

For he makes all things to move and live. For imitation is Action. For, as already has been ſaid, Metaphors muſt be taken from things familiar, yet not too open. As in Philoſophy it is eaſie to diſcern ſimilitude at a diſtance. As *Architas* ſaid, that the Court of Juſtice and the Altar were the ſame thing; for that they who ſuffer'd Injuries fled to both for ſanctuary.

There are alſo many Urbanities, by way of Metaphor through Prior deception. For it appears

pears the more that he has learnt, because he once thought otherwise, while the mind seems to confess, *'Tis so, and I was in a Errour.*

Apophthegms also are urbane, because they do not mean what the words sound, as in that of *Stesichorus*,

The very Grashopper's your shame
Will singing in the Grass Proclaim.

And such sayings as are fram'd in the nature of Riddles are pleasing. For it is an instruction, and is call'd a Metaphor; and as *Theodorus* calls it, a producing of Novelty's, especially when it happens Paradox-like, and not according to the common Opinion, but slightly transfigur'd. Which is also done by Jests that are made by playing with words: for it is a deception, even in Meter; For the Speaker does not intend what the Hearer expects,

He walk'd along, and on his Feet he wore
Chilblains ——

not Shoes, as the other expected he would have said. Yet as soon as the word is out, 'tis apparent what is meant by it.

Representations also set things most lively before the Eyes, if rightly chosen, as *Philamon* contesting with *Corycus*,

Like Parsley stalks his twisted shanks appear.

Proverbs also which conduce to the same purpose, are Translations from *Species* to *Species*. As when a man seeking to do himself good, does

himſelf a miſchief: Like the *Carpathian's* who not having any Hares in their Iſland, ſent for ſome: which afterwards multiply'd ſo faſt that they eat up their Corn, whence the Proverb, *As the Carpathian the Hare.*

Hyperboles alſo conduce to the ſame effect. You would have thought it had been a Basket of Mulberrys; ſpoken of a great fiery Boyl upon a man's Groyn. And again, Though he would give more pieces of Gold then there are Sands in the Sea,

I would not Agamemnons *daughter wed,*
Fairer then fairest Venus *though she were,*
Or then Minerva *wiser*——

But theſe things are moſt in uſe amongſt *Attic* Rhetoricians; and therefore not becoming the Gravity of old men.

CHAP. XII.

Of the ſeveral ſorts of Elocution.

IN the next place it is requiſite to know, that there are various ways of Elocution which belong to every kind.

For neither ought the Language of the Hiſtorian, and the Dramatiſt to be the ſame, nor of the Pleader at the Barr and the Popular Orator.

The Language of Hiſtory is that which is moſt proper and Elaborate.

Of

Of the Dramatical there are two ſorts. The one regarding Manners, the other the Affections. Therefore Actors chooſe one ſort of Subject, the Poets another. Such therefore as are fit to be read, are ever to be had, as *Charemon*; for he is an accurate Writer, and much like an Orator; and *Lycimnius* among the *Dythyrambic's*. And being compar'd together, the Hiſtorical Writers are very little addicted to Contention. The Rhetoritians well read, ſeem ſo many Clowniſh Squablers. The reaſon is, becauſe wrangling is requiſite in conteſts. Wherefore thoſe Writings which conſiſt of Action, not performing their Office, the Action being taken away, appear inſippid. As looſe Sentences and frequent Repetions are rejected in Hiſtory: but much us'd by the Rhetoricians, who are a kind of Actors; and therefore it is neceſſary for them to make frequent Repetitions, though in the change of words. *This is he that robb'd ye; this is he that deceiv'd ye; this is he who endeavour'd to betray ye.* As *Philemon* the Actor did, in *Anaxandrides's Gerontomania*, where *Rhadamanthus* and *Palamedes* ſpake. And in the Prologue of the *Religious*, *I* and *I* ſeveral times repeated. Which things if they be not help'd out by Action, the perſon becomes as ridiculous as he that carrys the Truncheon before the Actors.

Next Disjunctives in like manner: when many things ſeem to be ſpoken in equal time: for Conjunction makes many things one. Which if it be taken away, manifeſtly on the other ſide; One will be many. Wherefore it enlarges. *I came, I declar'd, I ſupplicated*, are many things. But he ſeem'd to neglect *whatever I could ſay,*

whatever I could urge. This is that which *Homer* intends

Nireus *from* Simus,
Nireus *the ſon of* Aglaia,
Nireus *the moſt fair.*

For of whom many things are ſaid, of neceſſity many things muſt be repeated: which being often done, they ſeem many things. Wherefore he enlarg'd, that he might once call him to mind, to avoid deception, never afterwards making any farther mention of him, believing the firſt remembrance enough.

Deliberative Elocution, is like to Picture and Shadowing in Painting. For the more numerous the People are, at ſo much the greater diſtance is the Proſpect. Wherefore exquiſiteneſs is ſuperfluous, and appears worſt in both.

But judicial Elocution is more Exquiſite, eſpecially if before one Judge. But that is the leaſt thing among Rhetoricians; For what is pertinent to the Matter is ſhort, and the Judge ſeparates what is Forreign and contentious, that his judgment may be right. For which reaſon the ſame Orators are not approv'd in all theſe things: One obſerves this, that where there is moſt Action, there, there is the leaſt of Eloquent Elocution: and that is where a voice is requir'd, and a loud one too.

Demonſtrative Elocution is moſt proper for writing: and the Duty of it is, to make fit for reading: and the next is Judicial Pleading.

Now it will be needleſs to divide Elocution into delightful, and lofty; for why not as well into

into liberal, and Temperate, or any other of the moral vertues. For what has been already ſaid will make it delightful, if the vertue of Elocution be rightly defin'd. For why ought it to be perſpicuous and not mean, but decent? Becauſe if it be loquacious, it cannot be clear; nor if it be too conciſe. And therefore Mediocrity is convenient. What has been ſaid will alſo render it delightful; if Vulgar and unuſual are well blended, and Number and Probability, as they ought to be.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Parts of Oration.

HERE are two parts of Oration. For it is requiſite to tell what the matter is which is dicours'd of, and then to demonſtrate it. Wherefore it is impoſſible not to demonſtrate where the Subject is propounded, or to demonſtrate before the thing is propounded. For he that demonſtrates, demonſtrates ſomething; and he that propounds, propounds that he may demonſtrate.

Of theſe then, the one is the propoſition, the other the Proof; as if one ſhould diſtinguiſh and ſay, the one is the probleme, the other the demonſtration. Now adays they diſtinguiſh ridiculouſly; For Commemoration belongs only to Juridical Oratory. But how can ſuch a Narration be proper for demonſtrative and deliberative

tive Oratory? Or what is to be pleaded againſt a Planitiff, or the Enumeration of demonſtration? But the Proem, the comparing part, and the Repetition in Orations to the People, then are in force, when there is a contradiction.

And many times there is Accuſation and defence in ſuch an Oration, but not as it is deliberative. Nor does *Perration* belong altogether to Judicial Oratory, as when the Oration is ſhort, or the matter eaſie to be remembr'd. And therefore the propoſition and the Proof are the neceſſary parts: for theſe are proper. The common parts, are Proem, Propoſition, Proof, and Epilogue. What is alleadg'd againſt the Adverſary, is for Proofs ſake. The Comparative part, the amplification of his own, ſo that it is a part of the Probation. For he that compares, demonſtrates ſomething; which neither the *Proem* nor the Peroration do, but only recollect for the memories ſake. Wherefore if a man ſhould divide theſe things like the Scholars of *Theodotus*, Narration will be one thing, Prenarration another, and Supernarration another, Refutation, and Superrefutation. But he that gives form and difference to a thing, muſt alſo give it a name; otherwiſe 'tis vain and Ridiculous.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

Of the Proem.

THE *Proem* is the Exordium of the Oration, as in Poeſie the Prologue, and the *Overture* in Muſic. For all theſe things are beginnings, and as it were preparations of the way to what follows. And the demonſtrative Exordium is like the *Overture* in Muſic. For as Muſitians come in with their moſt delectable and charming compoſition, next after the *Overture*; Thus in demonſtrative Oration, after a ſhort accompt given, the Orator preſently produces and annexes what he has to ſay. As in the *Proem* to *Iſocrates*'s Oration upon *Helena*. For *Helena has nothing to do with diſputes and Controverſies.* Or if he make a digreſſion at the ſame time, it is requiſite that the Oration ſhould not be all of one ſort.

Now the Proems of demonſtrative Orations derive themſelves from Commendation, or Diſpraiſe: As *Gorgias* in his *Olympiac* Oration, *It is worthy Admiration, among many, O Grecians.* For he praiſes thoſe who firſt inſtituted the ſo much celebrated Solemnities. On the other ſide, *Iſocrates* diſcommends 'em, becauſe they thought ſtrength of Body worth Priſes and Gift, but ſet no reward for prudence.

In the next place from Counſel and adviſe; as if we ſhould be advis'd to honour vertuous

men. And therefore *Isocrates* commends *Aristides*, or such, who are neither approv'd, nor yet accompted bad, but such as being vertuous, lye conceal'd, as *Paris* the Son of *Priam*: for he is one that gives Counsel.

There are also judicial Proems, when the Oration is concerning any new difficult thing, or concerning the common report of the People, to beg Pardon, as *Cherilus* says, *But now that all things are publickly divided by lot.*

Proems of demonstrative Orations are deriv'd from praise and dispraise, from perswasion and dissawasion of those things which are referr'd to the Auditory: and of necessity they must be either foreign or proper which make way for an Oration. As for judicial Proems, they have the same force as the Prologues of Dramatic, and the Proems of Epic Poems; and as for Dithyrambic Proems, they are like the Demonstrative.

For thy sake, and the sake of thy Gifts or Spoyls.

But in Orations and Poetry, the Proems are demonstrations of what is coming, that the Auditors may not be held in suspence, but know the subject before hand. For what is unlimited leads to Error. He therefore that *hands* his subject to the Auditory, detains the hearer to follow the Oration with his attention

The Fury sing, O Goddess.
Tell me the Man, beloved Muse.
Teach me in other Language, how from the Asiatic shoare, a bloody war infested European fields.

The

The Tragedians declare the Subject, though not presently, as *Euripides*. But *Sophocles* immediately in his prologue,

Polybius *was my father.*

After the same manner Comic Poets. And indeed the most necessary and proper Office of the Proem, is to clear the end for which the Oration was made. Wherefore if the Matter be short and known, there needs no Prologue.

Those other Forms which they use are for the removing of Calumny, and are Common; being deriv'd either from him that speaks, from the Hearer, from the Matter, or the Adversary. From him that speaks, and from the adversary, are deriv'd whatever avails to the removal of a Calumny, and to make Objections. Yet not all in the same manner. For he who makes his defence, answers to the Calumny at the beginning; he who accuses, inveighs in the *Peroration*. And the reason is plain. For there is a necessity that the Defendant remove all Impediments at the beginning: but for the Accuser to aggravate, in the Epilogue: that the Hearers may the better remember. Now things are referr'd to the Hearer on purpose to render him either kind or angry: to make him attentive or negligent. For it is not always expedient to render him attentive, since the Orator sometimes endeavours to excite him to laughter. Now they are render'd attentive by great things, by proper things, by wonderful and pleasant things. But to celerity of Apprehension, if the Orator design Integrity. For to Integrity they attend most of all. Yet if we would not have the hearer to be Attentive, then

we

we muſt tell the Auditory, that the Matter is of little concernment, that it is nothing to them, or that it is a troubleſome buſineſs. Nor muſt we be ignorant that all theſe things are foreign to the Oration. For we ſpeake to a partial Auditory, that gladly hears thoſe things which are foreign to the Matter. For if it be not ſuch, there is no need of Prologue, but only to ſum up the heads of the Matter, that the Oration may not be like a Body without a Head. Tho to make the Hearers attentive, is common to all the parts, if there be occaſion. Now if the Orator be any where ſmart, 'tis at the beginning; ſo that it would be ridiculous to flag at the begining at what time all men are moſt attentive. But when People grow drowſie, there is a neceſſity of raiſing 'em, with a *Mark I beſeech ye, This buſineſs concerns your ſelves as well as me: I am now about to tell ye a thing that is wonderful, a ſtrange and unheard of Crime.* Which *Prodicus* ſaid, was like ſcattering Money among the People.

The *Exordiums* of Popular Haranguing flow from the Prologues of judicial Oratory, as not having any proper to it ſelf: for they know the ſubject before hand, and therefore the Matter needs no Prologue, but either in behalf of himſelf, or in reference to the Adverſary; or elſe if they do not apprehend what he deſires, but either more or leſs. In ſuch caſes Exordiums in Popular Harangues are neceſſary: or elſe for ornaments ſake, otherwiſe they will appear to be huddled up *extempore.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

Of Narration.

NArration is taken from demonſtratives, not in a continu'd ſeries, but in parts. For it is expedient to repeat the Tranſactions of which the Oration conſiſts. Now the Oration is partly without art; (for the Orator is not the cauſe of the Tranſactions) partly Artificial. This is to demonſtrate, whether credible, or how much, or of what ſort, or altogether. Therefore it is expedient not to relate ſometimes in a continu'd ſeries, in regard the memory may not ſuffice to declare in that manner. For by the relation of ſome things a Man ſhall appear to be ſtout; of other things, to be wiſe or juſt. And the one Relation will be plain, the other more full of Variety. It is alſo expedient to call to mind things and Perſons notoriouſly eminent. Nor is it needful to make uſe of many things in Narration. As if we would commend *Achilles*: ſince all men know his moſt famous deeds, the moſt notorious are to be made uſe of. But if we were to applau'd *Critias*, whoſe *Actions* are not many; there all are to be recited. Now praiſe is an Oration declaring the Magnitude of Vertue: and therefore the Actions are to be ſet forth in their full Magnitude: for an Encomium belongs to Deeds. But things Extraneous, as Nobility and Education ſerve for Proof. For it is probable that a Perſon deſcended of honeſt Parents and well Educated

ted will prove an honeſt Man. Therefore we praiſe thoſe that do well, and look upon the Actions as ſigns of the habit: and ſomtimes we praiſe the Perſon that has not acted, if we believe him to be a deſerving Perſon. But now adays they ſay a Narration ought to be ſhort, though ridiculouſly. As when the Baker, was ask'd, whether he bak'd hard or ſoft? what ſaid he, is it ſo impoſſible to bake well. For a man muſt not be prolix either in his Relations, nor Prologues, nor Proofs. Neither does the well-relating conſiſt in ſwiftneſs or conciſeneſs, but in the Mediocrity. Which is done by relating the thing ſignificantly, ſo as to create a belief of the thing, or the injuſtice to be done.

Somethings are alſo to be annex'd to the Narration, as thy own vertues, and the Vices of the Adverſary, or what elſe will pleaſe the Auditory: as thus, *But I, for my part, ſtill adviſ'd what was juſt and Religious, that he ſhould not forſake his Children; but he cry'd out, that whereever he was* he could have more Children; and other things of the ſame nature, which *Herodotus* tells ye, the revolting *Egyptians* apologiz'd for themſelves. The ſhorter Narration alſo ſuffices the defendant: For the controverſy lyes only in this, whether not done, whether not hurtful, whether not unjuſt, whether not ſo much. Wherefore we muſt not inſiſt upon a thing confeſs'd, farther then is pertinent to the buſineſs; as confeſſing the thing to be done, but then we are to make out that it was not done unjuſtly. Alſo we are to relate as acted, thoſe things, which not being acted beget pity or common indignation. As in the Apology of *Alcinous* which he makes

makes to *Penelope* in ſixty verſes: and the Prologue to *Olneus*.

A Narration alſo muſt be well manner'd. Which is brought to paſs, by knowing what makes a moraliz'd Oration. One thing is, ſo to ſpeak that the will and Inclination of the Perſon may appear. For as the manners are, ſo is the will, and the will appears in the end. The Mathematicians therefore never make uſe of Sentences, becauſe they have nothing to do with the will. But the *Socratics* diſcourſe of theſe things. There are other Narrations which are Ethical, becauſe they belong to every particular *Manner* or *Inclination*. As when we ſay, *He made a great Noiſe as he went*: which ſets forth the confidence, and Ruſticity of the Perſon's manners. Alſo when a man ſpeaks not according to the agitations of his thoughts, but from pre-election. As, *I would*, and I would chooſe this: but if I forego my profit, it would be better. For a prudent man purſues his profit; but a Good Man, Honeſty.

If the Narration want Proof, a reaſon is to be given. As *Antigone* in *Sophocles*, when ſhe prefers her Brother before her Husband or her Children; *A Husband or Children being loſt, others perhaps may be had; but a Brother or Parents dying, can never be born again.*

In the next place the Narration muſt be ſuch as moves the Affections and begets the Conſequences, eſpecially of things which the People know; or of ſuch ſigns, by which they cannot but know. As, *After he had mock'd me, he went his ways.* Or as *Æſchines* ſpeaks concerning *Cratilus*, that he hiſs'd, and ſhook his fiſt at him.

Many

Many ſpeeches of this nature we meet with in *Homer.*

Upon her Face the Old Woman clapt her hands.

For they that begin to weep, clap their hands to their Eyes.

In deliberative Oratory there is no need of Relation, for no Body makes a Relation of things to come. But if there be any Narration belongs to it, it muſt be of things already Tranſacted, and call'd to mind to ſerve as examples of what is to be done for the future, whether in praiſe or diſcommendation.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Confirmation

WHatever things are fit to prove, are alſo proper to demonſtrate. For it is neceſſary to demonſtrate by bringing a demonſtration concerning the thing in Controverſie, according to the four Queſtions, whether he did the thing, whether he did any harme thereby; or whether ſo much, or whether deſervedly? Nor muſt we be ignorant that in this one Controverſie, one of the Perſons muſt be bad. Wherefore if men quarrel about *juſt* or *unjuſt*, ignorance is no crime: ſo that we muſt inſiſt upon That, not upon other things. But in *Demonſtratives* Multitude will be an *Amplification*, becauſe honeſt and profitable. For Actions muſt

muſt be believed; therefore they ſeldom bring Demonſtrations of thoſe things, if they be paſt relief, or if another has the cauſe.

In Popular Harangues ſome will queſtion either how it will be, or how it will not be, whatever he adviſes, but that they are either not juſt, or not profitable, or ſo and ſo; and care muſt be taken, leaſt he ſpeak erroniouſly beſide the matter.

Examples threfore are moſt proper for Popular Harngues; *Enthymemes* for judicial Oratory: for the one concerns the future; the other diſputes of things whether in being, or not in being; where Demonſtration is moſt uſeful.

However *Enthymemes* are not to be ſpoken continually, but intermix'd with other things, leſt they injure one another. For there is a certain limit of quantity, as *Homer* ſhews us.

O Friend———
Since thou haſt ſpoken as much, as the wiſeſt man could do

Nor muſt we ſeek for *Enthymemes* for all things; otherwiſe we ſhould do like ſome of the Philoſophers, who Syllogiſtically conclude things known and certain from things unknown and uncertain.

Sentences may be alſo us'd as well in Proof as in Narration. For they move the Affection and render the Oration well moraliz'd; as thus, *I committed this to him, though I knew he were not to be entruſted.* And, *though I receiv'd this injury, it does not repent me, eſpecially when I find that the Gain is his, but the right is mine.*

Now of *Enthymemes*, thoſe that are moſt proper to refute, are more to be approv'd, then thoſe which are proper to demonſtrate: in regard

gard that whatever inforce to convincement, are concluded more Syllogiſtically: for the contrarys parallell'd ſooneſt appear. But *Enthymemes* urg'd againſt an Adverſay, are no more then Proofs, which diſſolve the Accuſation either by Objection, or convincement. But as well in Conſultations as in Judicial Proceedings, he that begins muſt bring his own proofs firſt, and then meet his Adverſary, loading and aſperſing him before hand. But if the Contradictions of the adverſary be manifold, the beſt way is to begin with the Contradictions; like *Calliſtratus* in the *Meſſeniac* Aſſembly, where he firſt refuted what his Adverſaries could ſay, and then ſpoke his own.

But he that is to ſpeak laſt, muſt firſt encounter his Adverſaries reaſon, by oppoſing Objections and Arguments; eſpecially if his Adverſary ſeem to have ſpoken well. For as the mind does not fore-judge any man till condemn'd, no more do they fore-judge an Oration if the Adverſary have ſeem'd well to maintain his cauſe. And therefore it behoves a man to make way in the Ears of the Hearers, for the ſpeech which is to come; which he muſt do by removing the Adverſaries Arguments. And therefore he muſt oppoſe himſelf againſt all, or the chiefeſt, or the moſt approv'd, or the moſt convincing; and then prove his own.

But firſt the Goddeſſes I will aſſiſt——
For Juno, *&c.*

Where he touches firſt upon what was moſt approv'd for honeſt. And thus much for Confirmation.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the ſeaſon for Interrogation.

IT is then ſeaſonable to interrogate, when of two things, the Adverſary affirms the one, and ſeeks for an Abſurdity to follow from a Queſtion demanded upon the other. As when *Pericles* ask'd *Lampo* concerning the Ceremonies of the Goddeſs *Soſpita*, who anſwer'd, *That it was not for him that was not initiated, to hear*; then *Pericles* ask'd *Lampo* again, *Whether he knew himſelf?* To whom *Lampo*, *How can I, not being initiated?*

Secondly, When one thing is apparent, and it is manifeſt that the Adverſary will grant him the other upon his demand. As *Socrates*, when *Melitus* affirm'd, that he did not believe there were any Gods. But ſaid he, I acknowledge there are certain *Dæmons*. Which *Socrates* having granted, the other ask'd him whether *Dæmons* were the Sons of the Gods, or at leaſt any thing of divine Nature. Which being granted, *Melitus* inferr'd that there was one who believ'd that there were no Gods, but only Sons of the Gods.

Moreover, when the Opponent would ſhew a Perſon ſpeaking things contrary to Reaſon, or at leaſt Paradoxically.

Fourthly, When there is no way to anſwer the Queſtion, but by Sophiſtical evaſion. As, *that it is not ſo, but ſo; that it is partly, partly not*; by

which means, they that put the Queſtion are puzzl'd, for ſhould the other refuſe to Anſwer, he would ſeem to be overcome. Nor muſt many Queſtions be put at once; by reaſon of the infirmity of the Hearer. If the Queſtions be Ambiguous, we are not to anſwer preſently, but to diſtinguiſh by *Ratiocination*. When we anſwer to Contraries, we muſt bring the Solution together with the Anſwer, before he ask the reſt, or conclude Syllogiſtically. And to him that concludes, if the Queſtion makes a Concluſion, by telling the cauſe. As when *Piſander* ask'd *Sophocles*, whether he agreed with the reſt of the Senators to ſet up the *Forty*, He anſwer'd, *Didſt not thou act theſe evill things?* To whom the other, *There were no better to be done.* In both which Anſwers there was an acknowledgment before any Concluſion could be made. Or as the *Lacædemonian*, giving an Account of an Act of the *Ephori*; being ask'd, *Whether it ſeem'd juſt to him, that another ſhould periſh?* Made anſwer, *And didſt not thou decree the ſame as they did?* To whom the other, *Therefore wilt thou deſervedly periſh.* No' reply'd the former, *For they were brib'd to make the Decree, but what I did was according to my judgment.* Therefore it is not proper to ask after the Concluſion, nor to demand the Concluſion, unleſs the greateſt part of the Truth remain behind.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Peroration.

PEroration is compos'd of four things; First, of thoſe things that prepare the Hearer to have a good Opinion of us, an ill Opinion of our Adverſary; of that which amplifies or extenuates; of that which ſtirs up the Affections of the Hearer, and of that which rubs up the Memory. For it is natural after demonſtration, to ſhew that we are in the right, the Adverſary in the wrong, and accordingly to praiſe the one, and diſcommend the other, and deſpoil him of all good opinion in the Court. For theſe two things are to be aim'd at, to render the one either honeſt as to the things of which he is accus'd, or ſimply ſo; the other guilty as to the things prov'd againſt him, or entirely bad. Now how to aggravate, how to extenuate, and how to gain upon the Affections, has been already diſcours'd.

As to refreſhing the memory, it is to be done as others improperly teach us to do in Prologues, by often repeating the ſame thing. For in Prologues, things are only briefly to be ſumm'd up, that the Hearers may not be ignorant of the ſubject, But in Epilogues, all the Heads of the Proofs and Demonſtrations are to be repeated. And the beginning muſt be, that he has perform'd what he promis'd: as for what

reaſon, and what things were ſpoken. And with this Repetition is alſo joyn'd a Compariſon of thoſe things which were alledg'd by the adverſary. *Thus he concerning theſe things, but I thus*, and for theſe reaſons. Or by way of Irony. *What would he have done, if he had made out theſe things.* Or by way of demonſtration, What have we not made clear? Or on the other ſide, What has he made appear? And at laſt disjunctives are moſt proper; that it may look like a Peroration, and not like a ſet Speech; as thus, *I have ſaid, you have heard me, you have it, and ſo I leave it to your Judgment.*

The End of the Rhetoric *to* THEODECTES.

ARISTOTLE'S

Ariſtotle's RHETORIC TO KING Alexander.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

Ariſtotle *to* Alexander *wiſhes Health and happineſs.*

UNderſtanding by thy Letters, thy great deſire that we ſhould ſend thee the Precepts and Method of Political Arguments, it was not ſlothfulneſs that made me thus long delay; but that I might make ſuch enquiries, before I ſet Pen to Paper, for my own Information, that I might write to thee more accurately then ever any Perſon has yet done, who has labour'd upon this Subject. And I did well in ſo doing. For as it is thy

ſtudy to excel others in ſumptuouſneſs of Royal Habit, and Magnificence, ſo is it our endeavour to furniſh thee with the moſt noble Efficacy and force both of Reaſon and Argument. Seeing it is much more noble and King-like, to have a Soul endu'd with Vertue, then to behold a habit of Body adorn'd with pompous Veſtments. For it is abſur'd, that he, who excels all others in renown for his great Atcheivements, ſhould give place in Eloquence to Perſons of the meaneſt rank; eſpecially not being ignorant, that they who live under *Democracies*, refer all things to the People; but they who live under the Dominion of a ſingle Monarch, refer all things to Reaſon and Judgment. For as the Common Law in free Cities always aims at the Nobleſt end; ſo may thy Eloquence direct thoſe that are ſubjected under thy Command, to what is good and profitable. For the Law, as I may ſo ſay, is but a certain Speech, limited by the conſent of the City, commanding how every thing ought to be done. Add to this, that it is not unknown to thee, how we have alway made it our buſineſs to excel thoſe who make a right uſe of Reaſon, chooſing to act according to the Rules of it; but that we have always had in deteſtation thoſe who act without Reaſon, which produces nothing but Cruelty and Beſtiality. For which reaſon we have chaſtis'd the wicked glorying in their Vices, and have commended the generous, making their Vertues known, to Bliſs, to admiration and Imitation. Thus we have found out a way to divert future Calamities, and to enjoy preſent felicity. By which means we have avoided imminent Diſtreſſes,

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and acquir'd abſent profit. For as a life not ſubject to pain is to be preferr'd, ſo is right and ſound Reaſon to be advanc'd above all things. Nor art thou to be ignorant, that Examples govern moſt men, ſome the Law, others thy Life, and Rational conduct. Therefore as thou ſurpaſſeſt all, both *Greeks* and Barbarians, it is to be thy chief endeavour, that they who ſtudy theſe Examples may take from thee the Fair Impreſſion, and ſtrive to be partakers of thy vertues.

Moreover, there is nothing in Man more approaching to Divinity, then to adviſe and Conſult. Therefore it behoves thee not to ſpend thy time in trivial and ſuperfluous things, but with all diligence to learn the Celeſtial Art of Conſultation. For what man in his Wits will deny, that to act unadviſedly is a ſign of Madneſs; but that to act according to Reaſon, is a mark of Prudence. And therefore we ſee all the beſt Governments among the *Greeks* conſulting firſt, and long debating, before they fall to Action. Nay even they of moſt eſteem among the Barbarians obſerve the ſame Method, knowing that the Conſideration of uſeful and advantagious, ariſing from Reaſon, is the Bulwark and preſervation of Honorable Undertakings. But I fear being too prolix in theſe matters leaſt I ſhould ſeem too much to boaſt my ſelf, eſpecially in things that need no proof, but are ſo apparent to all Men.

Wherefore ſetting all theſe things aſide, I ſhall only inſiſt upon ſuch as it behoves us to diſcourſe of as long as we live, as being that which makes the grand difference between us and all other li-

ving Creatures; to which if we attain, we ſhall alſo differ in Excellency from all other Mortals, as receiving from Heaven the greateſt Honour which the Gods beſtow on Men. For if other Creatures have the uſe of Deſire, Anger, and other Affections, yet there is no other Creature has the uſe of Reaſon except Man. Wherefore it would be the abſurdeſt thing in the World, if in this alone being the moſt happy of all Creatures, we ſhould through negligence forſake ſuch a Guide to well-living. Therefore I admoniſh thee, again and again, though of thy ſelf ſufficiently thereto enclin'd, diligently to embrace the Philoſophy of Eloquence. For as the Body is preſerv'd by Health, ſo is the Mind preſerv'd by Diſcipline and ſound Learning. For ſo guided and conducted, thou canſt not err in the management of thy grand Affairs, but ſhalt be able to defend and preſerve what thou has purchas'd by thy vertue. Again, if it be ſo delightful to ſee with the Eye, certainly it muſt be much more pleaſing to diſcern with the ſight of the Mind. For as a General is the preſerver of his Army, ſo Eloquence, being joyn'd to Wiſdom, is the Pilot of humane Life.

I have receiv'd thy farther Commands, That no man living beſide, ſhall take this Book in hand: well knowing, that as Parents bear a greater Affection to Children begot upon their own bodys, then to ſuch as are ſuppoſititious; in like manner, they who apprehend ſome more then ordinary invention in themſelves, are carry'd on with a greater fervency, to perfect what they have once begun. For ſome men will hazard death for their Inventions, as ſoon as for their Children. Tho

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the *Parian* Sophiſters, ſo call'd, becauſe they do not bring forth, through ſlothful negligence deſpiſe their low Inventions, and ſell 'em for mony. For which reaſon I earneſtly exhort thee, ſo to obſerve and defend theſe Precepts of Eloquence, that as they grow in years they may not be raviſh'd from thee by any mans wealth, but may live with thee Vertuouſly and Honourably; and when they come to full maturity, may obtain Immortal Honour.

CHAP. II.

Of Ratiocinations.

THere are three ſorts of Political Ratiocinations, Deliberative, Demonſtrative, and Judicial. Of theſe there are ſeven Species, Perſwaſion, Diſſwaſion, Praiſe, Diſpraiſe, Accuſation, Defence, and Queſtion, either as to its ſelf, or to ſomething elſe. And we make uſe of theſe in Popular Harangues, in Pleadings concerning Contracts, and in private diſcourſe. Of all which we may ſpeak that which is moſt adapt and proper, if we enumerate their Efficacy, their Uſe, and Practicability. Firſt therefore let us diſcourſe of Perſwaſion and Diſſwaſion (of which there is moſt uſe in Popular Harangues, and private converſe.)

Generally therefore, Perſwaſion, is an exhortation to elect, to ſpeak, or act. Diſſwaſion is the Impeding from election, from ſpeaking, or acting.

acting. Which being thus defin'd, he that perſwades muſt ſhew thoſe things, to which he exhorts, to be either juſt, or legal, profitable, honeſt, delightful or eaſily practicable. If not, he muſt make 'em appear to be poſſible, if he exhorts to difficult things, and make it out that they are neceſſary. He that diſſwades muſt make the contrary appear; as that they are unjuſt, illegal, uſeleſs, unpleaſing, diſhoneſt, and impoſſible to be accompliſh'd: if not, that they are difficult, troubleſome, and not neceſſary. For all actions participate of theſe things, ſo that he who has neither of theſe Propoſitions, wants Arguments.

Now I ſhall endeavour to define every one of theſe, and to ſhew, how we may be ſufficiently furniſh'd with all theſe for Arguments. Therefore the unwritten cuſtom of All, or Moſt, is but juſt in the definition of what is honeſt, what infamous; as to honour our Parents, to love our friends, and be greatful to our Benefactors. For ſuch precepts as theſe are not Commanded by the written Laws, but by unwritten Cuſtom and the Common Law of nature. Theſe therefore are juſt things.

The Law is the Common conſent of a City, commanding in Writing, how we ought to act in ſuch and ſuch particulars.

Profitable, is the Conſervation of preſent benefits, the acquiring of abſent benefits, or the warding off preſent evils, or the prohibition of threating Inconveniences. This muſt be divided, as to preſent Perſons, into Body and Soul, and things external. To the Body are profitable Strength, Beauty, Health. To the Soul, Fortitude, Wiſdom, Juſtice. External things are Friends, Mony, Lands. The contrary to which are unprofitable

profitable. Profitable to a Commonweal are ſuch things, as theſe, Concord, War-like force, Mony, Revenues, many and ſtout Allies, and ſuch like; the contrary to which are unprofitable. Honeſt things are ſuch, as from which ſome ſplendor or illuſtrious honour flows upon thoſe who have acted honourably. Delightful things are thoſe which affect us with gladneſs; eaſie things are thoſe which are accompliſh'd in a ſhort time, with little labour and expence; poſſible things are thoſe, which are to be done in nature. Neceſſary things are thoſe which are not at our diſpoſal to do or let alone; but are acted as it were by a certain divine or humane neceſſity. Of all which we might draw Arguments in abundance, from what has been already ſaid, or from their like, or contraries, and from thoſe things already adjudg'd either by the Immortal Gods, or by famous and celebrated men, or by the Judges, or by our Adverſaries.

Thus we have ſhewn what is juſt: and Like to juſt is much the ſame. For as we eſteem it juſt, to obey our Parents, it is alſo expedient, that Children ſhould imitate the noble acts of their Predeceſſors: and as it is but juſt to be grateful to our benefactors, ſo it is like to juſt, not to injure thoſe from whom we have receiv'd no harm. Now it is requiſite that we make the Example perſpicuous from the contraries. For as it is juſt to puniſh thoſe who have highly offended; ſo it but juſt to be grateful to our benefactors. Now what has been adjudg'd juſt by celebrated Perſons, is ſo to be deem'd. For not only we our ſelves proſecute our Enemies, and ſeek their miſcheif, but the *Athenians* and *Lacedæ-*

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monians adjudge it to be juſt. In this manner frequent uſe makes a thing juſt. For where it is profitable, the Sentence a giver ought to recite the Law, Then what is like the written Law: which may be much of the ſame nature. For as the Law-giver deſires that Robbers ſhould be ſeverely puniſh'd, for the ſame reaſon Impoſtors and Deceivers are alſo to be puniſh'd; for they likewiſe rob the Underſtanding. And as the Law-giver appoints the next of kin to be Heirs to thoſe that dye without Children, in like manner ought I to be Maſter of the goods of the freed Servants. For being next of kin to the deceaſed that ſet the Servant free, it is but juſt that I ſhould be Maſter likewiſe of all his goods. In this manner therefore is like to legal taken; but the contrary thus. For if the Law forbids that what belongs to the Law ſhould be privately diſtributed, it is apparent that all they that make ſuch a partition do unjuſtly to all in whoſe behalf the Law-giver made the Law. For if the Law Commands us to honour thoſe that faithfully and juſtly preſerve and manage the Common Treaſury, the ſame Law deems worthy of puniſhment thoſe that waſt and diſſipate the publick ſtock. Thus it is apparent what is legal from Contraries: but from things adjudg'd in this manner. For I do not only ſay this preſent Law was made upon theſe grounds by the Law-giver; but former Judges, by the report of *Lyſchidas*, decree'd ſeveral things like to thoſe by me already related.

What profitable is, we have already defin'd: but there is alſo like to profitable; for as it is advantageous in War that the Stouteſt and moſt

Magnanimous

Magnanimous ſhould be plac'd in the Front of the Battel, ſo is it of great advantage to a Commonweal, that the moſt prudent and moſt juſt ſhould govern the Multitude; and as men that are in health ought to be wary to preſerve themſelves from ſickneſs, ſo is it requiſite for Cities that are in Peace and concord, to beware of Sedition.

From Contraries Profitable will be thus made manifeſt. For if it be profitable to honour good and vertuous Citizens, it may be as much to advantage, to puniſh bad Citizens. And if it be to our diſadvantage to fight ſingly againſt the *Thebans*, it may be for our advanage to aſſociate our ſelves with the *Lacedæmonians*, and ſo to make War upon the *Thebans*.

Profitable alſo may be thus taken from the judgment of celebrated Men. For the *Lacedæmonians*, when they had vanquiſh'd the *Athenians*, thought it would be for their advantage not to enſlave their City. And the *Athenians*, when they could have raz'd *Lacedæmon* to the ground, thought it would be more to their advantage to let it ſtand.

CHAP. III.

What things are are to be conſulted.

WE ſhall once more define how many, of what nature, and what things are to be conſulted, as well at Council-Board, as in public

Public Aſſemblies. For if we diſtinctly underſtand every one of theſe things, the things themſelves will afford us words for every Conſultation. Briefly then, Conſultation is to be had concerning ſeven things; either about Religion, or Laws, or Political Preparations, or of Leagues againſt other Cities, or of War or Peace, or of the Public Revenue.

Now let us divide every one of theſe, and let us conſider in what manner we are to make uſe of Oration concerning any of theſe things. Of Ceremonies there is not much to be ſaid; for we either ſay they are to be continu'd as they are, or that they ought to be more ſumptuous, or elſe that ſome of the Pomp is ſuperfluous, If we ſay they are to be continued as they are, we are to find out reaſons from what is juſt, and then to alledge how unjuſt it is to alter any thing from the ancient and Eſtabliſh'd Cuſtoms of the Country. How all the Propheſies command men to perform the Sacred Ceremonies according to ancient Cuſtoms and Uſe. That that worſhip is chiefly to be obſerv'd which was eſtabliſh'd by thoſe that firſt built Citys, and erected Temples to the Gods.

From Profit we may argue, That it will be more for the diſtribution of Money, both privately and publickly, that the ancient Sacrifices be continu'd; That it creates a confidence in the Citizens one of another, and conſequently makes 'em more bold and daring. For the Citizens ſeeing the Souldiers feaſting and performing their Military Sacrifices, ſhake off their former fears, as being Ambitious to be of the Number.

From honeſt, by alledging thoſe Ceremonies

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to be the occaſion of ſeveral Friendly Meetings among vertuous Society.

From delightful, if there be any Variety in the Ceremonies. From poſſible, if there be neither want nor exceſs.

Therefore when we conſult about things that have been long eſtabliſh'd, we muſt take into conſideration what things have been already ſaid and their Reſemblances, and then as the nature of the things will bear, to diſcourſe upon the ſeveral recited Subjects.

But when we adviſe to make the Sacrifices more pompous, then we bring proper Arguments to prove that it may be lawful to change the Cuſtoms of our Country; alleadging, that to add to what is already, is not to abrogate, but to adorn the ſettl'd conſtitution. Then, that it is probable the Gods will be the more Propitious to us, when they ſee that we give 'em greater honour: then, that our Fathers did not always obſerve the ſame Ceremonies, but varied according as times and Seaſons and their Proſperity admitted; and thereupon made particular changes both in public and private worſhip. And again, that it is requiſite ſo to do, if any profit, ſplendor or pleaſure will thence arive to the Common weal; in regard we order our Cities, as we do our private Houſes.

If the debate be about reducing the Sacrifices to a meaner Condition, then our Oration muſt be adapted to the Seaſon, by urging that the Condition of the City is Lower then formerly: Then, that the Gods are better pleas'd with devotion then Gaudy Pomp. Then, that both Gods and Men will condemn the Stupidity of thoſe

thoſe that do any thing beyond their power. Then, that the public Expences are not at the diſpoſal of men, but according to their Proſperity or Adverſity. Now then, that we may know how to propoſe and Eſtabliſh thoſe things that appertain to the beſt way of Sacrificing, we are to conſider, that that is the beſt Sacrifice, which is made to the Gods piouſly and holily: Moderate, as to Expences; profitable, as to War; but ſplendid for ſhew. Now thou ſhalt behave thy ſelf piouſly toward the Gods, if the Cuſtoms and Conſtitutions of thy Country be not infring'd; moderately as to expences, if all the preſents that are made be not conſum'd at once. Profitably for the War, if Infantry and Cavalry feaſt and maintain their paſtimes together in their Arms: ſplendidly for ſhew, if there be a magnificent uſe made of Gold and other precious Ornaments which are not conſum'd and waſted. And thus from theſe things ſhall we agree about the chiefeſt Ornaments that concern the Gods: and out of what we have already ſaid, we may plainly underſtand after what manner we are to diſcourſe concerning the ſeveral ſorts Sacrifices.

In the ſame manner we may frame Arguments in reference to the Laws and civil Conſtitutions. For the Laws, as we have already briefly hinted, are the public conſent of the Commonweal, which determines in writing, and commands how every one is to act in ſuch and ſuch particulars. Now for making of Laws in *Democracies*, the meaner Magiſtrates are many, and choſen by Lot, which prevents Sedition: But the Superiour Magiſtrates, by the ſuffrages of the People. For thus the People having in their Power to confer Hononrs

nours upon they pleaſe, will never envy thoſe that accept it: and they who are moſt eminent, will be moſt diligent to exerciſe Probity and Sincerity, knowing they ſhall gain by being in eſteem with the People. And thus much concerning the Election of Magiſtrates in *Democracies*.

As to what concerns the other part of Popular Adminiſtration, to ſpeak briefly, This muſt be obſerv'd, That the Laws prohibit the Multitude from gaping after the ſubſtance of the Wealthy; and the rich to a willing Munificence in public Offic's. Which may be done, by decreeing to the Rich certain peculiar honours in lieu of their Expences beſtow'd upon the Public: as by preferring Husbandmen before poor Artiſts, and Maſters of Ships before Ordinary Water-men. Alſo there ought to be a ſeverity in the Laws to prevent neglect of Tillage, and the publiſhing the Eſtates of the deceas'd, with great Penalties upon the Contemners of theſe Statutes. Alſo there ought to be allow'd ſome public place of Sepulture for thoſe that are ſlain in the Wars, and their Children ought to be brought up at the public charge, till they come of Age. Such Laws as theſe become a Popular Government. In Oligarchies; the Laws ought to diſtribute the Power equally to all that participate in the Goverment. Of theſe Magiſtrates the moſt are choſen by lots, the cheifeſt privately by Suffrage, with Oaths and a very great exactneſs. And in an Oligarchy there ought to be the greateſt puniſhments ordain'd upon thoſe that go about to offer injury to any of their fellow Citizens. For the Multitude is not ſo much concern'd for being depriv'd of the Magiſtracy

as they are offended when abus'd and injur'd. It is requiſite alſo to be very diligent in compoſing the differences of one Citizen with another, and never to ſuffer the Multitude to meet together in any noted place; for ſuch Aſſemblies cement the Multitude, and diſſolve the Oligarchy. And thus much as to what is to be obſerv'd and deſir'd in all Civil Conſtitutions.

Now he that would defend his cauſe by the Law, muſt ſhew that it is equal among the Citizens, that it is agreeable to the reſt of the Laws, that it is for the Peace of the City, for the advance of the Public Tributes, for the honour of the City, and that it will encreaſe the Power of the City; and whatever elſe to this effect. And then the Opponent muſt conſider firſt whether the Law be common to all, whether agreeable or contrary to the reſt of the Laws, whether profitable as the other alledg'd, or hurtful. Now as concerning Allies and Leagues againſt other Cities, Leagues muſt be made according to public contracts. Allies are to be ſought for, according to the Condition of the times, when they that ſeek Aſſiſtance are weak of themſelves, or that they are threaten'd with ſome War, and therefore a League muſt be made with others who they think will forſake their ſide in time of War. And theſe are the cheif reaſons that induce men to make Leagues. Now he that would perſwade the making of a League uſes theſe Arguments, That it is Seaſonable, that the People are a juſt and generous People, that they are already well affected toward us, that they are our Neighbours and Powerful. But if all theſe things cannot be alledg'd, then to urge as many as can be.

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He that would diſſwade the entring into a League, muſt ſhew that it is needleſs at this time, that the People are not to be truſted, and that they have ever born us a grudge, that they live at a diſtance, and that they are in no capacity to aſſiſt us in time.

If the Queſtion be whether to make War or Peace, Arguments are deduc'd from the Cauſes. Now the Cauſes of War are, For that now is the time to take our Revenge upon thoſe that injur'd us before; or being now provok'd either in reference to our ſelves or our Kindred, or our Benefactors; or to aſſiſt our Allies unjuſtly invaded, or for the common benefit, for honour, or to enrich our ſelves, or for any other cauſe of the ſame nature. Therefore when we would exhort our Hearers to War, we ought to comprehend as many of theſe cauſes as we can, and to ſhew that the moſt of thoſe things that render War ſucceſsful, auſpiciouſly appear to favour the exhorted. For all men become Victorious by the favour of the Gods, which we call *Good Fortune*, or through Multitude or ſtrength of Bodies, through Riches, prudence of the General, ſtout Aſſociates, and opportunity of ſtrong holds. Therefore from theſe or Arguments like to theſe, which are moſt congruons to the matter, we may exhort the undertaking a War, extenuating the ſtrength of our Adverſaries, and extolling our own.

On the other ſide if we deſire to prevent a War, firſt thoſe reaſons are to be found out, by which we may demonſtrate, that the Injuries are very ſlight, or none at all that induce us to War, that the War cannot be advantagous,

and then the Calamities attending War are ſlightly to be run over. Then we are to ſhew, that all the Advantages which procure Victory are on the Enemies ſide.

If we would exhort the Surceaſing a preſent War, then the firſt thing to be urg'd is, That they who are in their wits, will never ſtay till a misfortune happen, but will endeavour to make Peace while they are Victorious, and may procure it upon the beſt Terms. Then, becauſe it is the chance of War, that they who win at firſt looſe at laſt: but that it is the nature of Peace to preſerve the vanquiſh'd, and that thereby the Victor enjoys the fruits of the War. Then repeat the many and various changes that are wont to happen in War. Thus are they to be exhorted who have the better. But they who have miſcarry'd in the War are to be perſwaded to give over another way: that is, by reaſons drawn from the chances themſelves that have befallen 'em; and the miſeries they endur'd before, when they refus'd Peace: and then, that it is better to part with a ſmall Portion, then to hazard the whole at one throw. Breifly we ought to underſtand this, that men are wont then to give over War, when they believe their Enemies deſire what is juſt, or that any Quarrel happens between them and their Allies, or that they are weary of the War, or that they are afraid of their Adverſaries, or that they begin to fall out among themſelves.

As for what concerns the public Revenue, Firſt we are to conſider whether any of the public Lands be neglected; which neither yeilds any Revenue, nor yet is conſecrated to the Gods. As there

there are ſome public Lands neglected which would yield good profit, were they either ſold or ſet out to private Perſons. But if there be no ſuch thing, of neceſſity Taxes muſt be lay'd; and the Poor muſt pay the Tribute of their Bodys, the Rich muſt find Money, the Tradſemen Armes. And thus much for Propoſitions in deliberative Arguments.

CHAP. IV.

Of Arguments in the Encomiaſtic kind.

THE Encomiaſtic kind (to ſpeak breifly) is an amplification of the Pre-elections, Deeds, and Speeches of illuſtrious men, and a conciliation of things abſent. Diſpraiſe on the other ſide is the obſcuring of Men illuſtrious; and the extolling men of no worth. Now thoſe things deſerve praiſe which are juſt, which are legal, which are profitable, which are honeſt, which are delightful, and which are not eaſily accompliſh'd. Now he that applauds muſt make out by reaſon, that there is ſomething in that man, or in his Actions which was done by him, or which proceeded from him; or which happen d from this, or was done for the ſake of this, or was not perform'd without this. And he that would diſpraiſe any Perſon muſt make out the contraries to be in that Perſon.

Which happen'd from thence, as thus. Through diligent exerciſe of the Body Victories happen;

through ſloth men fall into diſtempers. Again; by the ſtudy of Philoſophy men become more ſmart in prudence. But negligence brings 'em to want neceſſaries.

Or was done for the ſake of this; as thus. Mortals endure many hard labours, run through many dangers, that they may be immortaliz'd by their fellow Citizens; and others ſtrive for nothing more, then to gratifie thoſe they love. *Or was not perform'd without this*, as thus. Victories at Sea cannot be won without Seamen; nor can men be drunk without drink.

If we go about to amplifie or extenuate, we muſt ſhew that many good or bad things were acted by ſuch a Perſon. In the next place ſomething is to be brought in by way of Metaphor, that has been ſo adjudg'd; if by way of Praiſe, that which is good and laudable: if in diſcommendation, that which is bad. Then produce what has been ſaid by thy ſelf, and compare together the beſt that has been ſpok'n by thy ſelf, with the worſt that has been ſaid by the Opponent; by which means thou mayſt ſhew the thing adjudg'd to be great.

The third way is to counter-compare the greateſt thing ſaid by thy ſelf, with the leaſt of thoſe things that fall under the ſame *Idea*; for ſo ſhall the greateſt thing ſaid by thy ſelf appear. As men of middle Stature appear to be taller, when meaſur'd together with thoſe that are lower.

Or Amplification may be made in this manner. If this be adjudg'd a great good, the contrary to it muſt be a great Evil. In like manner, if it be adjudg'd a great Evil, the contrary

to

to it muſt be a great good. We may alſo magnifie good or bad things in this manner, if we ſhew by ratiocination, and riveting ſeveral things together, as how he premeditated many things, how he deſign'd to act many things; how he acted a long time; how never any one undertook the like before; how afterwards he acted with thoſe that never any did; how, willingly; how of ſet purpoſe and by foreſight; how if we ſhould all do like this man, we ſhould be happy or miſerable. And he that makes Similes muſt collect together, and appropriating the one to the other muſt amplifie in this manner. As if a man be mindful of his friends, 'tis very probable that he honours his Parents. And he that honours his Parents, 'tis as probable, that he is a lover of his Country. In a word if we ſhew the Perſon to be the Author of many things, either good or bad; many things will appear to be great. Moreover the thing will appear what it is, being either divided into parts, or ſpok'n generally; and which way it will appear greateſt, that way it is to be ſpok'n. Extenuations are handl'd the quite contrary way, as when we demonſtrate the Perſon to be the Author of nothing at all, or at leaſt of things very mean and Paltry.

Amplifications are uſeful alſo upon other Occaſions; but eſpecially in Applauſes and *Encomiums*, and diſcommending and vilifying.

CHAP. V.

Of Accuſation and defence.

Accuſation is the diſplaying of Injuries and Crimes.

Defence is the freeing a Mans ſelf from Injuries and Crimes of which he ſtands either accus'd or ſuſpected.

Now in regard both kinds have the ſame force and efficacy, of neceſſity the accuſer when he declaims againſt wickedneſs, muſt lay open the Actions of the Defendant to be unjuſt and vile, and pernicious to the whole Body of his fellow Citizens. But when he accuſes of folly; then he muſt ſhew the Actions of the Criminal to be unprofitable even to himſelf, infamous, unpleaſant, and which were impoſſible to be accompliſh'd. Theſe and ſuch like are the Arguments againſt vain and wicked People. The Accuſer is alſo to obſerve this, what puniſhments are ſet upon every Crime, and what Acts of Injuſtice are finable by the Judges. When the Law then has determin'd the puniſhment, this is firſt to be conſider'd by the Accuſer, that he make out the fact to be perpetrated. And when the Judges underſtand the Accuſation, the Injuries and Crimes of the Adverſaries are to be aggravated, and it is cheifly to be made out, that he Committed the Fact, willing, of malice fore thought, and not by chance, but with great and premeditated

ditated Preparation. But if this be not possible to be done, or that you rather think that the Adversary will acknowledge, that he was in some fault, or that he did it by chance, or that he did it with a good intent, then to incense the Auditory you must alledg, that it did not become the guilty, after they had committed a Crime to Plead that they mistook through Imprudence, but to have consider'd before he acted. Or that if he acted Imprudently, or did it by chance, he ought to be fin'd so much the more, because of his Chance and his Imprudence, then he who never pleaded any such Plea. Besides that the Law does not acquit those who have acted Imprudently, but leaves 'em to punishment, least they should do an Injury to others by mistake. And he may farther urge that if such a Plea should be admitted, it would prove an incouragement for others to play the Villains; for that then they might take their opportunity to do any mischeif in regard they may escape punishment by pleading mistake, or imprudence. And this is the way to prevent compassion and forgiveness in the Hearers. And these are the formes of Accusation according to it's several parts. Defence consists of three Methods. For either he must deny the doing what he is accus'd of; or if he be compell'd to make his defence he must endeavour to prove the Fact lawful, honest and profitable; or if he cannot do that; that it was done unadvisedly, or by accident, or that the Injury was inconsiderable. Then distinguish between reall Injustice, Imprudence and Miscarriage. For to act premeditately is to do Injustice; to act through ignorance is only a bare offence; what is committed not willingly

willingly but by the Inſtigation of others, or by miſcarriage, in regard ſuch things are not acted upon due conſideration, they are only to be attributed to misfortune: in regard that none act wickedly and adviſedly, but wicked men; but to offend and miſcarry in Actions, was not only particular to himſelf but common even to the Judges themſelves and all other men.

The Defendant muſt alſo conſider what crimes are puniſh'd by the Law, and what Treſpaſſes are finable. And when the Law determin'd the Puniſhment, he is to ſhew, that either he has committed no fact at all, or that he has done juſtly and according to Law. And where the Treſpaſs is only finable, he is to extenuate the offence, as of little conſequence, that the injury was ſmall, and unwillingly done.

CHAP. VI.

Of Queſtions.

A Queſtion is the Exhibiting of *Pre-election*, Deeds, or Actions contrary one to another, or to another manner of life. He then that asks a Queſtion muſt demand, whether the words or the actions, or the pre-elections differ one from another. Now the method is this. To look back into the time paſt, and conſider, whether any one being formerly a Friend, afterwards became his Enemy, and then whether a friend again to the very ſame perſon; or has done any other unfriendly act

out

out of malice; or would do, if he had an Opportunity, contrary to what were formerly done by him. Then obſerve, if ſpeaking now, he ſpeak contrary to what he ſpoke before by himſelf, or contrary to what was reported before, and now ſaid: alſo, whether he ſpeak contrary to what he had ſpoken before, or would not, if he had an opportunity. Alſo we are to add to the other honeſt Studies and diligences of the Querent, the contrarieties in the Life of the Perſon to whom the Queſtion is put. And whoever thus manages the queſtioning part, ſhall not omit any manner of putting a Queſtion. And thus all the parts of queſtioning being divided, they are to be made uſe of ſeverally as occaſion requires, or intermixing their force and abilities together, for they contain great variety. Nevertheleſs they communicate one with another, as they are made uſe of, and are of the ſame nature with the different forms of Men. For they are partly alike, and partly unlike, as well in their Aſpects as in their Senſes. Therefore having thus determin'd the ſeveral *Species*'s, and what they want, let us now enumerate how many ways they are to be made uſe of.

CHAP

CHAP. VII.

FIrſt therefore, Juſt and Legal, Profitable and Honeſt, as we divided 'em before, are agreable to all the Species. But in perſwaſion we chiefly make uſe of theſe.

In the ſecond place Extenuation and Aggravation are of neceſſity profitable beyond all the the reſt: but their chiefeſt uſe is in *Encomiums* and vilifying Orations. In the third Place Probations, which we are conſtrain'd to uſe in all Parts of Orations; but chiefly in accuſations and defences. For ſuch things as thoſe are moſt controverted.

There are alſo Anticipations, Petitions, Repetitions and Tautologies, Prolixity of Oration, Mediocrity of length, Brevity of ſpeaking, and Interpretation.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Probation.

TO begin therefore from Probations; of theſe there are two ſorts. For ſome are produc'd from the words themſelves, ſome from theſe matter and ſome from the men: others are fix'd to the things ſaid and done. For probables,

probables, Examples, Conjectures, *Enthymemes*, Sentences, Signs, Arguments and Proofs are gather'd from the men themſelves, from the words and from the matter. Additional Proofs are Witneſſes, Oaths and Queſtions.

Probable, which we call a Probable Propoſition, is that which when we have declar'd to the Hearers, they retain the Examples of the thing ſpok'n in their minds: as if one ſhould ſay, he wiſhes his Country may Flouriſh, his Friends may proſper, and misfortune to his Enemies, they might collectively ſeem Probable. For every one of the Hearers has the ſame Sentiments probably with the Perſon that utters theſe wiſhes. And therefore we are to obſerve this diligently always in our Orations, whether we have left the Auditors conſcious of the thing of which we diſcours'd to 'em. For it is moſt likely that they give greateſt credit to thoſe things.

Probable is divided into three ſorts. The one is when in our Orations we comprehend the Paſſions or Affections generally incident to all men, as well when we accuſe as when we defend. As when any Perſon deſpiſes, or fears ſuch a one, or does the very ſame thing ſeveral times, or is again affected with pleaſure, greif or deſire; or is void of deſire; or is wealthy, or affected with any other Paſſion to which our Souls or Bodies, or Senſes are Subject. For theſe and ſuch like perturbations of the mind, are known to the Hearers. And theſe are thoſe things which being naturally Incident to men, muſt be comprehended in our Oration.

The Second Part is the cuſtom of Probabilities, which

which every one frames according to the general Uſes.

The third ſort is Gain. For many times for the ſake of Gain, forcing nature, we bid adieu to our own Inclinations.

Which things being thus determin'd, both in perſwading and diſſwading, we are to demonſtrate upon the things required, that the thing to which we exhort, or to which we are averſe, is according to what we have ſaid. Or elſe that the things which are like to this matter, were done as we ſaid, either the moſt or all. In reference to Things therefore, Probable is thus to be taken; in reference to men eſpecially in Accuſations, if it may be done, you are to ſhew that the adverſe Party has committed this Fact formerly or at leaſt, ſuch as were like it. Endeavour alſo to ſhew that it was for his advantage to do theſe things. For moſt men adoring profit, imagin that other men do all things for the ſake of profit. If therefore you can wreſt any Probabilities from the adverſaries themſelves, make your Collection in that manner; which if it cannot be done, then infer from things like to thoſe which men are accuſtom'd to do. For Example, 'tis a young man whom you accuſe, and therefore prove him to have done thoſe things which men of his Age are accuſtom'd to do. For Similitude of Actions will cauſe what you ſaid againſt him to be credited. For by reaſon of his familiarity with thoſe young men of his own Age, he will be thought to allow himſelf the ſame Indulgences with his friends, eſpecially if any man ſhall make his Comrades appear to be ſuch as you ſay he is.

As

As for them that are upon the defenſive part, it behoves them to ſhew that neither he, nor any of his friends ever acted formerly any of thoſe things of which they are accus'd, and that they could be no advantage to him. Or if it be apparent, that he has done the ſame before, then let him lay the offence upon his Age, or bring ſome other Arguments to leſſen his miſcarriage. Let him ſay that it neither could be advantageous to him, nor now.

But if nothing of this nature were committed by him, but that ſome of his friends did ſome ſuch things, let him plead the Injuſtice of being accus'd for the Facts of others; and then let him ſhew that the reſt of his Companians are ſober and moderate young men. For ſo the Accuſation will become dubious.

If it ſhall be ſaid, that ſome others like Him have committed the ſame Facts, let him urge, that becauſe certain others appear to have done the ſame thing, 'tis no Argument he has committed thoſe things of which he ſtands accus'd. And thus he that denies himſelf to have done any of thoſe things of which he is accus'd muſt defend himſelf by Probabilities. For ſo ſhall he weaken the Probability of the Accuſation.

But if he is compell'd to confeſs, let him them compare his own with the cuſtomary practiſes of many, alledging that moſt or many, do as he happen'd to do, but if that be not poſſible to do, let him fly to unfortunate miſcarriage or Imprudence for Refuge and beg for Pardon, making uſe for advocates of all the Common perturbations of the mind, which put us beſide our Reaſon, as Love, Anger, Wine, Ambition and the

the like. And this is the moſt artful Method of Probability.

CHAP IX.

Of Examples.

EXamples are like Actions other where done, and contrary to thoſe of which we now ſpeak. And they are to be made uſe of when he that affirms a thing, promiſes to make it out when it ſeems not to be very probable, at what time reciting another Action, like to that recited by himſelf, ſo done as he affirms it, that ſo the more credit may be given to his words.

Of Examples there are two ſorts. Some are according to Reaſon, others beſide Reaſon. Examples according to Reaſon are eaſily believ'd; but ſuch as are not according to reaſon ſeldom or never gain credit. As if a man ſhould ſay the Rich are juſter then the Poor, and brings for Example certain juſt Actions of Rich men. Theſe and ſuch like Examples ſeem to be according to Reaſon, in regard moſt men believe the Wealthy to be juſter then the Poor. But if on the other ſide, another Perſon brings Examples of Rich men doing Injury for love of Money, bringing an Example that it is not ſo agreeable to Probability, he ſhall leſſen the Argument againſt the Rich. In like manner another Perſon brings Example of a thing that ſeems according

to

ing to Reaſon; That the *Lacedæmonians* or *Athenians* being reinforc'd with a great Multitude of Allies, vanquiſh'd their Enemies, and thence will perſwade the Auditors to court many Allies; Theſe Examples are according to Reaſon. For all men believe that Multitude very much conduces to Victory. But if any one will undertake to ſhew that Multitude is not the cauſe of Victory, he muſt make uſe of ſuch Examples as are beſide Reaſon, as when the *Athenian* Fugitives with fifty men, and one Tribe, encountring a much greater Multitude, aſſiſted by the *Lacedæmonians* their Allies, regain'd their own City. And again, But the *Thebans*, when the *Lacedæmonians* aſſiſted by the whole force of the *Peloponneſians*, invaded *Bœotia*, withſtood their Enemies alone, and utterly defeated the *Lacedæmonians*. Again, But *Dio* Sayling to *Syracuſe* with three thouſand men, vanquiſh'd *Dionyſius* that had five times his Number. Alſo the *Corinthians*, when they Sayl'd with nine Galleys to ay'd the *Syracuſans*, drave the *Carthaginians* out of the City, though they had poſſeſſion of the Town and the Haven with a hundred and fifty ſhips. Breifly, ſuch Examples as theſe, that ſeem contrary to Reaſon, are often objected in Conſultation to thoſe Examples that ſeem much more rational.

This is therefore the nature of Examples, and they are to be us'd both ways. When we ſpeak of things that are done according to Reaſon, we ſhew how ſuch and ſuch things were accompliſh'd in ſuch a manner. But when we offer Examples that ſeem contradictory to Reaſon, we ſhew how ſuch and ſuch things, though raſhly undertaken

had a proſperous Iſſue. But they that ſpeak againſt theſe Examples, ought to ſhew how theſe ſucceſſes happen'd, and then to urge, that they rarely fall out, but the other Examples frequently. And this is the uſe which is to be made of Examples. But when we offer Examples contrary to reaſon, we are to collect the moſt we can, and then to affirm, that the one as well as the other frequently happen.

Now we may produce Examples not only from theſe things, but from their Contraries; as if we were to ſhew, that ſome through their covetouſneſs toward their Allies have loſt their Friendſhip, and then proceeding, ſay, But we would have been more equal and more liberal to our Allies, and ſo have preſerv'd their friendſhip a longer time. And again, as if after we had ſhewn, that others becauſe they undertook the War, before they were well provided for it, were vanquiſh'd, we ſhould they ſay, But let us go well provided to War, for then we may have more certain hopes of ſucceſs. We may alſo take many Examples as well from things paſt, as from the preſent affairs. For moſt things are partly like, partly unlike one to another. Wherefore we need not fear to have ſtore of Examples to refute thoſe that are offer'd by others.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Of Conjectures.

CONjectures are whatever are done contrary to thoſe things concerning which the Diſcourſe is, and wherein the Diſcourſe it ſelf contradicts it ſelf. For the moſt Auditors, by thoſe contrarieties which happen contrary to reaſon or the Common courſe of Action, conjecture, that there is nothing of ſound and ſolid in thoſe things which are ſaid or done. And a man may make ſeveral Conjectures, by obſerving whether the Opponents Oration contradict it ſelf, or whether the thing it ſelf be contrary to the Diſcourſe of the Speaker.

CHAP. XI.

Of Enthymemes.

ENthymemes are thoſe things which are not only contrary to Reaſon and Practice, but to all other things beſide. And a man may make uſe of many, handling them as in the *Queſtioning Kind*, obſerving whether the Diſcourſe contradict it ſelf, or whether the things tranſacted be contrary to Juſtice, to the Law, to what is profitable, to Probability, to the *Genius* of the

Speaker, or to the nature of the Tranſactions. Therefore ſuch *Enthymemes* are to be choſen according to the contraries. Now the contraries to theſe are ſuch as we ought to aſſume for our ſelves, ſhewing that our Actions and our Words are contrary to what is unjuſt, illegal, unprofitable, to the manners of wicked men, and in a word to every thing that is evil. All which ought to be ſpoken breifly and in few words. And in this manner we may frame many *Enthymemes*, and make the beſt uſe of 'em.

CHAP. XII.

Of a Sentence.

A Sentence (to ſpeak breifly) is the declaration of a man's proper opinion in all things.

Of Sentences there are two ſorts. The one Credible, the other Paradoxical. When we ſpeak a thing that deſerves to be credited, there is no reaſon to be given. For neither is what is ſaid unknown, neither does any Perſon contradict it. But when a Paradox is ſpoken, the reaſons are in few words to be given, to avoid Loquacity and the misfortune of not being believ'd. Now thoſe Sentences are always to be ſpoken that are moſt conſentaneous to the preſent affairs, leſt what is utter'd ſhould ſeem forc'd and improper. And we may deduce many Sentences, either naturally, or from *Hyperboles*, or by way of *Paromoioſis*.

Natural

Natural Sentences are these, *No man, in my opinion, who is unskill'd in Affairs, can be a shrewd Commander.* And again, *It is the duty of Prudent men, to study the Examples of things past, that they may avoid inconsiderate Errours.*

Sentences from *Hyberboles* are these. *It is much more dangerous to admit of Theives then Robbers, for the one take our money from us privately, the other openly.*

By way of *Paromoiosis* or Similitude, these; *They that steal our Money, in my opinion, do the same, as they who betray Cities. For both being trusted, they 'em, injure those that entrust.* And again, *They that are unjust, to me seem to be like Tyrants. For they never think they deserve punishment for the Injuries they do to others; but where they believe others to be offenders, they spare for no Torments. And these, if they owe me any thing, never repay it; but if I owe them any thing, they exact both the Principal and Interest.*

CHAP. XIII.

Of Signs.

A Sign is the other of the other, not every thing of every thing, nor all of all, but what uses to be before the thing, or with the thing or after the thing. And the sign is not only of the thing being, but not in being. In like manner, that which never was done is the sign not only of the thing done, but of that which was never done.

Now of theſe Signs ſome cauſe us to think, others to know, and in the next place thoſe that beget the moſt probable opinion. Nor can we want plenty of theſe Signs, to ſpeak ſummarily, taken ſingly and ſeparately from every thing ſaid, done or ſeen, from the greatneſs or ſmallneſs of thoſe things which happen to us, either good or evil; Alſo from the Teſtimonies, from the favourers of us or our adverſaries, from them themſelves, from the Proſecutions, from the times and ſeaſons, and from many other things.

CHAP. XIV.

Of an Elenchus.

AN *Elenchus* or convincing Argument is that which cannot be otherwiſe then as we ſay. And it is taken from things naturally neceſſary to be as we ſay; or what the Opponent ſays, and from ſuch things as are naturally poſſible or impoſſible; which of therefore naturally of neceſſity muſt be. As that living Creatures ſtand in need of Victuals; and the like. As we ſay, Of neceſſity thoſe that are whipp'd muſt confeſs what thoſe that lay on command 'em. Alſo naturally we ſay, 'tis impoſſible ſuch a little Child ſhould ſteal ſo much Money: as not being able to bear it, and go away with ſo much weight. Or if the adverſary ſhould aver it to be impoſſible, if he ſhould but tell us at what time we ſign'd the contract at *Athens*: For we are

are able to prove, that at that time we were abſent in ſome other City. In a word, we have already diſcours'd of all manner of Proofs, and how they are to be taken from Speech, from buſineſs, and from men themſelves. Now let us conſider how they differ one from another.

CHAP. XV.

Of the difference between Probable and Example, &c.

PRobable differs from Example in this, that the Hearers themſelves have a notion of Probability; but Examples are brought from things as well contrary as ſimilar. Conjectures are compos'd of contraries both in Speech and Practiſe. And *Enthymemes* differ from conjecture is a certain Repugnancy between the word and the deed. But *Enthymemes* remove the contradictions concering other *Ideas*. Or elſe becauſe it is not for us to comprehend a Conjecture unleſs there be ſome repugnancy between things and words: but an *Enthymeme* offers it ſelf every where and upon every thing.

Sentences differ from *Enthymemes*; for that *Enthymemes* conſiſt of Repugnancies only; but Sentences may be utter'd as well with Repugnancies, as ſimply themſelves by themſelves.

Signs differ from Sentences and all other things before mention'd in this, for that all the other

things create an opinion in the Hearers; but ſome Signs will cauſe the Judges rightly to apprehend. Beſides, it never happens to the reſt, that we can abound in many; But we may produce many Signs. An *Elenchus* differs from a *Sign* in this, that ſome Signs only create an opinion in the Hearers; but an *Elenchus* teaches and confirms 'em in the Truth.

Now let us ſee what may be oppos'd to theſe. The opinion of the ſpeaker is the declaration of his Sentiments touching ſuch or ſuch matters. And it is requiſite that he ſhew himſelf experienc'd in thoſe things concerning which he diſcourſes; and that he ſhould demonſtrate how much it concerns him to ſpeak the Truth concerning ſuch matters. And then let him make out that the Oppoment knows nothing of the matters which he undertakes to diſcourſe of, and that his opinion is as frivolous. Which if it may not be ſaid, then let him urge, that ſometimes the moſt experienc'd may be in an Errour; or that it is not for his intereſt to ſpeak the Truth concerning theſe matters.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Teſtimony.

A Teſtimony is a voluntary Confeſſion of a known Thing. Now of neceſſity it muſt be either probable or improbable or doubtful to be believ'd: and in like manner the witneſs muſt be either

either credible, or not to be believed or of doubtful Credit. Now when the Teſtimony ſeems probable and and the Witneſs true, the Teſtimonies need no Epilogues, unleſs for *Decorum's* ſake you would make uſe of any Sentence or *Enthymeme*.

But if the Witneſs be ſuſpected, then it muſt be urg'd that he has given his Teſtimony neither out of Affection, for fear of Torment, nor for hopes of Gain, and that it is no way advantagious to him to teſtifie an untruth: For the utmoſt he can expect can be but a ſmall profit: but to be convicted of a Perjury is a dangerous thing, conſidering the Puniſhments which the Law inflicts upon Bribery and Perjury: and thus we ſhall render the Witneſſes Credible.

They that contradict the Witneſſes are to detract from their Lives and Converſations, and to enquire into the Teſtimony, whether it be credible, or to contradict both at once, and to detect at once all the Vices and Enormities of the Witneſs and his Procurers. It is alſo to be enquir'd into, whether the Witneſs be a friend to him for whom he gives his Teſtimony, or if he have any dealings with him; or whether he be an Enemy to him againſt whom he gives his Teſtimony, or whether he be a poor man. For ſuch as theſe may be ſuſpected to ſwear falſe either for favour or fear, or in hopes of a Reward, for all which the Law has provided puniſhment. And therefore we may add at the ſame time, that it would be an abſurd thing for the Judges who are bound to judge according the Law, to believe ſuch men as the Law will not believe.

Now there is a way of ſtealing a Teſtimony, which

which is this. *Bear witness for me, O* Calliches: *By the Immortal Gods not I: for do what I could, he wou'd needs do these Things.* And therefore giving a false Testimony upon the sentence, he shall not be lyable to the Punishment inflicted upon a false Witness. But if the Adversary do any such thing, we presently lay open his foul Play, and order him to attest the Writings.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Rack.

THE Rack is the unwilling Confession of a guilty Person. And therefore when we desire an ample and strong Confession, we may urge, that private Persons about most serious matters, Cities in case of greatest Discoveries, draw and make out proofs by the Torture of the Rack, and therefore the Torture of witnesses procures the best Evidence. For sometimes it may be advantageous for a Witness to tell an untruth, but it is less for the Advantage of those that are tortur'd to tell the truth. For then their pain will be the sooner over. But when we would make proofs by Torture invalid, we must first alledge, how they that are Rack'd are Enemies to those by whom they are delivered up, and therefore many speak false against their Masters: and then because many times they confess to their Tormentors whatever comes uppermost, and any thing but the Truth, to be out of their pain. Then it is

their

to be made out, that ſome freemen, to be rid of their Torments, have confeſs'd untruths againſt themſelves: and therefore it is more likely that Servants ſhould confeſs lyes againſt their Maſters, to avoid the torture both of the Body and Mind, which they are never put to ſuffer that can frame a cunning peice of falſhood.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Oaths.

AN Oath is an Aſſeveration utter'd with divine Reverence, that wants proof. And therefore when we would enlarge upon it, we are to ſay, That certainly no man would forſwear himſelf, either for fear of divine Vengeance, or of looſing his Reputation among men.

But when the Adverſary flies for Sanctuary to an Oath, we are to urge, that they who will not ſtick to do as he has done, will not ſcruple a falſe Oath. For he that impiouſly thinks he can deceive the Gods, believes he may eaſily eſcape the puniſhment of Perjury among Men.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Anticipation.

ANticipation is that, by which, while we Anticipate the ill opinions of the Hearers, and the Reaſons of thoſe that would Contradict us, we remove the Difficulties that lye in our way. And thus we are to prevent the ill opinions of the Hearers.

But you may perhaps admire, that a Perſon ſo young in years as my ſelf ſhould undertake to ſpeak concerning things of this High Nature. Or thus, *Let no man meet me with a Sowre and Moroſe Countenance, becauſe I undertake to adviſe ye in thoſe things, concerning which ſome others have been ſo free with ye in their diſcourſes.*

And thus having prevented the ill will of the Hearers, we are then to bring our Reaſons to ſhew, that we do well in ſpeaking or adviſing; alleadging the want of Orators, the greatneſs of the Dangers, or the Public benefit, or any other Seaſonable Reaſon.

If Nevertheleſs the Hearers are uneaſie, it behoves us to ſpeak breifly, either by way of Sentence or *Enthymeme*, *That it is the abſurdeſt thing in the world to come here to debate what is beſt to be done; and now when you are unwilling to heare the ſpeaker, to think we can ever debate right.* Again, *That there can be no better way, then either to ſtand up and conſult together, or elſe*

giving

giving ear to thoſe that adviſe, to put it afterwards to the vote, when every man has given his opinion.

This is the way to make uſe of Anticipacition in Popular Harangues. And the ſame Method muſt be us'd in Pleadings at the Bar: as for Example, to prevent the Diſguſt and Mutiny of the Auditors, we may begin our Oration thus. *Is it not aſſur'd, that when the Law-giver has ordain'd every one of the adverſaries to have two Orations in his behalf, that you the Judges of the Law and by the Law, ſhould not be willing to hear ſo much as one Oration, and that ſuch a one as with all foreſight has well ſtudy'd ſo well for your Information, that hearing it you cannot Judg amiſs? And yet you to be ſo remiſs, as not deigning to hear the beginning, you believe you know the whole merits of the Cauſe already.* Or thus.

The Law-giver ordaines the Victory to him that has by an equal Number of Voices; how is it that you are ſo contrary in your Judgements, that you will not hear the defences of the accus'd? The Law-giver, becauſe thoſe that fly are in moſt danger, allows 'em this Prerogative of moſt Voices; but you cheriſh thoſe that accuſe in Security, and aſtoniſh thoſe that come from the Jaws of fear and danger to make their defences.

Thus if the Diſturbance be at the beginning: if afterwards in the middle of the Oration, or if but few, they may be thus check'd; That it is but juſt they ſhould be now a little attentive, leſt they ſhould hinder others from judging truly, but when they have heard him out, then to do what they thought fit. But

But if the whole Multitude ſeem diſcontented, then not to check the Judges, but to find fault with himſelf, by confeſſing himſelf in an Errour and beging Pardon. Alſo we may beſeech the Judges to hear us with a favourable Ear. In a word, we are to reconcile our ſelves to the Auditory, by ſpeaking briefly; with ſhort Sentences, and pithy *Enthymemes*; and by ſhewing that their Diſturbance is Repugnant to Law, to Juſtice, and the Public benefit.

Now to Anticipate what may be ſaid by the adverſary, theſe expreſſions may be convenient according to the Information we have. As thus, *And perhaps he will bewail his own Penury, of which not I, but his own manner of Living is the Occaſion.* And again, *I know he had urg'd this or that, But*, &c. And thus we are to Anticipate what has been ſpok'n ſtrenuouſly; for though the Reaſons in his preceding Oration were never ſo vailid, they will not ſo ſeem, when thus leſſen'd by him that comes after.

If we are to reply, and the adverſary has already anticipated us, then are we thus to counter-anticipate. *But this man has not only utter'd many falſhoods of me before ye, but knowing he ſhould by me be certainly refuted, he has ſcandaliz'd my Oration by Anticipation, to prevent your giving me that attention which he ſo humbly beg'd of you*: Or, *Leaſt I ſhould have the Liberty by ſpeaking before ye, to wipe off thoſe Aſperſions which he has lay'd upon my Oration. But I am apt believe, that it rather behooves ye to hear my Oration from my ſelf, then from my adverſary.* Or if the Accuſer has hinted this before, *Which I ſay are ſhrew'd Signs that he has ſpoken nothing*

of

of Truth or Solidity. Thus *Euripides of Philoctetes.*

But I muſt tell ye, though you think that I
Have loſt the Cauſe, by his ſuggeſting ſtill
That I have done the wrong; it is your part
To let me make my own Concerns appear,
And let him his own buſineſs only mind.

CHAP. XX.

Of Petitions.

A Petition, is when the ſpeaker begs ſomething in his Orations from the Hearers. And theſe Petitions are either juſt or unjuſt. Juſt, as when we beg attention, or a favourable conſtruction of our words. It is alſo juſt to beg to be aſſiſted according to the Law, or not to decree any thing againſt us contrary to the Law, or to beg Pardon for any thing that is amiſs. But if we deſire any thing that is contrary to the Law, then it is unjuſt: and we have thus diſtinguiſh'd 'em, that when we underſtand which deſires are juſt, and which unjuſt, we may make a right uſe of 'em; and know when the adverſary deſires any thing of the Judges that is unlawful.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Repetition.

REpetition is a Conciſe Commemoration of what has been ſaid. And this is to be made uſe of either at the end of the Parts, or at the Concluſion of the whole Oration. Now we ſum up the matter in Heads either by way of Ratiocination, or by way of Election, or by way of Queſtion, or Enumeration. By way of Ratiocination thus; *I ſhould doubt what they did, were it not manifeſt that they left us firſt. But it was prov'd that they came with an Army toward our City, not doing any thing that they promis'd.*

By way of Apology thus. *I have ſhew'd how they were the firſt that brake the League, and firſt ſet upon us, when we war'd with the* Lacedemonians, *deſigning chiefly to enſlave our City.*

By way of preelection, thus, *But we are to remember, that we never ſuffer'd any harm ſince we made a League with theſe People: for frequently aſſiſting us, they hinder'd the* Lacedemonians *from waſting our Territories, and now they continue to bring us much Money.*

By way of Queſtion, thus. *I would willingly ask 'em why they do not pay us our Tributes? For they cannot ſay, they want Money; who are known to receive ſo much Money every year out*

of the Place. Nor can they ſay, they have ſpent much Money upon the Adminiſtration of the Government; for manifeſtly they have expended leſs then any of the Ilanders.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Irony.

AN Irony is, when we know one thing and diſſemble another. *We muſt not ſay, that theſe men, who boaſt they have done us ſo much good, have been the People that have done us all this miſcheif.* But when we call things by contrary names, then thus. *Theſe good men were they that did the miſcheif to our Confederates*; but we wicked People, they that did 'em all the kindneſs. And thus by way of Commemoration we uſe theſe Repetitions either at the Concluſion of the parts, or of the whole Oration.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Speaking Quaintly.

TO ſpeak Quaintly, this is one *Place*: as when we ſpeak *Enthymemes* either entire or by halves; ſo that the Auditors may comprehend the half; to which purpoſe we ought to include Sentences. And theſe pithy ſayings

we are to diſperſe into all the parts of the Oration, never altering the words, and never uttering the ſame in the ſame Sentence.

But he that would be prolix in his Orations, muſt divide the matter into parts, and then teach the nature and uſe of every thing contain'd in each part, both in private and in Common, and to declare at large his Colours and Pretences.

If yet we would ſpin out the Oration more in length, we muſt make uſe of many words to expreſs every particular, and make Repetitions in every part of the Oration, only let every Repetition be Conciſe. But at the end of the Oration rammaſs all the Particulars of which before you had diſcourſed particularly and diſtinctly together into one heap: and thus may we prolong our Orations. But if we ſtudy Conciſeneſs, we muſt comprehend the whole matter in one word: ſome few Copulatives may be us'd, but moſt things are to be joyn'd into one: all Repetitions taken out of the parts, and only repeated in the Concluſion.

If we ſtudy Mediocrity, then to cull out the chiefeſt of the Parts, and diſcourſe only upon that. We are alſo to make uſe of the middle ſort of words, neither the longeſt nor the ſhorteſt; not of many about one thing; but in the middle between both. Nor muſt we wholly take away our Epilogues out of the middle parts, nor uſe 'em in all the parts: but where we deſire the Hearers to take moſt notice, there to uſe 'em in the end.

But if we would write a facetious Oration, take care to obſerve and aſſimilate the nature of the

the words to the nature of men. Which may be done, if we conſider which are the greateſt, which the moſt accurate, which the intermediate both of Natures and Cuſtoms.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the Diſpoſition of Words.

THE Figures of words are three, Simple, Compound, and Metaphorical. The one terminates in a Vowel, and ends in a Vowel by Syllables. The ſecond begins from a Mute, and ends in a Mute. The third binds Mutes and Vowels together.

There are alſo four orders of words; the one places parallel, or elſe ſeparates like words: the ſecond makes uſe of the ſame words, or changes 'em into others: the other calls the thing by one or more words: the other names Tranſactions in order, or elſe paſſes 'em by.

CAAP. XXV.

Of Interpretation.

INterpretation is firſt to be divided into two parts, and then to be made perſpicuous. We divide Interpretation into two parts thus. Firſt, *That he is able to do both this and that other.* Secondly, *That this man can, the other*

cannot Thirdly, *That this man can do both this and that.* Fourthly, *That neither he nor the other can.* Fifthly, *That he can, but the other cannot.* Sixthly, That one is able to do the other thing, but that the other is not able to do the other thing.

First, *He can do both this and the other thing too*; Thus. *But I was not only the Author of these things in your behalf, but hinder'd* Timotheus, *who was ready to march against ye.*

Secondly, *This man cannot, the other can*; as thus. *Your Embassadours cannot, but this man, who is a friend to the* Spartans, *is able to do your business.*

Thirdly, *This man can do both this and that too: He has not only shew'd himself most stout and valiant in War, but for Counsel and Advice he gives way to none.*

Fourthly, *Neither he nor another can.* Thus; *Neither he nor any other of his fellow Citizens with a small force can dislodge the Enemy.*

Fifthly, *But he can, the other cannot*; As thus. *He is vigorous in his strength, but I am weak in body.*

Sixthly, *He himself can do that other thing, but the other cannot do the other thing*; as thus. I that stand at the Helm am able, but he that has the Oar in his hand will never be able.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Dilucidation.

IN the firſt place, give to all things their own Proper Names, avoiding Ambiguities. Beware of placing the Articles in their right and Proper Places; leaſt the Compoſition be confus'd, nor diſorderly, To the Conjunctions ſpoken before, add the following Copulatives: as thus. *I was preſent, where I appointed; but he who ſaid he would come, came not.* Again, as when the ſame Copulative follows, *For thou wert the cauſe of thoſe things, and of theſe thou alſo.*

Confuſion of words is thus. *'Tis a hard caſe for this man to ſtrike this man*; for it is not clear which was the Perſon that ſtrook.

How the Articles are to be properly plac'd from hence obſerve. This man this man injures. This is clear in the *Greek*, where there is a diſtinction of Nominative and accuſative; but not in *Engliſh*, where the Verb muſt come between.

Sometimes one word has two ſignifications; but that ſignification is to be apply'd, which is moſt Proper to the ſenſe, and which the ſeries of the diſcourſe requires.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of Antitheta, Æquates.

Antitheta are thoſe things which both in name and Efficacie, are contrary to their Oppoſites, or either the one or the other.

Contrary both in name and words, thus; *For it is not juſt, that this man enjoying my Eſtate ſhould grow Rich; but that I being depriv'd of my own, ſhould be thus miſerably Poor.*

Contrary in name only, as thus. *Let the Rich and Happy give to the Poor and Miſerable*: Contrary in Efficacy thus. I cur'd this man when he lay ſick, but he has done me the greateſt injuries Imaginable. Here is a contrariety in the deed, not in the words. So that the neateſt *Antitheſis* is both in name and thing.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of Equation.

EQuation is when two even clauſes are pronounc'd: and thus many ſmall clauſes may be equal to a few great ones, and equal in Bigneſs to equal in Number. And this is the form of Equation, *Either for want Money*, or through the greatneſs of the War. For theſe Clauſes are neither like nor contrary, yet are they equal one among another.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Paromoioſis, or like Cadencies.

P*Aromoioſis* is that which is bigger then Equation: For it does not only make Clauſes even, but a like, and of like words; as thus

Bring-

Bring a deſire equal to that Imitation of Oration which becomes thee: But chiefly the Concluſions of the words are to be alike. Now thoſe are like words, that conſiſt of like Syllables, wherein moſt Letters are the ſame as in ἐνδιῶς & ἐντιλῶς; or as in the Engliſh *Warm, Harm, Charm, Arm.* Or as if we ſhould ſay, This clink the Cloſe is now left off by us in Proſe, And ſo we paſs again to *Exordiums.*

CHAP. XXX.

Of Exordiums.

THE *Exordium*, is a Preparation of the Auditors, and a Summary Declaration of the Subject to thoſe that know it not, that they may underſtand the ſubject of the Diſcourſe, and give Attention to it; and as far as we are able, to deſire their favourable Conſtruction of our words.

In making our firſt propoſition to the hearers, thus; *I ſtood up, to adviſe, how we ſhould carry on the War againſt the* Syracuſans. Or, *I ſtood up to ſhew, that it did not behove us to aſſiſt the* Syracuſans. And this a brief ſumming up of the Matter.

Now how to perſwade to attention, we ſhall beſt know from hence, if we underſtand what words and ſubjects moſt provoke our attention. Now we are generally moſt attentive when we conſult either about great things, or terrible

things, or things familiar to us. Or when the Orator tell us they will demonſtrate to us, how juſt, how honeſt, how uſeful, how eaſie to be accompliſh'd thoſe things are to which they exhort us: or requeſt the Auditory to hear 'em with Attention. Therefore as they themſelves uſe to deal by others, ſo likewiſe we chooſing out of the premiſes, the moſt proper to the buſineſs in hand, and making 'em clear to the Hearers, ſhall gain their Attention.

Then we ſhall acquire their favour and good Will, obſerving firſt how they ſtand affected to our ſelves in particular, whether kindly or moroſely, whether well or ill. If they are benevolent, it will be needleſs to ſpeak of benevolence, but if we muſt needs take notice of their kindneſs, we ought to ſpeak briefly with an *Ironie* in this manner. *How great has been my affection to this City; and how often, by my perſwaſion, you have acted with great profit ad advantage; and how juſt I have ſhewn my ſelf to the Publik, rather chooſing to expend of my own, then to be a Debtor to the Commonwealth, I deem it needleſs to put ye in mind, who know it ſo well already; now therefore if you will be rul'd by me,* I ſhall endeavour to ſhew ye, how ye may do well.

But if the Hearers are neither oppoſite, nor well diſpos'd, we may tell 'em, That it is but juſt and uſeful, that they ſhould be kind to ſuch and ſuch Citizens, and diſcourage thoſe who have as yet given no experiment of themſelves. Then we may ſtroke the Auditory with an *Encomium*, That they have always been accuſtom'd to paſs their judments gravely and juſtly.

Alſo Extenuations may be us'd; as thus: *I ſtood*

up

up, not confiding ſo much in my Eloquence, but believing I ſhould offer that which would be for the benefit of the Public.

But as for thoſe that are obnoxious to Accuſations, of neceſſity either themſelves, or the matter of which they diſcourſe, or the Oration it ſelf muſt contain the Accuſations. Now theſe Scandals are drawn either from the time paſt or preſent. If any ſuſpicion be had of any, from the time paſt, then make uſe of *Anticipation* towards the *Auditors. Nor am I ignorant, that I lye under ſome kind of Scandal among ye:* But I ſhall make all thoſe appear to be falſe. Then make a ſhort Apology in the *Exordium* (if thou haſt any thing to ſay for thy ſelf, or in repeal of the Judgments) for if a man lie under any Scandal privately or publickly, judgment will ſurely follow, or elſe has been already, or elſe the Accuſers will not take judgment; and we muſt then ſay that the thing was unjuſtly adjudg'd; or that we were injur'd by our Enemies: or if this be not ſo probable; that it ought to ſuffice for us, who had then the worſt of it, and that it is unjuſt, ſince the Matters are already decreed, to bring the Accuſations upon the Stage again.

But if the Sentence be likely to prove notorious, then alleadge thy ſelf prepar'd to anſwer all Accuſations in this moſt honourable Aſſembly, and that if thou haſt done the Commonwealth any injury knowingly and of ſet purpoſe, thou art ready to ſuffer. If the Enemies do not inſiſt violently, then bring the Argument of conjecture, That becauſe they believe they have accus'd us falſely, therefore they deſiſt from their Proſecution. For it is not probable that they ſhould refuſe to have

have Judgment given, had they brought a real Accuſation. Alſo we ought at the ſame time to inveigh againſt Calumny, letting the world know how venomous, how pernicious, and of how many miſchiefs it is the common Cauſe: and how many men have been ruin'd by falſe Accuſations. We may alſo declare how idle a thing it is for thoſe that conſult the common ſafety not to hear what is ſaid by all, and then to conſider what they hear, but to lye feſtring the Accuſations of particular perſons. And therefore for thy part, thou art to declare and promiſe, that thou wilt offer nothing but what is juſt, honourable, and profitable.

Accuſations from the preſent time are brought againſt Orators, firſt for their Age. For if they be either too young or too old, the Auditory is offended. Or if the Orator ſpeak without intermiſſion, for then he ſeems to take too much buſineſs upon him, though he never ſpake before, and he ſeems to ſpeak for ſome private end, that harangues contrary to the common cuſtom.

For theſe things, excuſes and pretences muſt be alledged by the younger perſon, from want of Adviſers, or that he has not choſen any Subject, but what may become his Age, as the *Gymnaſium*, Horſes, Armes, Warlike preparations, all which Subjects are proper for Youth to handle.

He may alſo inſiſt, that if his years do not permit to be as yet ſo wiſe, howe're, that he may have acquir'd it by ſtudy and diligence: and he may do well to intimate, that by his failing no man ſuffers but himſelf, but if it be profitable what he ſays, the whole Nation will receive the Benefit.

A Perſon ſuperannuated, brings his excuſes likewiſe from the want of Adviſers, and his own ſufficiency; from the greatneſs and novelty of the dangers that threaten. Or if he be one that has frequently advis'd, from his Experience; and from the ſhame it would be, that he who had ſo often advis'd, ſhould not now be permitted to ſpeak.

Theſe are reproaches as to the Perſon; but there are other as to the Matter. When the Orator perſwades quiet to thoſe who have done no injury, or thoſe that are Superiour in Power, or to make an ignominious Peace, or perſwades a niggardly Parcimony as to the Sacrifices to the Gods.

Here Anticipation muſt be made uſe of towards the Auditors, and the Cauſes of theſe things muſt be referr'd either to Neceſſity or Fortune, or the Times, or ſome particular Advantage; and alledge, that not the Adviſers, but the things themſelveves are the occaſion of the Accidents.

Now the Oration accuſes in Popular Harangues, when it is either long, or too Antique, or not over probable. If prolix, the reaſon muſt be aſcrib'd to prolixity of the Subjects. If ancient, yet that it is at this time ſeaſonable; if not probable, promiſe to make it appear true in the progreſs of the Oration.

And thus we are to conſtitute our Popular Harangues; but how ſhall we order 'em? If there be no exception againſt the Matter nor the Orations, expoſe the Propoſition preſently at the beginning: then requeſt attention and benevolent Audience. But if there be any Exceptions, we

are

are to anticipate the Auditory, bringing first our Apologies, and Excuſes as briefly as we can, and requeſting the favour of the Hearers.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Narration.

AFter all this, there is a neceſſity that either we relate or call to mind paſt Tranſactions, or that we declare preſent Actions, or that we foretell ſuch as are to come to paſs hereafter. If then we were to repeate the Tranſactions of an Embaſſie, it would behove us to relate all things that were ſaid perſpicuouſly, that firſt the Grandeur of the Oration might appear. For this would be only a bare Narrative, where no other Figure of ſpeech would interfere. So that if any miſcarriage happen'd, the Hearers may believe that it did not fall out through any negligence of ours, but for ſome other Cauſe. But if it fell out according to our expectation, they may not believe it happen'd by Chance, but by means of Induſtry and Sedulity. And this they will the more eaſily believe, ſeeing that if they were not preſent at the Tranſaction of Affairs, they may obſerve by our Alacrity in the delivery of our Relation, that we have not left out any thing, but that we accurately give an accompt of every thing. But in a Popular Harangue, when we either call to mind things paſt, or make a relation of the preſent Affair, or foretell what is to come, we are to do theſe things, briefly, perſpicuouſly,

ſpicuouſly, and not with probability. Perſpicuouſly, that the Hearers may underſtand what is ſaid; Briefly, that they may remember what is ſpoken; faithfully, leſt before we have confirm'd our Oration by proofs and legality of Proceedings, the Hearers ſhould reject our Relation. We ſhall perſpicuouſly make appear either from words, or from the buſineſs it ſelf. From the buſineſs it ſelf, if we do not relate the Matters confuſedly and out of order, but ſuch as were firſt done or to be done, in the firſt Place: and the reſt afterwards in their Order; and not forſaking the Order which we have propos'd to our ſelves, to fall upon another thing.

In Words we ſhall be perſpicuous, when we relate the Tranſactions in words proper to the Matter; and if we place our words according to the common cuſtom, and not confuſedly or prefunctorily; but always obſerving a Coherency.

In Brevity we ſhall be perſpicuous, if both from things and words we cut off thoſe things which are not neceſſary to be ſpoken; leaving only thoſe things, which if they ſhould be taken away, the Oration would be obſcure and difficult to be underſtood. We ſhall be thought faithful, and to be credited, if we bring Reaſons, by which the things that are ſaid to be done may ſeem to be probable. And as for thoſe things that are like to fall under too great a Cenſure of Improbability, to lay 'em quite aſide. But if of neceſſity they muſt be ſpoken, the Orator muſt relate the things upon his own knowledge, and reſerving 'em to the Proper place of refutation, where he intends to handle other

other things that are intermix'd, muſt promiſe in the Progreſs of his Oration to make 'em out to be true, pretending firſt to make out other things more difficult; which being done, there is no Queſtion but they will believe the reſt. Which is the way to cure the Incredulity of the Hearers.

CHAP. XXXII.

AN now we ſhall order theſe Narrations, Manifeſtations and Predictions after a threefold manner. For if the Actions of which we diſcourſe be few, and notorious to the Hearers, we muſt joyn the Relation to the *Exordium*, leaſt that part being plac'd ſeparately ſhould ſeem too ſhort.

But when the affairs are very many and unknown, it is requeſite that Relations be join'd to every one, and that we make 'em out to be juſt, profitable and honeſt, by which means we may not only make a bare Relation without any Variety, but take the Ears of the Hearers. But if they be Actions but of a middle concernment, then the Relation, or the Manifeſtation, or the Prediction muſt be plac'd in the *Exordium*, as part of the Body of it; which may be done, if we Proſecute the Relation from the beginning of it without intermiſſion, not taking in any thing, but barely and nakedly relating the things themſelves.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of Confirmation.

OF neceſſity, Confirmation muſt follow next, to confirm the Relations foregoing by juſt and profitable Proofs, as we promis'd before to do. Seeing then we are to make our Relations cloſely connex'd together, the moſt proper Proof for Popular Harangues are to be drawn from the Cuſtom of things, from Example, from Commemoration, and from the Opinion which all men conceive of the Orator. And if we happen upon any other Proofs, they are to be made uſe of.

Now theſe Proofs are thus to rank'd. Firſt, the opinion concerning the Speaker. Which if it cannot be done, then firſt the uſual Cuſtom of things; where we muſt ſhew, That the things by us related, and the like to them, uſually were wont to be done in this manner; and then we muſt bring Examples: and if there be any thing of Similitude with thoſe things which we have ſpok'n, we muſt not omit it. Thoſe Examples alſo are to be made choice of, which are both agreeable to the matter and to the Auditory; and next in place or time. But if there be none ſuch, then from ſuch other things as are of greateſt importance and moſt notoriouſly kown. After this, we muſt make uſe of Sentences. For we are to terminate theſe parts where Probabilities and Examples were handl'd, with *Enthymemes* and Sentences. And this is to be done for the confirmation of matters.

But

But if credit be immediately given to the Relation, we may omit the Proofs themſelves, and deduce the Confirmation of the Actions before rehears'd from aſſertions of juſt, legal, uſeful, pleaſant, eaſie, poſſible and neceſſary. And if it be ſo, juſt is to be plac'd in Front; proceeding with what is like to juſt, what contrary to juſt, and what has been adjudg'd to be juſt.

Examples are alſo to be brought like to thoſe things by thee averr'd to be juſt. And you will have many things to ſay from thoſe things by every one in particular ſuppos'd to be juſt, and from thoſe things ſo deem'd in the ſame City where the Oration is deliver'd, as alſo in ſeveral other Cities, concluding in the end with Sentences, and midling *Enthymemes*, differing one among another, if the part be prolix; and if we deſign to recollect, making uſe of a conciſe Repetition. But if it be of a moderate length, with a Recapitulation, puting an end to that part, we may begin another. As for Example;

That it is juſt for us to aſſiſt the Siracuſans, *I believe to be ſufficiently made out by what we have ſaid. Now that it will be alſo for our advantage, I ſhall endeavour to ſhew ye.* And then again, as to Profit aud Advantage, the ſame Method is to be obſerv'd, as has been taught in reference to *Juſt*, adding to the end of the part either a Repetition or a Concluſion, and then beginning again with what remains behind: And this is the way to joyn one part to another, and ſo finiſh the whole contexture of the Oration. At laſt having by Proofs ſufficiently confirm'd the thing which thou wouldſt perſwade, then Summarily with *Enthymemes*, Sentences, and Flouriſhes,

it

it behoves thee to ſhew, that it is unjuſt, diſadvantagious, infamous, and unpleaſant to act otherwiſe; adding a breif *Antitheſis*, that it is both juſt, profitable, honourable and delightful to follow thy Counſel and Advice, cloſing up the whole with certain grave and pithy Sentences.

CHAP. XXXIV.

Of Anticipation.

Anticipation is when we endeavour to vilifie the objections that have been made againſt what has been ſaid by us. Therefore it behoves us to leſſen the objections of the adverſary, and extol our own Aſſertions; to which purpoſe it will be requiſite to compare one with one, if thine be the greater, or more with more, or one with many, or many with one: and when we have done this, we muſt conclude with Repetitions, and the fore mention'd Colours and Flouriſhes of Ratiocination, Enumeration, Election, Interrogation and Irony.

CHAP. XXXV.

Several manners of Perſwaſion.

BUT now, if we were to perſwade the giving aſſiſtance either to private Perſons or to Cities; Brevity will be moſt convenient: and if any acts of Friendſhip, Favour, or Pity have

formerly paſt between them and the Auditors, it will be well remember'd. For men are apt to aſſiſt thoſe who have been formerly ſo affected toward 'em: and have a kindneſs for thoſe from whom, or from whoſe friends, either themſelves or their Relations have receiv'd any kindneſs, or ſo believe. Now if we find that any thing of this has been done, it is to be urg'd to excite Compaſſion. It is alſo to be made out, that they either do or may or are like to ſuffer unjuſtly, unleſs they are aſſiſted by the Auditory.

If theſe *Places* are wanting, we are to prove 'em deſtitute of all thoſe Felicities that other men enjoy, and that they never can be able to arrive at any thing of a happy Condition, unleſs the Auditory take pity upon 'em. And thus we incite to Compaſſion.

But we divert from pity by alledging the contraries, laying open the whole buſineſs, and by Proofs demonſtrating to the Auditory, that what they go about to do is unjuſt, illegal, pernicious, infamous, *&c.*

But he that would contradict the Perſwaſions of others, muſt lay down in his *Exordium* the Aſſertions of his adverſary, which he deſigns to oppoſe; what elſe he has to ſay muſt be done in ſeveral Prologues by themſelves. After the Prologues, he is to prove every one of the ſaid Aſſertions to be either falſe, or unjuſt, or illegal, or pernicious, nor conſentanous to what the adverſary exhorts. Which he muſt do by proving his Allegations of Falſhood, Injuſtice, Illegality, Perniciouſneſs, *&c.* And this is the cheifeſt way of Diſſwaſion.

But if this be not to be done, then make uſe of

of what remains: as if the adverſary Demonſtrate the thing to be juſt, endeavour thou to prove it infamous, or unprofitable, or irkſome, or impoſſible, or whatever elſe may be proper to thy purpoſe.

If the adverſary demonſtrates the thing to be profitable, do thou prove it to be unjuſt, or bring whatever other objection may ſtand thee in ſtead: magnifying thy own, and clouding the Arguments of thy adverſary. Nor will it be amiſs to make uſe of *Enthymemes* and Sentences, and at length to ſum up all in a Recapitulation, having firſt refuted the Anticipations of the Adverſary.

CHAP. XXXIV.

Of Praiſe and Diſpraiſe.

IN praiſing and diſpraiſing we are to order our Proems after the ſame manner as in the *Deliberative* kind. After the Proem we are to divide the benefits external to vertue, and the benefits internal in vertue. The benefits external to vertue are Health, Strength, Beauty, Wealth. Internal vertues are Wiſdom, Juſtice, Fortitude, and the more noble Sciences. Now we praiſe thoſe things that are ſeated and inherent in vertue. But as for the Strong, the Healthy, the Rich, the Beautiful and the High born, we do not applaud them, but we ſay that they are happy. Which things being diligently conſider'd, we order the Genealogy in the firſt place: for that, both as to men, and all other Creatures

is in the first place either noble or ignoble. And therefore we rightly begin the praises either of men or of any other Creature from their descent. But when we design to extol any affection, or thing, any Oration, or Estate, we praise what is most worthy Commendation in them.

From the Stock we derive our *Encomiums* thus. If his Progenitors were famous, we are to enumerate every one from the first of the race to the Person living, and of every one make some remarkable Observation. If the first were persons of Industry, and men of Renown, and that the rest were Persons never noted for any worthy Acts, we are to extol the first, and pass by the rest, pretending that by reason of the great number of his Ancestors, thou wilt not be tedious in ennumerating the whole Line: besides that it cannot be unknown to all men, that they who are born of generous Parents, generally tread the footsteps of their Fore-fathers. But if the first Progenitors were men of ill Fame, and the Father and Grandfather Persons of Renown, the first are to be omitted under pretence of Prolixity: and the last are to be applauded, not doubting but the Progenitors of such Persons were equal in value to them. But if there were nothing of Splendid Ancestry, praise the Person himself for his own Generosity and Bravery, adding, that all men are well born who are born to Vertue; and that they are to be preferr'd before all others, who are born to be the Ornaments of their own Parentage, and give lustre to their Ancestry; for that many times Persons born of Noble Parentage, degenerate.

The same Method is to be used in vilifying the Parentage of any Person. When

When we come to the Actions of the Perſon whom we applaud, we are firſt to begin with his Juſtice, then commend him for his Prudence, next for his Fortitude; and in every *Encomium*, it will not be amiſs to uſe many words, to render the Oration Splendid and Magnificent.

In villyfying, Ironies are of great uſe, and to deride the Adverſary in thoſe things for which he chiefly magnifies himſelf.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Of the ſorts of Queſtions.

INterrogation is chiefly uſeful againſt Contradictions. And they that Interrogate muſt begin in the ſame manner with thoſe that are accuſed. Where when we have brought proper pretences at the beginning for ſo doing, we are then to proceed to Interrogate. Now the Proper pretences in Civil Aſſemblies are, that we do not do it for contentions ſake, but to make the matter plain to the Auditory; and becauſe the Adverſary firſt began with us. Now in private Diſputes we are to alledge the Enmities, or the ill manners of the Perſons interrogated, or their Affection to the Adverſe party. In public Diſputes we muſt alledge Legality, Juſtice and Public profit.

The Proem thus fram'd out of theſe, and things like theſe, after we have propounded in order every one of the things done, ſaid, or

thought, we muſt make our Interrogations, and ſhew how they are contrary to Juſtice, to Law, to publick and private Profit; and then we muſt conſider all together, whether they are contrary to themſelves, to the Manners of good men, or ſuch as ſeem to be ſo.

But to avoid prolixity in ennumerating every one particularly one by one, how much the more we prove the Perſons interrogated to be averſe to ingenious Studies, to good Actions, or good Manners, by ſo much the more ſhall we render 'em obnoxious to the Auditors. Nor muſt we interrogate with a ſevere and moroſe Countenance; but a mild and winning Aſpect. By which means the Orators will avoid all pretence of Scandal, and their Orations will be the more acceptable to the People.

When we have diligently interrogated as much as is needful, and enlarg'd upon the Queſtions, then it will be requiſite to ſum up all at the concluſion, for the ſatisfaction of the Auditory.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

The Peroration.

NOW then it behoves thoſe that ſpeak and write, to deliver their Orations according to the Actions, and to accuſtom our ſelves to make uſe of all theſe things promptly and readily. How then to ſpeak Artificially both in private and public Diſputes, and in Converſe with others, we have here the moſt, and the moſt Artificial

cial aſſiſtances. But an Orator muſt not only be careful of his Words, but of his Life, to adorn it with the *Idea's* afore mention'd. For the care of a mans Life and Converſation avails as well to perſwaſion, as to the gaining of Eſteem and Reputation. Firſt then, we are to divide things according to the diviſion of true Diſcipline, what is to be handl'd in the firſt, and what in the ſecond, what in the third, and what in the fourth place. Then we are to make thoſe preparations which are neceſſary for the Auditors, as in the Chapter of *Exordiums*. For we may win favour to our Perſons if we keept conſtant to our Profeſſions, and preſerve the ſame friends while we live; not wavering in our Studies, but ſtill following the ſame courſe. We ſhall render the Auditors attentive, if our Subjects be always Important, Honourable and Profitable. Now having made the Auditory both kind and attentive, when we come to propoſe our Matter, whatever contains the diſwaſion from Evil, and the perſwaſion to Good, they will readily and eaſily admit, as being for their advantage, or elſe reject the contrary. Now to render thy Oration brief, perſpicuous and profitable, this is to be done. Thou ſhalt quickly conclude if thou doeſt not deſign to act all together, but the firſt, firſt of all, and the next in order. Thou wilt be perſpicuous, if thou makeſt an end of one thing before thou paſſeſt to another.

Thy Oration will be probable, if thou doeſt not act any thing contrary to thy own Genius, and the good opinion had of thee; and if thou doſt not pretend the ſame Perſons to be both thy Friends and Enemies:

Of Proofs, we are to make choice of thoſe which

which we know to be ſo proper to accompliſh our buſineſs, that we are able to explain 'em to others: but as for ſuch as we have not real knowlege of, to take thoſe as they moſt frequently happen. For thou ſhall act moſt ſecurely in things of this nature, if thou art guided by cuſtom.

In Diſputes with the Adverſary, if we contend by way Oration, we muſt make out our Proofs out of thoſe things that are ſpoken.

But if the Diſpute be about Contracts, we are to proceed according to the Laws both written and unwritten, with the choiceſt witneſſes, and at a time perfix'd.

And in the Concluſion we ſhall the better imprint into the Memory of the Auditors, what has been ſpoken, if we make a brief and ſummary Repetition.

Of our Actions we ſhall put 'em in mind, when we handle the ſame again, or like the former.

We ſhall win the good will of the Auditory, if we act thoſe things by which they have receiv'd, or do or are like to receive any Benefit. And we ſhall act great things if we undertake Actions that are the Cauſes of many and honorable events. And theſe are the Preparations we muſt make toward a vertuous Life: the former Treatiſes concern'd the Exerciſes of Eloquence.

FINIS.

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